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Abstract of the Thesis  
 
 
This thesis examines Nietzsche’s model of subjectivity, with a particular focus on the 
process of self-regulation. Self-regulation is to be understood as the maintenance of the 
psychological stability or ‘well-being’ of an individual, especially in the face of adverse 
circumstances. I suggest that self-regulation provides us with a more intelligible means 
of exploring the philosophical psychology Nietzsche provides than self-formation. The 
reason for this is twofold: (i) self-regulation is a phenomenon exhibited by all individuals, 
not just elite, ‘higher’ types, who are singled out by Nietzsche, as being capable of the task 
of self-formation, and (ii) we can identify distinct psychological mechanisms involved in 
this process of self-regulation, in contrast to the somewhat obscure notion of ‘becoming 
what you are’. The thesis explores key psychological mechanisms involved in regulating 
a self, namely forgetting, autobiographical memory, and self-deception. The capacities 
implicated in these regulatory processes can be seen to possess a different functional 
profile to that of a drive or an affect. The thesis thus supplements current drive-based 
accounts which have so far dominated discussions of Nietzsche’s model of the self, by 
further exploring different structures within the self, and their operations. Outlining the 
interactions between these regulatory capacities, and the drives and affects, enables us 
to have a richer understanding of how a self may develop itself through interpretation, 
incorporation, and extirpation. Finally, the thesis offers a taxonomy of the characteristics 
of self-regulation by triangulating this notion with Nietzsche’s concept of health. This will 
show how self-regulation can be linked with marks of Nietzschean health such as 
incorporation, providing a necessary condition for self-formation in strong, artistic, 
‘higher’ types. However, the thesis will also show that self-regulation can come apart from 
health, concluding that self-regulation emerges as a necessary but not sufficient condition 
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i. The Project  
 
When examining Nietzsche’s understanding of subjectivity, commentators have tended 
to view Nietzsche’s stance on the self as going hand in hand with his notion of self-
formation or ‘becoming what you are’. This thesis will instead examine Nietzsche’s model 
of subjectivity via an alternative process in the self, namely self-regulation, and suggest 
that the activity of self-regulation provides us with a more intelligible means of exploring 
Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology than self-formation.  
The reason for shifting the focus from self-formation to self-regulation is twofold. Firstly, 
the exact nature of self-formation is fraught. There is no clear consensus on what this 
process consists in and the accounts can vary widely; May (2009) appeals to drive 
psychology, and takes self-formation to be a unification of the multiplicity of drives by a 
master drive within the self, whilst Nehamas (1985) understands the process in highly 
aestheticized terms, where the individual ‘blends’ his actions into a perfectly coherent 
whole via the medium of literature. Often the notion of self-formation is tied up with ideas 
of freedom and agency, (notions which are themselves somewhat contested). Some 
commentators such as Leiter (2001), doubt the very possibility of self-formation, 
claiming that it is not consistent with Nietzsche’s characterisation of drives as fixed. 
Others, such as Katsafanas (2012), have tried to allay this concern by drawing upon the 
idea that consciousness, as distinct from the drives, and causally efficacious, can open up 
the possibility of self-formation. Self-formation is also often aligned with ideas of self-
knowledge or self-understanding, the status of which appears ambiguous in Nietzsche’s 
writings. The very notion of self-formation thus appears deeply mysterious, and it is not 
clear how deeply this process is meant to operate, i.e. whether self-formation amounts to 
self-styling in the sense of taking up second-order attitudes against one’s character, or 




Secondly, self-formation is reserved for the few. Often characterised as an achievement 
or an ideal, Nietzsche envisages this phenomenon as open only to the ‘higher’ men: 
artistic types who have a specific psychological constitution, e.g. Goethe is one of the few 
singled out as having achieved this ideal (TI ‘Skirmishes of an Untimely Man’ 49). It is not 
an option for everyone. Trying to understand the self via a notion of such exclusivity may 
not teach us very much about the range of operations available in the philosophical 
psychology Nietzsche outlines. Focusing on self-formation may be restrictive in this 
sense.  
Self-regulation, by contrast, is something which every individual exhibits (albeit in 
varying degrees of efficiency). How should we understand self-regulation? This notion 
can have various connotations, e.g. self-control, self-managing, self-monitoring, and it can 
be applied to spheres as diverse as behaviour, impulses, emotions, thoughts, and health. 
Within the context of Nietzsche’s thought, self-regulation is often aligned with the idea of 
self-control relating to one’s drives, and the Sovereign Individual is sometimes seen as a 
model of this kind of self-regulation through the notion of promise-keeping, 
responsibility, and commitment.  However, commentators such as Acampora (2006) 
raise concerns about attributing too much weight to the Sovereign Individual, suggesting 
that this notion is too idealistic and Kantian in flavour, with its associated concepts of 
autonomy and responsibility.  
To avoid these concerns, I instead take self-regulation to be broadly construed as the 
maintenance of the individual’s psychological stability or ‘well-being’, especially in the 
face of challenging circumstances.  This process thus relates specifically to the 
individual’s mental economy. Self-regulation, understood this way, inevitably brings up 
the notion of health, a concept which preoccupied Nietzsche throughout his writings. 
After outlining various means of self-regulation available in the Nietzschean self, the 
thesis concludes by arguing that Nietzsche’s concept of health emerges as a higher ideal, 
and that these two notions can come apart. Self-regulation can be seen as a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for health.  
I will suggest that self-regulation can be achieved in a number of ways, and that it can be 
found in both, by Nietzsche’s lights, healthy (e.g. the nobles in On the Genealogy of 




in the Genealogy). We will see how self-regulation can be linked with other marks of 
Nietzschean health such as incorporation and reinterpretation, and that in such cases 
where self-regulation occurs (i.e. in strong, healthy, artistic types), it provides a necessary 
condition for self-formation (where this notion is understood as involving 
interpretation). In this way, before even addressing the notion of self-formation, we need 
to first investigate the prior and fundamental process of self-regulation.  
Examining the process of self-regulation will shed light on different structures within a 
Nietzschean self.  With regards to the content of a Nietzschean self, the drives and affects 
have tended to be the main focus of commentators, e.g. Leiter 2002, 2007, Gemes 2009, 
Risse 2005, who characterise these as the basic explanatory items in Nietzsche’s 
philosophical psychology. Though some commentators allow for other cognitive 
capacities (e.g. the intellect or consciousness, which may interact with the drives and 
affects), there has not been a sustained discussion of the capacities explored in this thesis, 
namely, forgetting, autobiographical memory, and imagination. I suggest that these 
capacities possess a different functional profile to that of a drive or an affect, and tap into 
the different kinds of attitudes a self can exhibit, which include, as Janaway (2009:52) 
suggests: ‘not only the standard beliefs and desires of current-day moral psychology, but 
also “wills”, feelings, sensations, moods, imaginings, memories, valuations, convictions, 
and more’. Without further exploration of these capacities, and how they interact with 
the drives and affects, we will not have a full picture of a Nietzschean self, and accounts 
may appear too thin in relation to Nietzsche’s practical philosophy. We will see how these 
methods of self-regulation have important implications for other Nietzschean notions 
such as Amor Fati, the Eternal Return, and Nietzsche’s call for reinterpretation. In this 
way, self-regulation used as a prism to explore Nietzsche’s views on the self, can help 
bridge the gap (cf. Gardner 2009) between his theoretical and practical philosophy.  
 
ii. Methodological Preliminaries  
 
With regards to methodology, Nietzsche’s works have been consulted in the original, 
alongside established translations. When attempting to reconstruct arguments from the 




often than not, bringing out different nuances of a word will affect the interpretation of 
an entire passage. Where appropriate, I have amended the translation for key terms.  
The canonical status of the Nachlass is obviously fraught. In light of this, I have, for the 
most part, stayed within the published works. I believe that the most forceful and 
considered arguments or remarks made by Nietzsche on the topic of the self are to be 
found within the published works. Moreover, there are more than enough substantive 
passages to examine and interpret within these works alone. When constructing my own 
arguments and interpretations, I have been keen to avoid attributing any undue 
explanatory or argumentative weight to fragments from the Nachlass, and I have sought 
to engage with commentators who also place the bulk of their discussion upon the 
published works.  
Nietzsche is a notoriously unsystematic thinker, something which has tended to split 
commentators regarding how best to approach his writings. Preserving historical 
accuracy and contextualisation on the one hand, with extracting philosophical insights 
and conceptual coherence on the other, can be a tricky balance to maintain.  
I have endeavoured to combine close exegetical reading, with occasional use of 
contemporary analytic philosophy as a tool for illuminating aspects of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy. I have found that the latter can provide a useful prism through which to 
contest, develop, and reconstruct elements of Nietzsche’s thought.  Given the focus of this 
thesis, not to make use of relevant material from contemporary debates in philosophy of 
mind, philosophy of emotion, and epistemology to enrich and develop my interpretations, 
seemed amiss. In doing so, however, I have been careful to avoid either attributing 
anachronistic readings to Nietzsche, or attempts to ‘shoe-horn’ him into contemporary 
debates. Rather, I hope to have offered an exploratory project into Nietzsche’s insights 
regarding subjectivity and self-regulation, with the aid of some analytic conceptual tools. 
iii. Thesis Outline  
 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. I motivate the project by examining how 
commentators’ treatment of the Nietzschean self has tended to revolve around the issue 




regulation may provide a better framework for examining Nietzsche’s remarks on the 
self.  I then examine three methods of self-regulation within the self, namely forgetting, 
autobiographical memory, and self-deception, the capacities involved, and the effects 
these mechanisms have within the subject’s mental economy. In this way, I explore 
components of Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology other than the drives and the affects, 
and examine how these capacities interact with the drives and affects.  The final chapter 
brings together the three previous chapters in offering a characterisation of self-
regulation in general, exploring how this differs from Nietzsche’s concept of health, and 
how it provides the necessary psychological conditions for health.  
Chapter One offers a review of contemporary debates in analytic philosophy regarding 
the status of the self in Nietzsche. I discuss the recent trend of interpreting Nietzsche as 
a naturalistic thinker (Leiter 2002, 2007, 2012), and the advantages and disadvantages 
of such an approach. I then examine the transcendental approach (Gardner 2009a), 
cognitivist accounts (Katsafanas 2005, 2012, 2013, and Janaway 2009, 2012), and 
accounts which focus on the idea of a self as an achievement (Gemes 2009a and Anderson 
2012). I evaluate the extent to which these accounts provide a comprehensive analysis of 
Nietzsche’s views on the self, and examine what motivates the debate for each of these 
commentators, be it normativity, agency, intentionality, or consciousness.  
I suggest that the debate can appear unclear, and often conflates conceptions of the self. I 
argue that this is largely due to: (i) commentators working with differing interpretations 
of key notions like free will, or consciousness, and (ii) the fact that each model assumes a 
different understanding of self-formation.  
I suggest that focusing on self-formation is a somewhat problematic way of approaching 
the debate, since it is not clear what Nietzsche had in mind with this notion, and it is a 
process which is limited to a few individuals. As such, it may not provide us with an 
exhaustive analysis of Nietzsche’s views on the self. These concerns motivate the need for 
a new approach: I suggest that the concept of self-regulation may be fruitful here, and 
that this calls for an examination of structures within the philosophical psychology 





Chapter Two examines in detail Nietzsche’s account of active forgetting, and argues that 
it is a key regulatory procedure within the self, conducive to Nietzsche’s understanding 
of health. Nietzsche presents what seems like an idiosyncratic understanding of 
forgetting. Contrary to the notion of forgetting as a passive, degenerative process, 
associated with decline and incapacity, i.e. poor memory performance, Nietzsche offers 
us a far more nuanced, and more importantly positive, understanding of forgetting.  
Drawing on recent studies in cognitive science, in particular the theory of ‘motivated 
forgetting’ (Anderson 2014), I suggest that Nietzsche’s understanding of forgetting is best 
understood as an operative subconscious capacity (akin to, for example, a language 
faculty, i.e. functioning but beneath our conscious control).  Prima facie the idea of active 
forgetting appears paradoxical, but when it is understood as a capacity, we can see that 
Nietzsche provides us with a philosophical psychology which does not in fact meet this 
paradox.  
I then explore the structure and operations of this capacity, and how it has a different 
functional profile to that of a drive. I argue that forgetting does not fit the criteria of a 
drive outlined by commentators such as Anderson (2012), Katsafanas (2005, 2012, 2016) 
and Janaway (2009). I suggest that this forgetting capacity is responsive to, and recruited 
by the drives in order to reach their ends, forming subordinate relational structures. I 
then examine the most important role forgetting has within the self as a regulatory ‘deep-
clean’ procedure, and why this process is required. I also discuss how the Nietzschean 
account of forgetting importantly differs from the Freudian model. Forgetting frees up 
space in the mental economy via alterations of the affective valence of memories. Such 
space is vital for the re-interpretative process and allows new values to displace old ones.  
I also explore the importance of this revised model of Nietzschean forgetting to the 
understanding of several other Nietzschean themes such as the Eternal Recurrence and 
Amor Fati, both key components of his practical philosophy.  
Chapter Three explores the role of autobiographical memory in the self. 
Autobiographical memory can be understood as a type of memory which relates to an 
individual’s personal past, and which necessarily carries a first-person perspective. 
Within the context of a Nietzschean self, autobiographical memory can be seen as a plastic 




as a case-study, I propose that autobiographical memory emerges as an important factor 
in constituting a narrative self for Nietzsche, and goes some way to allowing us to locate 
the sense of first-person subjectivity required for such a self. Although Ecce Homo has 
often been viewed as a highly aestheticized instance of self-formation, I will use it solely 
as an example of autobiographical memory as it functions broadly.  
I argue that the use of autobiographical memory, and the ensuing narrative in Ecce Homo 
allows for the following: 1) an awareness of a self persisting throughout time, 2) a degree 
of self-knowledge regarding past perspectives, and 3) a sense of first-person perspective 
which is tied to affectivity.  
In terms of self-regulation, a narrative self allows us to make sense of the question ‘who 
am I?’, a question which preoccupies Nietzsche in Ecce Homo. The idea of a narrative self 
provides us with a degree of coherence or unity, a means of evaluating ourselves, and (in 
healthy individuals) a means of incorporating experiences in such a way that, through the 
interactions between autobiographical memory and the drives, our self-esteem is 
safeguarded, as a celebratory, triumphant narrative emerges.  
In this way, Ecce Homo emerges as a good example of how the self can recuperate and 
regulate itself through this use of autobiographical memory 
Chapter Four then turns to an example of ‘unhealthy’ self-regulation found in the 
Genealogy, namely the self-deception of the slaves. I begin by offering a taxonomy of the 
self-deceptive beliefs present in the Genealogy¸ drawing a distinction between the slaves’ 
value-facing beliefs (‘I believe that humility is intrinsically good’), and their person-facing 
beliefs (‘I am humble’), and exploring how these beliefs can be maintained.  
I suggest that the greatest potential threat to the slaves’ self-deception is their affective 
experiences, namely their emotions such as vengefulness, hatred, anger (and the 
particular intensity/frequency/duration of these emotions), which run the risk of 
undermining their self-deceptive person-facing beliefs. In this way, it is possible that the 
subject’s phenomenology alone may call their self-deceptive beliefs into question, as it 
would be seen to directly undermine their beliefs about their moral character. This kind 
of tension would need to be alleviated in some way in order to allow the self-deception 




I argue that the conflict between the slaves’ self-deceptive person-facing beliefs, and their 
high-intensity affective experiences is not accommodated for by deflationary accounts of 
self-deception e.g. Mele 2000. I suggest that Nietzsche gestures towards one possible 
means of resolving this tension between affective states and person-facing beliefs, 
namely via the mechanism of pretense.  
I outline what constitutes a pretense-state in the Genealogy, and how they are to be 
differentiated from belief-states. Pretense here is broadly understood as an imagined-
state, which plays an intermediary role between the subject’s affective states and their 
beliefs. I suggest that these pretense-states modify the subject’s affective states, e.g. 
vengefulness, such that they are brought into line with the subject’s self-deceptive beliefs. 
Modification of these affective states, however, should not be understood as an actual 
transformation in kind of the emotion, but rather as a second-order reinterpretation of 
it.  
The pretense-states in the Genealogy take the form of rich, vivid narratives (cf. GM I:15). 
I argue that because of their narrative richness and pretense’s ability to generate affective 
responses (cf. Moran 1994, Gendler 2007), these pretense-states are more effective than, 
for example, additional belief-states in easing possible cognitive dissonance. The 
imaginary simulation of, e.g. revenge present in these narratives provides the slaves with 
something close to fictional emotions. This enables the slaves, in an acceptable context, 
to actively engage with, rather than repress or remove emotions of hatred, anger, 
vengefulness. The narratives allow the slaves to view their emotions as justified, i.e. these 
are the emotions experienced by ‘the virtuous’ and ‘the blessed’ who have been wronged. 
Self-deception (understood as involving pretense-states) emerges as a crucial means of 
self-regulation for the slaves in the face of adverse circumstances, allowing them to 
reinterpret their phenomenology.  
Chapter Five aims to identify the key features of the self-regulation process in a 
Nietzschean self, and argues that self-regulation emerges as a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for Nietzsche’s distinctive understanding of health. I argue against defining self-
regulation as strength or flourishing, and suggest that whilst it initially appears to be 




angulating self-regulation with health, I argue that we can come to understand self-
regulation as an independent notion, whilst also providing a more fine-grained 
understanding of Nietzschean health. 
I argue against defining health by reducing it to other Nietzschean concepts like 
overcoming (Letteri 1990), or interpretation (Neuhouser forthcoming). This approach is 
too broad, and it is often unclear what work the concept ‘health’ is serving in these 
accounts. This approach also admits cases as ‘healthy’ which Nietzsche himself 
emphasizes are sick. I suggest that this is a result of focusing on passages where Nietzsche 
discusses health in abstract terms, and that we ought to shift our focus onto the distinct 
case-studies of health and sickness which Nietzsche provides, for example the nobles and  
slaves in the Genealogy. I then explore the consequences of an alternative approach to 
defining health, namely considering the normative dimension to formal and dynamic 
drive accounts of health (Huddleston 2017).  I suggest that, whilst this approach is 
generally helpful in explaining why individuals are classified as sick or healthy in 
Nietzschean terms, there are certain cases in which it appears that the health of an 
individual is somewhat fixed, and that the option of amelioration or recovery from 
sickness is ruled out.  
Using case-studies from the Genealogy, I then demonstrate how self-regulation can come 
apart from health. I discuss: (i) the possibility of self-regulation in sickness, using the 
example of the slaves, and (ii) an instance of fragile self-regulation in health as seen in the 
nobles, identifying the key mechanisms involved in both cases. I then offer a taxonomy of 
the self-regulation process, outlining general methods, namely interpretation, 
incorporation, and extirpation, and the key characteristics which emerge, namely 
stability/endurance/resilience, productivity and functional efficiency, adaptivity, and 
physiological/psychological integrity. The fact that efficient self-regulation can occur 
independently of health goes some way to explain why Nietzsche presents the sick as the 
‘greatest danger to man’ (GM III:14). Finally, I suggest that the idea that self-regulation is 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for health is of some assistance in illuminating 










The nature of the self is of central importance in Nietzsche’s philosophy: it is a theme to 
which he returns throughout his writings, and it serves as the bedrock for aspects of his 
thought such as his critique of morality. As such, Nietzsche’s views on the self and 
subjectivity have been the focus of much debate in recent scholarship. This chapter offers 
a review of how analytic commentators have approached this debate. Much of the 
discussion has revolved around whether, and how, a self is able to engage in self-
formation. At times, this question is addressed directly, at others it is implicit in the 
treatment of Nietzsche’s remarks. It is not clear however, that there is any general 
consensus regarding what self-formation in fact amounts to, and this is reflected in the 
variety of ways in which Nietzsche’s remarks have been interpreted. As a result, the 
debate can appear unclear, and often conflates different conceptions of selfhood.  
This chapter will suggest that these confusions in current scholarship arise partly due to 
a tendency to frame the investigation with this question of self-formation. This is 
problematic for two reasons: a) it is not clear exactly what Nietzsche had in mind with 
the notion of self-formation, and b) self-formation is not an option for all individuals: 
Nietzsche only singles out ‘higher’ men as capable of such an activity, cf. Goethe in TI 
‘Skirmishes’ 49. Due to the exclusivity of self-formation, viewing the debate through this 
particular lens may not yield an exhaustive account of Nietzsche’s model of a self. In 
addition, the majority of the accounts examined in this chapter restrict their discussion 
to the drives and affects (though some allow for other cognitive capacities).  As such, we 
may not be able to fully account for processes such as reinterpretation, which Nietzsche 
takes to be part of what it means to be a self. It therefore seems that we need to open up 
the discussion to involve other components of the philosophical psychology Nietzsche 
provides, and that we need to find a different way of approaching this investigation, 






Before assessing the debate, it is worth considering whether this enterprise of modelling 
a Nietzsche self is feasible, and if so, the kind of considerations which should be kept in 
mind. 
 Various models of the self have been put forward, which purport to be representative of 
Nietzsche’s views on the self across his entire oeuvre. It is not obvious, however, that a 
single, unified view on this subject is to be found in his works. The opinions Nietzsche 
espouses in his earlier works such as Daybreak, and later works such as Beyond Good and 
Evil, are not always consistent. His emerging views on the self depend greatly upon his 
stance regarding, for example, free will, causal determinism, compatibilism, 
incompatibilism, many of which appear to be modified in later works (discussed by 
Katsafanas: 2012). It is necessary to take these modifications into account when 
attempting to construct a model of the self. We must therefore ask whether it is even 
possible to extract a coherent, consistent model of the self from Nietzsche’s works. As 
Williams (1994:66) notes, Nietzsche’s writings are often ‘booby-trapped not only against 
recovering theory from it, but, in many cases, against any systematic exegesis that 
assimilates it to theory.’ Stern (2015) even argues that Nietzsche is far more concerned 
with attacking prevailing models of the self than constructing his own positive model.  
Alongside changing opinions over time, we also find contradictions regarding topics such 
as free will (sometimes even within a single text), but these can often be resolved or 
explained by identifying a qualified interpretation of these topics, i.e. Nietzsche is 
targeting a specific conception of free will over other conceptions. It will therefore be 
important to identify which specific conceptions of the following Nietzsche targets: ‘I’, the 
‘soul’, ‘free will’, ‘agency’, ‘responsibility’, ‘consciousness’, ‘autonomy’, ‘unity’.  
The models discussed in this chapter appear to be motivated by very different concerns. 
There is little consensus on what it is for a self to be a self per se, let alone what it is to be 
a Nietzschean self. Gardner (2010), for example, takes the debate to be about normativity; 
for Katsafanas (2012) it is to do with conscious willing; whilst for Anderson (2012), the 
issue is the ‘I’. For Gemes (2009a), and Janaway (2012), both of whom suggest that 




is on a self qua task or achievement. Due to the fact that these interpretations have 
differing concerns, at times the debate can appear unclear, and conflates conceptions of 
the self and/or self-formation.  
The models of the self discussed here are all placed against the background of the 
naturalism debate in Nietzsche. Leiter’s influential Nietzsche on Morality (2002) seeks to 
show Nietzsche’s unwavering commitments to naturalism, and regards any departures 
from the naturalistic interpretation as trivial. In this way, Leiter takes very seriously 
Nietzsche’s claim in BGE 230 to ‘translate man back into nature’.  
Leiter is left with an unreservedly fatalistic reading of Nietzsche with little room for 
notions like creativity, agency, autonomy, or responsibility. Should we wish to integrate 
a Nietzschean self into a normative framework, it seems that the naturalistic reading will 
be somewhat unattractive. Many of the alternative models here are keen to avoid this 
interpretation, and attempt to show that a strict naturalistic reading of Nietzsche, aside 
from being unsatisfying regarding practical and axiological contexts, does not cohere 
with many of the passages in Nietzsche’s works where he criticises the ‘clumsy 
naturalists’ (BGE 12), and is unable to allow for any notion of self-formation.  
In examining the various models, I will discuss the following: a) what exactly each 
interpretation takes the debate to be about, b) the extent to which they offer an 
exhaustive analysis of the philosophical psychology Nietzsche provides, and c) what they 
have to say about the idea of self-formation.  
The first section will examine two opposing accounts: the naturalistic account espoused 
by Leiter (2002), and the transcendentalist account put forward by Gardner (2009).  
 
1.1 The Naturalistic Account (Leiter 2002)  
 
At one end of the spectrum, Leiter’s naturalistic reading of Nietzsche offers a view of the 
self where self-formation is effectively ruled out. Leiter (2002:8) attributes to Nietzsche 
a ‘Doctrine of Types’, whereby ‘each person has a fixed psycho-physical constitution 




merely as a bundle of drives and affects: ‘soul as social structure of the drives and affects’ 
(BGE 12). There is nothing above and beyond these components. The individual’s 
conscious life is reduced to what Leiter calls ‘type-facts’, i.e. facts about the physiology 
and unconscious psychology of human beings. These type facts are, according to Leiter’s 
interpretation (2001:287), ‘causally primary in fixing the trajectory of that person’s life.’  
This has several notable consequences. Firstly, the causal primacy of the type-facts 
ensures that free will does not exist for us. We are fully determined beings at the mercy 
of our type-facts which are fixed from birth.  Here, Leiter takes ‘free will’ to be free will 
causa sui, unconstrained by causal factors – an incompatibilist view. Qua conscious self 
or ‘agent’, the individual does not play an active role.1 
Instead the individual is ‘an arena in which the struggle of drives (type-facts) is played 
out; how they play out determines what he believes, what he values, what he becomes’ 
(2002:100). Leiter refers to a passage from Daybreak to reinforce this interpretation:  
 [T]hat one wants to combat the vehemence of a drive at all, however, does not 
stand within our own power; nor does the choice of any particular method; nor 
does the success or failure of this method. What is clearly the case is that in this 
entire procedure our intellect is only the blind instrument of another drive, 
which is a rival of the drive whose vehemence is tormenting us. ... While “we” 
believe we are complaining about the vehemence of a drive, at bottom it is one 
drive which is complaining about the other; that is to say: for us to become 
aware that we are suffering from the vehemence of a drive presupposes the 
existence of another equally vehement or even more vehement drive, and that 
a struggle is in prospect in which our intellect is going to have to take sides.  
(D 109)  
Secondly, consciousness is not causally effective and is reduced to mere epiphenomenon 
- a ‘phantom’.   
                                                        
 
1 Leiter does not seem to consider other conceptions of free will such as compatibilist views or the idea that 
we may possess free will in a limited sense in so far as our lives have various possible trajectories but we 




The 'inner world' is full of illusions and phantasms: will is one of them. The will 
does not do anything anymore, and so it does not explain anything anymore 
either - it just accompanies processes, but it can be absent as well. The so-called 
'motive': another error. Just a surface phenomenon of consciousness, an 'after-
the-fact' that hides the antecedentia of an act more than it reveals them... What 
follows from this? There are no mental causes whatsoever.  
(TI ‘The Four Great Errors’ 3) 
Leiter draws our attention to Nietzsche’s claim that ‘a thought comes when ‘it’ wishes, 
and not when ‘I’ wish’ (BGE 17), to further vindicate his argument for the 
epiphenomenality of consciousness. Here, it is made clear that consciousness has no 
causal autonomy: ‘while a person’s conscious states may be part of the causal chain 
leading up to action, they play that role only in virtue of type-facts about the person’ 
(2002:92). We may believe an action to have been caused by some conscious state or 
other, but in reality the action has been caused by some non-conscious state, be it a drive 
or a physiological state. Leiter therefore holds that it is a mistake to ‘conceive of ourselves 
as exercising our will’ (2007:7). In this way, something like valuing cannot be classed as 
an instance of cognising: there is no rational connection with cognitive activity, instead 
all we experience is an expression of a drive or physiological fact. Values then are 
explained psychologically or physiologically via antecedent, non-normative, efficient 
causal conditions.   
Thirdly, the self is not sufficiently transparent for us to make any claims regarding the 
motives of the agent’s actions. Actions are unknowable since ‘nothing…can be more 
incomplete than [one’s] image of the totality of drives which constitute [a man’s] being’ 
(D 119). We simply do not have epistemic access to what the causally effective motives 
really are. As a result of this epistemic opacity, we cannot assess actions in terms of their 
motives.  
It is worth at this point examining exactly how Leiter conceives of consciousness. We may 
think of consciousness in the following ways: 1) awakeness/awareness, 2) reflection, 3) 
self-consciousness, or 4) conscious willing. Leiter, in his account, does not discuss these 
various nuances. Instead, he assumes that consciousness amounts to conscious willing, 




argues is epiphenomenal. He views the content of experience solely due to the function 
of the drives, as opposed to conscious willing: in this sense, our actions are not products 
of consciousness.  However, it is not obvious that should we define consciousness in a 
different way, e.g. awareness, that Leiter would be able to claim that it is epiphenomenal. 
Consciousness qua awareness or awakeness appears as a necessary condition for 
experiencing the world, and one which is not necessarily epiphenomenal. On this 
definition, consciousness is a passive feature of the self: it plays an information role as 
opposed to a directional role, since it does not feature as a motivational factor in agency.  
As discussed above, Leiter draws on the following quotation from Nietzsche to 
substantiate his argument against conscious willing: ‘a thought comes when ‘it’ wishes, 
not when ‘I’ wish’. However, as Katsafanas (2005) notes, this quotation is taken out of 
context:  
A thought comes when ‘it’ wishes, not when ‘I’ wish, so that it is a falsification 
of the facts of the case to say that the subject ‘I’ is the condition of the predicate 
‘think’. It thinks; but that this ‘it’ is precisely the famous old ‘Ego’ is, to put it 
mildly, only a supposition, an assertion, and assuredly not an ‘immediate 
certainty’. After all, one has even gone too far with this ‘it thinks’—even the ‘it’ 
contains an interpretation of the process and does not belong to the process 
itself.  
(BGE 17) 
 If we examine the entire passage it appears that: 
Nietzsche is not concerned, here, with the question of whether conscious states 
are causally efficacious in their own right. Rather, he is attacking the idea that 
there is a substantive faculty, an Ego, standing behind conscious thoughts and 
generating them ex nihilo. 
(2005:11) 
Katsafanas goes on to argue that Leiter equivocates between: 1) attacks on consciousness 
as a faculty, and 2) attacks on consciousness as a property of mental states. We should 
not, however, assume that the denial of consciousness qua faculty, i.e. qua Ego which 




states are epiphenomenal. This is further supported by the fact that Nietzsche seems to, 
as Katsafanas suggests, offer an account of conscious states which does not depend upon 
a commitment to such a faculty. 
Leiter’s interpretation leaves us with a self that is static, reductive, fatalistic, and passive: 
a picture which seems at odds with the idea of ‘becoming what you are’ and self-
formation. One feature of this account which particularly undermines the possibility of 
self-formation, is the status of conscious thought. Leiter’s characterisation of conscious 
thought seems to leave no room for any meaningful engagement with normativity, 
something which might be required for the idea of self-formation.  
Gardner (2010), crystallises this concern by discussing the relation between conscious 
thought, judgement, and legislation. He argues that the naturalistic interpretation 
encounters difficulties regarding the self-understanding of the Nietzschean subject: what 
exactly does such a subject understand itself to be doing when it legislates? Gardner views 
legislation as the curation of values, whereby the individual can change their 
configuration of values in response to rational consideration.  
On Leiter’s picture, however, legislation occurs outside of any framework of rational 
norms. Any valuation is regarded as the expression of the causal effects of psychological 
or physiological facts about the individual. The subject is therefore expected to recognise 
that there is no rational warrant for taking valuation to be anything more than an 
expression of these pre-normative natural forces, and that the subject qua conscious 
agent plays no role in legislation.  
Given that Nietzsche repeatedly encourages the creation, and innovation of values in his 
writings, the naturalistic model seems deeply unsatisfying. Revaluating and creating 
value is a fundamentally discriminatory activity, in that it is the postulating of one thing 
as better than another. This requires judgement which in turn requires some kind of 
rational reflective activity. Such an activity would surely incur disagreement as to which 
values are better than others.  In response to this, Leiter claims that, for Nietzsche, the 
world is ‘value-less’, and that the above problem will only arise if we think there are 




on value, i.e. nothing has value in itself. On this reading, it would be impossible to sustain 
any disagreement as regards which values are better than others.  
Leiter draws our attention to a passage in The Wagner Case, where Nietzsche describes 
‘noble’ and Christian morality as ‘opposing forms in the optics of value [Werthe]’, and 
asserts that, as opposites they ‘are…immune to reasons and refutations. One cannot 
refute Christianity; one cannot refute a disease of the eye…. The concepts ‘true’ and 
‘untrue’ have, as it seems to me, no meaning in optics’ (WC Epilogue). Here, Leiter (2013), 
claims that Nietzsche is suggesting: 
there may be rational grounds for thinking one view better than another, 
perhaps for thinking one true and the other false, but since reasoning has so 
little impact in this context, it is “meaningless” (in the sense of pointless) to 
raise issues of truth and falsity. 
In other words, Leiter takes Nietzsche to be claiming that evaluative judgements are 
immune to the effects of reasoning, and that instead judgements about values are just 
expressions of drives. ‘Higher types’ or ‘free spirits’ will have no issue with understanding 
that ‘this is good’ has no ground beyond their ‘deeming it to be good’ (Leiter: 2010).  
 However, Leiter’s response is somewhat unsatisfactory. To say that for Nietzsche the 
world is ‘value-less’ seems too crude a claim. We may concede that Nietzsche argues 
against values conceived of as eternal, transcendental and objective qua 
Platonist/Christian conceptions of values, but throughout his works he is careful to 
elevate Tugenden– virtues.2 Tugend for Nietzsche is closely related to the Greek αρετή -
arete (excellence or virtue), and is presented as something which is achievable by certain 
types. In a notebook of 1888 Nietzsche outlines a list of Tugenden:  
The affirmative aspects: pride, joy, health, love of the sexes, enmity and war, 
reverence, beautiful gestures, manners and objects, strong will, the discipline 
                                                        
 
2 Here Leiter (2010) may respond by dismissing such passages as rhetoric which ‘does not really suggest 
realism about the content, but rather desperation on the part of the author to reach an increasingly distant 
and uninterested audience.’ However, I would argue that the frequency with which Nietzsche returns to 




of high spirituality, will to power, gratitude toward earth and life – everything 
that is rich and desires to bestow and that replenishes and gilds and 
immortalises and deifies life- the whole force of transfiguring virtues, 
everything that declares good and affirms in word and deed. 
 (KSA 13, 14 [11]) 
The cultivation of such virtues surely requires an element of judgement. Even if an 
individual qua ‘type’ is predisposed to ‘deem this to be good,’ this very idea of ‘deeming’ 
seems to call for rational engagement on the part of the individual. Leiter’s notion that 
valuing, as an expression of ‘type-facts’ does not occur as an instance of cognising will 
find the following passage to be problematic:  
The misunderstanding of passion and reason, as if the latter were an 
independent entity and not rather a system of relations between various 
passions and desires; and as if every passion did not possess its quantum of 
reason.  
(WP 397) 
Leiter’s interpretation certainly accounts for the first half of this passage, but neglects to 
incorporate the second half: ‘as if every passion did not possess its quantum of reason’. 
Here, it would appear that Nietzsche is indeed suggesting that rational activity also has a 
part to play in action, and that it interacts with the drives and affects. Leiter’s account 
filters out any notion of conscious thought, and reduces it to mere epiphenomenon, but it 
is not obvious in the above passage that Nietzsche is adopting such a view.  Leiter’s model 
of the self therefore seems overly crude: a closer examination of the drives, affects, and 
conscious thought is required.  
Leiter’s naturalistic account, by ruling out the idea that conscious thought has any causal 
efficacy, appears deterministic3, and as such, does not allow any room for self-formation, 
                                                        
 
3 Leiter may object and try to soften his determinism somewhat by adding that an individual’s type-facts 
enumerate a range of possible life trajectories, and that external factors such as ‘environment and 
circumstances’ can significantly accentuate or inhibit the expression of an individual’s type-facts. However, 




development, or amelioration. He straightforwardly interprets Nietzsche’s formulation 
‘how one becomes what one is’ in Ecce Homo as fatalistic, suggesting that this is carried 
out by ‘making no special effort directed towards that end, because one becomes what one 
is necessarily’ (2002: 86). Not only does this interpretation make the formulation circular 
and uninformative, i.e. what one is, is whatever one becomes, but such a reading does not 
quite tie in with the fact that Nietzsche often renders the formulation in the imperative 
form. Employing the formulation as an injunction suggests that Nietzsche is attempting 
to persuade us to act- to do something, and that if we fail to deliver, then there is the 
chance that we will not ‘become what we are.’  
The notion of self-formation certainly appears in Nietzsche’s writings, for example his 
comments on figures such as Goethe and Wagner. Nietzsche writes of Goethe:  
He surrounded himself with nothing but closed horizons; he did not sever 
himself from life, he placed himself within it; nothing could discourage him and 
he took as much as possible upon himself, above himself, within himself. What 
he aspired to was totality; he strove against the separation of reason, 
sensuality, feeling, will…he disciplined himself to a whole, he created himself. 
(TI ‘Skirmishes’ 49)  
Here, there seems to be an emphasis on self-determination and self-formation: active 
processes requiring some sort of agency on the part of the individual. Again, we should 
note the inclusion of reason in this process: ‘he strove against the separation of reason, 
sensuality, feeling, will’. Leiter’s model thus seems insufficient to incorporate Nietzsche’s 
thoughts on Goethe. The passive, static self which the naturalistic account depicts, and its 
                                                        
 
appropriate to try and calibrate the external factors and internal type-facts in terms of each other. 
Ultimately the influence of external factors on Leiter’s account emerges as being negligible and it seems 
that type-facts are wholly responsible for what we become. This conclusion is supported by the fact that 
Leiter substitutes ‘trajectories’ (note the plural) for the singular ‘Fate’ which suggests that the trajectory of 
the individual’s life is completely specific: ‘the trajectory of a person’s life follows a necessary course, one 





exclusion of conscious thought in agency, is unable to account for the process of self-
formation exemplified by individuals such as Goethe.  
 
The Transcendental Account (Gardner 2009) 
 
Gardner (2009) takes the debate regarding the self in Nietzsche to revolve around the 
issue of normativity. He draws attention to the disunity of theoretical and practical 
thinking (especially self-formation) in Nietzsche’s writings, suggesting that this could 
only be resolved by invoking a transcendental ‘I’, before arriving at an ultimately aporetic 
conclusion. In this way, he offers a very different account to that of Leiter’s, and takes 
seriously Nietzsche’s idea of ‘becoming what you are’, interpreting this as a call for the 
creation and legislation of values.  
Gardner argues that, with regards to theoretical reason, in works such as Beyond Good 
and Evil (‘On the Prejudices of the Philosophers’), Nietzsche appears to express 
naturalistic tendencies. The ‘I’ is described as an illusion and a fiction, and the self is 
conceived of in terms of drives and affects, with any consciousness being epiphenomenal: 
I don’t concede that the ‘I’ is what thinks. Instead, I take the I itself to be a 
construction of thinking,  of the same rank as ‘matter’, ‘thing’, ‘substance’, 
‘individual’, ‘purpose’, ‘number’: in other words to be only a regulative fiction 
with the help of which a kind of constancy and thus ‘knowability’ is inserted 
into, invented into, a world of becoming…but up to now philosophers have 
believed, like the ‘common people’, that in ‘I  think’ there lay something or 
other of unmediated certainty and that this ‘I’ was the given cause of 
thinking….However habituated and indispensable this fiction may now be, that 
in no way disproves its having been invented. 
(KGW VII- 3.248) 
However, Gardner argues that such views become highly problematic when we consider 
what Nietzsche has to say about practical reason.  
Gardner (2009:7) suggests that the kind of subject that realises value (cf. the Sovereign 




himself – his self – as the ground of the value that he affirms: ‘it is part of what it is to 
entertain and affirm values in the proper non‐alienated, explicitly legislative mode, that 
one's own contribution, the subject's act of sponsoring, be understood as constitutive of 
the ‘object’ that comprises one's value’ and, b) experience a reciprocal relation between 
valuing, self-formation, and self-affirmation: ‘to determine such and such to be of value is 
to determine oneself, and to affirm oneself by way of affirming (p.9) what one values, and 
vice versa.’ Both of these necessary conditions for what it is to be a subject that values, 
suggest that the ‘I’ plays a ‘fundamental, pervasive, and ineliminable role’ for Nietzsche. 
The naturalistic picture of the self à la Leiter does not, according to Gardner, allow for 
either of these conditions to be satisfied. The self qua bundle of drives and affects does 
not produce first-person thinking in practical or axiological contexts:  
while it is true that there is no inconsistency between our thinking of some 
individual as bearing value on account of their psychological structure, if that 
individual is to think of himself as bearing value, then the I‐conception is 
indispensable: Nietzschean man must set value on himself, not on some 
psychological structure. 
(2009:8) 
The naturalistic picture is too impersonal: the ‘I’ qua an epiphenomenal product is a weak 
concept, and does not seem to serve any purpose. As such, it is totally inadequate for what 
Gardner regards as Nietzsche’s ultimate philosophical purpose, i.e. to forge ‘individuals 
who set value on (affirm) themselves’ (2009:8) In order to carry out this project, Gardner 
maintains that Nietzsche needs an ‘I’ which has the capacity for self-awareness in 
judgement: this conception of the ‘I’ stands in stark contrast to the sub-personal ‘I’ in the 
naturalistic account.  According to Gardner the drives/affects lack the requisite cognitive 
and explanatory character needed for valuation.  
If we wish to aim for a unity of theoretical and practical thinking in Nietzsche’s works, the 
solution Gardner proposes lies in a conception of the ‘I’ as transcendental, and he 
maintains that ‘to transcendentalize Nietzsche is not to kantianize him’ (2009:19). 
Gardner is careful to argue that the ‘I’ which Nietzsche argues against is the specific, 




a transcendental ‘I’ per se, and that Nietzsche’s thought contains a ‘buried transcendental 
dimension’ (2009:18), which can help us to clarify his views on moral psychology.  
Gardner suggests that a conception of the ‘I’ that Nietzsche needs, must be one which 
‘holds together in a coherent manner both the unitary I of self‐consciousness and the 
psychological manifold’ (2009:12). Such an ‘I’ would maintain both: a) that the causality 
of the ‘I’ is properly interpreted as necessarily involving the expression of the dominant 
drive in the psychological composite, and b) that ‘the thought, which the Nietzschean 
subject must entertain when a power‐unit realizes itself successfully, wills values, etc., is 
an I‐thought, not the thought that such and such a power‐unit or whatever prevails 
presently’ (2009:12)4 cf. Korsgaard: ‘to regard some movement of my mind or my body 
as my action, I must see it as an expression of my self as a whole, rather than as a product 
of some force that is at work on me or in me' (2009:18).  
So how does Gardner understand this ‘I’?  
Gardner firstly delineates the ‘I’ in negative terms. He understands the ‘I’ ‘not as 
substratum, nor as equipped with freedom of will in the indeterministic sense, yet as 
occupying the position of ground’ (2009:8). Without such an ‘I’, he suggests that the 
individual would be left with a ‘profound self-alienation’, and the normative dimension 
of valuation would be undermined, i.e. ‘the possibility of its being thought that the 
valuation in any sense ‘gets things right’. He does not outline, however, what exactly 
comprises the Nietzschean ‘I will’ in relation to values. He suggests that it ‘amounts to 
more than the practical commitment that is implied trivially in any recognition of a norm, 
and appears to include an aesthetic or quasi‐artistic dimension—the Nietzschean subject 
will relate to his values in something of the way that an artist relates to his works, as 
something distinct from himself, yet as an object of pride and ownership, for which the 
subject claims responsibility or with which it identifies’ (2009:8).   
                                                        
 
4 Here we might compare the Nietzschean subject to the Freudian analysand who would wish to retain first-
person thinking over and above the psychological apparatus of the ego, super-ego, Id – there is still a desire 




After constructing a possible ‘I’ which he believes could potentially provide a unity of 
theoretical and practical reasoning in the Nietzschean subject, thus lending credence to 
Nietzsche’s views on normativity, Gardner then notes that Nietzsche does not actually 
aim to provide a unified theory of self. He then takes this to mean that Nietzsche is 
illustrating the unavoidable disunity of philosophical reasoning through an aporetic 
conclusion. In other words, we may wish to reject transcendental realities at a theoretical 
level, yet crave them or employ them at a practical level. It is not that Nietzsche fails to 
acknowledge or appreciate the conflict between naturalism and transcendentalism, or to 
choose between them: Gardner is suggesting that Nietzsche is drawing our attention to 
the fact that our search for a unity of reason is futile.  
But is this really Nietzsche’s aim? As Anderson suggests Gardner’s ‘result seems to be 
based primarily on an a priori argument identifying alleged presuppositions of 
Nietzschean positions, rather than any direct argument from Nietzsche’s texts. As such, it 
might be thought to tell us more about the shape and force of Gardner’s post-Kantian 
commitments than it does about Nietzsche’s own view’ (2012:4).  
I would also add that in Gardner’s account, much like Leiter’s, the drives and affects are 
the only components of the self which receive attention, and the level of attention seems 
somewhat insufficient, resulting in too crude a model of the self. Gardner contrasts 
Nietzsche’s drives and affects with the contemporary anti-realist view of the self as found 
in Dennett’s works:  
In Dennett, for example, the ‘I’ is regarded as a theoretical posit which is 
introduced in consequence of taking up the intentional stance, as a kind of 
conceptual corollary of belief and desire explanation, somewhat in the way 
that the laws of mechanics warrant the positing of a centre of gravity in 
physical objects. 
(2009:3) 
Nietzsche’s drives however, according to Gardner’s interpretation ‘lack at root the 
cognitive, explanatory character assumed by Dennett’. If this is true, then Gardner is right 
to wish to posit some kind of ‘I’ qua conscious capacity over and above the drives to 




perhaps we ought to a) take a closer look at the structure of drives and affects, and 
establish their characteristics, and b) explore the other components of a Nietzschean self. 
It may be that Nietzsche does indeed provide us with the materials to make sense of his 
practical philosophy.  
The next section will examine two accounts which aim to examine the operations of a 
Nietzschean self in greater detail: Katsafanas (2012) focuses on the role of consciousness, 
whilst Janaway (2009) explores the role of the affects.  
 
1.2 Conscious Willing (Katsafanas 2012) 
 
Katsafanas (2012) explores one component of the self in particular, namely conscious 
willing, and examines whether or not Nietzsche is able to account for this activity. This 
kind of activity seems important for notions of self-formation. In exploring the idea of 
conscious willing, Katsafanas offers a richer account of the Nietzschean self, with a 
particular emphasis on its cognitive capacities.  
Katsafanas makes the claims contra Leiter, that conscious thought: a) is not 
epiphenomenal and, b) has causal efficacy. In his earlier (2005) paper he highlights the 
importance of consciousness in Nietzsche’s thought, when he suggests that, without it, we 
would be unable to explain the transformation of bad conscience into guilt (as illustrated 
in On the Genealogy of Morality). Katsafanas, in his interpretation of the Nietzschean 
model of the self, allows conscious thought to have a role in agency, something which 
Leiter flatly denies, and which Gardner would wish there to be in an account of the self. 
In order to show this, Katsafanas devotes much attention to the structure of drives, and 
their relationship to affects and conscious thought, as he attempts to trace the pattern of 
causality.  
Why does Katsafanas insist on demonstrating the possibility of reflective agency in 
Nietzsche’s thought? At this point Katsafanas (2012:6) draws our attention to Nietzsche’s 
Sovereign Individual. The Sovereign Individual is characterised by the capacity ‘to 
promise’ which is outlined in GM II: 2. Such a capacity presupposes a certain conception 




In promising, the promisor is able to, as Richardson suggests ‘insert a pause’ in which to 
consult his commitments during the process of willing (2009: 139). This pause sees the 
promisor display a ‘strong inhibitive power to refrain from acting immediately upon 
one’s drives’. This notion of a pause or space does seem to surface in Nietzsche’s writings:  
[B]etween the original ‘I will’, ‘I shall do this’, and the actual discharge of the 
will, its act, a world of strange new things, circumstances, and even acts of will 
may be interposed, without causing this long chain of will to break. 
(GM II.1) 
The Sovereign Individual qua promisor is ‘strong enough for that’, and is able to preserve 
his commitments when faced with these temptations. Later in Twilight of the Idols 
Nietzsche identifies willing with the power: ‘not to react immediately to a stimulus, but 
instead to take control of the inhibiting, excluding instincts…the essential thing here is 
precisely not 'to will', to be able to suspend the decision’ (TI ‘What the Germans lack’ 6).  
Katsafanas then suggests that willing here is associated with the capacity to control one’s 
behaviour reflectively (2012:7), referring to phrases such as ‘gaining control’ over 
instincts, ‘suspending decision’, and having a ‘protracted, independent will’ as eliciting 
images of reflective processes. He also points out that to view Nietzsche’s claims about 
strong and weak wills as referring to mere conflict of desires, does not uncover the full 
weight of these claims. Katsafanas gives the example of how animals can have desires that 
are stronger than others, e.g. the desire of self-preservation can be stronger than another 
such as hunger, meaning that animals with desires ‘would eo ipso have a strong will’ 
(2012:8). Consequently, when Nietzsche talks of human beings having strong or weak 
wills, he must be referring to a reflective capacity, not just a conflict of desires.  
Katsafanas is then left to explain how we ought to account for the passages where 
Nietzsche suggests that conscious thoughts, decisions, acts of will play no role in 
causation of our actions. 
Error of false causation…We believed that our acts of will were causally 
efficacious…Nobody doubted that consciousness was the place to look for all 




causes there as well - under the rubric of 'motives'…Nowadays we do not 
believe a word of it. 
(TI ‘The Four Great Errors’ 3) 
How are we to resolve this tension? Again, as Katsafanas shows, this can be solved by 
establishing the specific notions of the will Nietzsche rejects or accepts: we must be 
careful not to assume that Nietzsche is targeting will per se in his writings. In the above 
passage, he rejects one particular conception of the will (cf. BGE 21 ‘a will that is ‘‘causa 
sui’’: a will that is determined by nothing other than the agent himself, a will whose 
‘‘causes could be found within our own consciousness”), but later in Twilight of the Idols 
he endorses an alternative conception of the will, i.e. a ‘strong’ but not causally isolated 
will (TI ‘What the Germans lack’ 6).  
In this way, as Katsafanas notes, it is especially important to take into account any 
modifications in Nietzsche’s views. In early and middle period works up to Daybreak 
Nietzsche appears to be an incompatibilist with regards to free will, maintaining that the 
notion of a will that is causa sui is not possible, instead our actions are causally 
determined by many factors. He then makes the move to eliminativism, shifting from the 
claim that we lack free will to the claim that we lack will:  
Perhaps there exists neither will nor purposes, and we have only imagined 
them. The iron hands of necessity which shake the dice box of chance play their 
game for an infinite length of time; so that there have to be throws which 
exactly resemble purposiveness and rationality of every degree. Perhaps our 
actions of will and purpose are nothing but such throws… 
(D 130) 
However, in the later work Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche seems to recognise that the 
quick move from ‘our actions are causally determined’ to ‘our actions are unfree’ is not a 
legitimate one, and adopts a compatibilist position, i.e. our actions could be both causally 
determined and the products of our wills. In BGE 21, he refutes the idea of a will that is 
causa sui, but then does not move on to eliminativism, as he did in the earlier works:  
Suppose someone were thus to see through the boorish simplicity of this 




his head altogether, I beg of him to carry his ‘‘enlightenment’’ a step further, 
and also put out of his head the contrary of this monstrous conception of ‘‘free 
will’’: I mean ‘‘unfree will,’’ which amounts to a misuse of cause and effect…The 
‘‘unfree will’’ is mythology; in real life it is only a matter of strong and weak 
wills. 
(BGE 21) 
So how should we understand the role of conscious thought in a Nietzschean self?  
Before sketching out exactly how conscious thought operates in Nietzsche, Katsafanas is 
careful to specify that the model of agency which Nietzsche attacks is Kantian5 or 
Lockean. In such models, self-conscious reflection can allow deliberate suspension of 
motives in that it enables us to distance ourselves from our motives, ensuring that these 
motives cease to ‘dominate’ us. Once the motives have been ‘suspended’, we may 
‘consider’ and ‘weigh’ them, and deliberate as to whether they are good reasons to act. 
Nietzsche, as we have seen in passages mentioned (BGE 3), is extremely sceptical of 
reflective agency: an individual who acts reflectively is very much still ‘secretly guided 
and channelled by his drives’, and that in reflective speculation, an agent’s intellect is 
merely ‘the blind instrument of another drive’ (D109). 
In his 2005 article ‘Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology’, Katsafanas closely examines 
the structure of drives. He suggests that drives have a crucial evaluative component, and 
defines a drive as a ‘disposition that manifests itself by informing an agent’s perception 
of a given object, generating an evaluative orientation towards that object and thereby 
bringing about action.’ In his 2012 article ‘Nietzsche and Kant on Reflective Agency’, 
Katsafanas discusses how both drives and conscious thought play a role in agency. If we 
return to this passage: 
The misunderstanding of passion and reason, as if the latter were an 
independent entity and not rather a system of relations between various 
                                                        
 




passions and desires; and as if every passion did not possess its quantum of 
reason. 
(WP 397) 
We can see how Katsafanas, unlike Leiter, attends to both halves of this claim, i.e. that 
reason is not independent from drives, and that drives are not independent from reason: 
‘the passions as influenced by reflection: the passions do not enjoy any independence 
from reflection; on the contrary, they are everywhere influenced by reflection’ (2012:25). 
He suggests that for Nietzsche, reflection: a) does not operate in an instantaneous manner 
(as we so often believe it to do), but rather its effects are gradual and incremental and, b) 
is just one causal factor amongst others.  
In order to further elucidate these claims, Katsafanas first offers a breakdown of the 
Kantian model of willing, which he believes can be arranged into the following three 
stages:  
 1. (Suspension) When an agent reflects on her motives for A-ing, she suspends the 
influence of the motives upon which she is reflecting, i.e. the agent is able to still these 
motives and choose in independence of them.  
2. (Inclination) In deliberative agency, motives incline without necessitating. The agent’s 
motives could be the same, and yet she could choose differently, i.e. given Suspension the 
agent is able to reflect on motives and suspend the motivational aspects of these motives; 
consequently, motives do not necessitate any actions. 
3. (Choice) Typically, if I am faced with two actions that it is possible for me to perform, 
A-ing and B-ing, and I choose to A, then I will A, i.e. the agent takes her choice to determine 
what she will do. 
Katsafanas then proposes that Nietzsche rejects certain components (Suspension) of the 
above model of willing, but retains others (Inclination and Choice):  
Due to the fact that he develops a more complex account of motivation, 
Nietzsche concludes that reflection is not capable of suspending the influence 
of motives. Nonetheless, he agrees with Kant that motives do not determine 




Moreover, he maintains that conscious choice plays a causal role in the 
production of action. 
(2012:3) 
Suspension does not hold for Nietzsche due to the fact that our actions are driven by 
underlying motives, of which we are not always aware. Moreover, even if we find 
ourselves identifying a particular motive, and subsequently ‘suspending’ it, all that has 
happened is that the motive has in fact become more covert ‘operating through reflection 
itself.’ In BGE 117 Nietzsche writes that ‘the will to overcome an affect is ultimately only 
the will of another, or several other, affects.’ 
Katsafanas uses the example of jealousy to illustrate this point: 
The attitude influences the agent’s reflective thought itself: the agent 
experiences herself as having a reflective distance from the attitude, as 
scrutinizing the attitude and asking herself whether there is a reason to act on 
it; but, all the while, the attitude influences the agent’s reflective thought in 
ways that she does not grasp. 
(2012:13) 
Here, the way in which we try to reflect on our jealousy is in itself structured and coloured 
by that jealousy unbeknownst to us: ‘a jealous agent’s deliberative process itself can be 
influenced by these attitudes; they can incline him to draw conclusions that are not 
supported by the evidence, to give excessive weight to certain features, and so on.’ 
Katsafanas cites Othello as an apt literary example of this process. In this way, a motive 
like jealousy influences the agent’s perception of reasons and indirectly moves the agent. 
The idea that we can stand apart from our motives therefore does not hold for Nietzsche.  
Katsafanas then suggests that Nietzsche is able to reject Suspension yet uphold 
Inclination and Choice. Having rejected Suspension we may be inclined to think that 
conscious thought has no role whatsoever in action, but in order to maintain both 
Inclination and Choice, conscious thought for Nietzsche cannot, contra Leiter’s 





Leiter’s claim that consciousness is causally inert relies on two models of the will: 1) ‘The 
Will as Epiphenomenal’, whereby conscious mental states and any events associated with 
willing do not play any part in the causal chain leading to action. This is because on this 
model both conscious experiences of willing and action are caused solely by the drives 
and affects. There is no causal connection whatsoever between conscious experiences of 
willing and action, and 2) ‘The Will as Secondary Cause’, whereby conscious mental states 
and events associated with willing are permitted to be part of the causal chain leading to 
action, but they are not primary causes. Rather, they are only efficacious in virtue of other 
causes. On this model, the drives and affects cause conscious experiences of willing, which 
then cause actions.  
Katsafanas, however, proposes that these models by no means provide an exhaustive 
understand of the causal role of consciousness, and that Nietzsche in fact rejects both of 
these particular models. Instead, he suggests, Nietzsche has a far more complex picture 
of the relationship between conscious thoughts and affects, in so far as he argues that 
conscious thought can transform the motivational tendencies of the affects. Such an 
interpretation attributes a vital role to conscious thought in the production of action.  
So how exactly does conscious thought transform the motivational tendencies of the 
affects?  
Katsafanas uses the example of pain and how, on Nietzsche’s account, it does not have a 
determinate motivational impact on agency.  This view is made clear in the Genealogy 
when Nietzsche declares that ‘what really arouses indignation against suffering is not 
suffering as such but the meaninglessness of suffering’ (GM II.7). Here, it seems that we 
only experience real aversion to suffering when it is coupled with an interpretation, i.e. 
‘this suffering is meaningless’. Conversely, we may have a pleasurable experience of pain 
if it is coupled with an interpretation such as ‘this pain means that I am exercising 
vigorously.’ In The Gay Science Nietzsche expresses this very thought: ‘that a violent 
stimulus is experienced as pleasure and pain is a matter of the interpreting intellect, 
which, to be sure, generally works without our being conscious of it; and one and the 




This notion of conscious thought transforming affects via interpretation does not just 
apply to the example of pain, but to affects generally. In Daybreak Nietzsche writes:  
Drives transformed by moral judgments.—The same drive evolves into the 
painful feeling of cowardice under the impress of the reproach custom has 
imposed upon this drive: or into the pleasant feeling of humility if it happens 
that a custom such as the Christian has taken it to its heart and labeled it good. 
That is to say, it is attended by either a good or a bad conscience! In itself it has, 
like every drive, neither this moral character nor any moral character at all, not 
even a determinate accompanying sensation of pleasure or displeasure: it 
acquires all this as a second nature only when it enters into relations with 
drives already baptized good or evil, or is noted as a property of beings that 
have already been morally ascertained and assessed by the people.— 
(D 38) 
Here, Katsafanas suggests that Nietzsche views ‘motives as causally indeterminate: 
motives have causal tendencies, but the particular behaviours that they characteristically 
cause are dependent on the associated interpretation’ (2012:20). These ‘interpretations’ 
can be understood as involving conscious thought. Moreover, as Katsafanas notes, 
because one and the same motive, e.g. pity, can be interpreted by two different agents in 
radically different ways (e.g. one agent via Interpretation A experiences the pity as 
attractive, and is driven to help another individual in distress, whilst the other agent via 
Interpretation B experiences the pity as unattractive and ignores said individual), we 
must also reject Leiter’s other model of ‘The Will as Secondary Cause’ as rendering the 
chain of causality from motive to action as too simplistic.  
If we accept the ideal that conscious thought does indeed play a role in human action, we 
must then ask in what way does this transformation of affect through conscious thought 
take place?  
There are two crucial aspects of Nietzsche’s conception of willing according to 
Katsafanas. Firstly, the effects of conscious reflective thought are gradual and 
incremental. Nietzsche observes the transformation of motives via conscious thought 
across generations: they must be ‘constantly internalized, drilled, translated into flesh 




makes it clear that the transformation of motives can be an arduous process ‘we have to 
learn to think differently—in order at last, perhaps very late on, to attain even more: to 
feel differently’’ (D 103). Indeed, at times, he makes it clear that there will be some affects 
which cannot be transformed: ‘learning changes us . . . but at the bottom of us, really ‘deep 
down’, there is of course something unteachable, some granite of spiritual fatum…’ (BGE 
231).  
Secondly, reflective thought is but one causal factor amongst many others. In order to 
explain this, Katsafanas distinguishes between what he calls a ‘Trigger’ model of willing, 
and a ‘Vector’ model of willing. The Trigger mode, according to Katsafanas, is what we see 
in Kant. Here, the agent has various motivational desires and affects which may incline 
the agent to certain actions, but, after deliberation, these motivational states are 
incapable of causing the agent to act. It is only after the will has consented to a certain 
course of action, and endorsed a certain motivational state, that these desires and affects 
then become causally efficacious. Thus, choice alone determines action and the will acts 
as a trigger.  The Vector model, by contrast, reduces the causal importance of the will: the 
will is merely one source of motivation amongst others. The will may reinforce other 
motives ‘by placing its motivational weight behind them’ but it is not uniquely efficacious. 
Action is determined by the vector of motives (which includes the will).  On this model, 
motives, episodes of decision, and conscious thought are all seen as causal forces which 
interact with each other: ‘none enjoys a privileged position in the production of action’ 
(2012:28).  
This vector model allows conscious willing to have a role in agency (and to retain 
Inclination and Choice), but does not require that it take the form of some substantive 
faculty capable of Suspension which we see in the Kantian model. Instead, it is seen to 
have a rather more modest role than a Kantian conception of the will. Willing is one causal 
factor amongst others, and its effects are not immediate: instead we see gradual, 
incremental change (and the transformation of motives is far from guaranteed).  The 
vector model also allows us to make sense of Nietzsche’s claims that there are strong and 
weak wills since conscious thought, though causally efficacious, is not absolutely 
guaranteed to have a decisive causal impact.   Katsafanas notes how the Sovereign 




willing: ‘the capacity deliberatively to form intentions, and to remain resolute in their 
realization, is something that might well vary across individuals. Indeed, we already 
know that in certain cases it does vary: certain individuals seem to manifest more self-
control than others’ (2012:27).  
Katsafanas’ account pays close attention to the workings of the psychological apparatus 
Nietzsche mentions: he offers careful discussion of both the drives and affects, and does 
not neglect the importance Nietzsche does accord to conscious reflection or willing. As 
Stern (2015) suggests:  
while instinct can indicate something non-conscious, some of these examples 
of drives and instincts appear to demand or presuppose something like 
conscious reflection: mulling things over, intellectuality, researching, 
reflecting. And one can have a Hang for dialectics or for the vita contemplativa. 
Affects, taking into account what Nietzsche tells us, obviously stretch well 
beyond brief, exhausting ‘seizures of excitement’ or even ‘ways in which we 
feel’ (Janaway 2009: 52) to incorporate desires and demands; indeed, some 
affects have ‘wills’ of their own (BGE 117). 
(2015:127) 
It thus seems vital to incorporate cognitive aspects and the idea of conscious willing into 
an account of the Nietzschean self.  
 
Perspectival Knowing (Janaway 2009)  
 
Like Katsafanas, Janaway emphasises cognitive aspects of the self in Nietzsche, and 
focuses, in particular, on the affects, which he takes to the sole locus of interpretations. 
Janaway takes perspectival knowing to be the main motivation for a ‘relatively unified 
and autonomous self’ (2009:1). Self-formation can therefore be seen to include this 
notion of ‘perspectival knowing’ on this account. As such, Janaway argues that a 
Nietzschean self is a self which possesses self-awareness, and a certain level of creative 




out’, something which is required for perspectival knowing, and which implies that 
Nietzsche does have a reasonably unified and autonomous self in mind.  
Before examining these claims regarding the self, we should first examine the idea of 
perspectival knowing, and how Janaway proceeds from Nietzsche’s arguments regarding 
cognition in order to argue for a self.   
 In the Genealogy , Nietzsche espouses this notion of perspectival knowing:  
there is only a perspectival seeing, only a perspectival ‘knowing’; and the more 
affects we allow to speak about a matter, the more eyes, different eyes, we 
know how to bring to bear on one and the same matter, that much more 
complete will our ‘concept’ of this matter, our ‘objectivity’ be. 
(GM III:12) 
In this way, Nietzsche rejects prior conceptions of knowledge as requiring the absence of 
affects or passions, and instead argues not only for: 1) for the inseparability of knowledge 
and the affects, but also 2) that the greater the number of affects involved in 
interpretation, the more complete our knowledge will be. Janaway takes Nietzsche to 
suggest that there is an intrinsic link between affects and knowledge, which can be 
beneficial, and we should not seek to separate the two: ‘to eliminate the will altogether, 
to disconnect the affects would be to disable knowledge’ (2009:3). 
These affects possess a cognitive potency in that ‘our belief that our feeling shocked, 
embarrassed, disgusted or attracted by some phenomenon tells us something about that 
phenomenon.’ In the Genealogy, for example, by examining the role of cruelty in the origin 
of guilt and bad conscience ‘we acknowledge, beneath our more obvious feelings of anger 
and disgust, a streak of joyfulness in seeing and making suffer’ (2009:4).  In this way, 
acknowledging our affects allows us to acquire knowledge about ourselves, and sheds 
light on our moral attitudes.  
That the notion of perspectival knowing can, in this way, allow for greater self-awareness, 
is for Janaway, crucial for Nietzsche’s idea of revaluation and consequently, self-




One comes to believe a certain explanation as true, one judges a set of 
psychological states as unhealthy, one tries to feel a new set of affects, and 
identifies oneself with specific critical second‐order attitudes regarding certain 
of one's feelings. 
(2009:18) 
In such a process, it is necessary that the individual possesses some notion of himself as 
‘deciding, choosing, and trying as a genuine agent’. This is not to say that the agent 
experiences an ‘unlimited possibility of action unconstrained by character and the causal 
order’. Nietzsche quite clearly does not forward such a conception of free will. However, 
neither does he advance the notion of total unfreedom of the will. In this way Janaway 
suggests that Nietzsche wishes to preserve a sense of creative agency ‘because without it 
his proposed critique of moral values and his project of learning to think and feel in 
healthier ways would make little sense’ (2012:18). 
So how do the affects lead us to posit a self? It seems that the answer to this question will 
shed some light on how Janaway envisages creative agency in Nietzsche. In order to 
answer the question fully we must examine the following in Janaway’s account: (i) what 
is an affect? (ii) what is a drive? (iii) how are affects and drives related? And (iv) does the 
interplay between drives and affects constitute knowledge?  
Janaway defines affects as: ‘inclinations and aversions’ ‘pro and contra’ ‘for and against’ 
– inclinations or aversions of some sort… affects are, at the very least, ways in which we 
feel’. He also highlights the fact that some affects are unconscious or beyond accurate 
apprehension. Here he cites D 115 to demonstrate the range of apprehensibility of affects:   
[W]ords really exist only for superlative degrees of these [inner] processes and 
drives. [ … ] Anger, hatred, love, pity, desire, knowledge, joy, pain—all are 
names for extreme states: (p.53) the milder, middle degrees, not to speak of 
the lower degrees which are continually in play, elude us, and yet it is they 
which weave the web of our character and destiny’. 
Janaway, like Katsafanas, accords motivational capacities to affects suggesting that affects 




It is our needs which interpret the world: our drives and their for and against. 
Every drive is a kind of lust for domination, each has its perspective’; and ‘Who 
interprets?—Our affects. 
(2009:7) 
Drives, meanwhile, are, for Janaway ‘relatively enduring tendencies’. He seems to agree 
with Katsafanas that drives can be characterised as dispositions, but he disagrees with 
Katsafanas’ claim that drives provide agents with structuring goals of which they are 
ignorant, providing the example of the drive to artistic self-expression, i.e. it need not be 
the case here that the agent must remain ignorant of the ultimate goal of this drive. 
 Moreover, it is not the case that this drive must persist constantly. Janaway claims that 
Nietzsche’s idea that man has ‘bred’ the plenitude of drives into himself implies that 
drives may be culturally acquired or lost6:  
according to Nietzsche’s use of ‘instinct’ and ‘drive’, such things need not be 
built unchangeably into human beings—neither generically into humans qua 
humans, nor into the constitution of any human being considered individually. 
How an individual’s drives operate over time, and even what drives an 
individual continues to have, is open to change. 
(2012:7) 
In this way, it seems that Janaway’s interpretation leaves us with a more plastic notion of 
the self than Katsafanas’. It is not just that drives remain latent until activated, waxing 
and waning in response to conditions, but they can in fact disappear altogether. This 
plasticity seems important for self-formation particularly in light of passages such as the 
following from The Gay Science: 
                                                        
 
6 Janaway’s conception of drives places them in a reciprocal relationship with something like morality – an 
external condition like morality may influence which drives are acquired or lost, which in turn influence 
the kind of moralities an individual will adhere to or create. In this way Janaway’s account, unlike Leiter’s, 
offers a richer explanation of the influence between internal and external factors and is able to account for 




It is practiced by those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their 
nature and then fit them into an artistic plan until every one of them appears 
as art and reason and even weaknesses delight the eye. Here a large mass of 
second nature has been added; there a piece of original nature has been 
removed – both times through long practice and daily work at it. Here the ugly 
that could not be removed is concealed; there it has been reinterpreted and 
made sublime. Much that is vague and resisted shaping has been saved and 
exploited for distant views 
(GS 290)  
The ability to acquire or lose drives is particularly pertinent here. So, how do affects relate 
to drives? Janaway suggests that ‘we might hypothesize that a drive is a relatively stable 
tendency to active behaviour of some kind, while an affect, put very roughly, is what it 
feels like when a drive is active inside oneself’ (2009:6). Affects here then seem to be 
emotional responses to the operation of the drives, and to the successes or failures of 
drives in obtaining their goals. The constitution of an individual’s drives would therefore 
seem to have a direct influence upon their affective landscape.  
We have seen that Janaway believes that the affects play a vital role in perspectival 
knowing, but we must now ask how can we move from an ‘interpretation’ to a ‘knowing’? 
On the above definition of the relationship between drives and affects, knowing must 
equal some activity of the drives which compose the individual, along with the feelings 
essentially involved in their activity.  
Are the drives and affects enough to warrant knowing? Janaway suggests that this is an 
insufficient model to constitute knowledge. Instead we require operations to take place 
upon the affects and interpretations, namely the ‘shifting them in and out’, and ‘having 
them in one’s power’, which Nietzsche speaks of. Differences in perspectives and affective 
interpretations must be made clear, and manipulated in some way so that they are useful 
for knowledge.  
Like Gardner, Janaway here raises the problem of the ‘I.’ He maintains that such 
operations must be conducted by some kind of self-conscious unity, in order for us to 
have a coherent notion of controlling affects, and bringing them to bear on one another, 




I have to be aware that affects A and B, each of which may ‘speak’ 
interchangeably about the same subject‐matter, are both mine. I have to be that 
which feels both affects, regards itself as feeling them both, and takes some 
attitude towards its subject‐matter in the light now of this affect, and now of 
that.  
(2009:8) 
It seems that Janaway, like Gardner, desires some sort of ‘I’ over and above the drives and 
affects, which is able to self-consciously adopt attitudes:  
but I have to be, in my own self-conception, a sufficiently unified self that I can 
‘take sides’ between the various drives that (though I did not originally will 
them) I find within myself. Likewise, it is not just that each of the affects I find 
within myself has a goal of its own, but rather that I have a goal in pursuit of 
which I can flexibly use the affects I feel.  
(2009:9) 
In this way, the naturalistic model of the self offered by Leiter looks inadequate. So what 
kind of ‘I’ does Janaway posit?  
The ‘I’ for Janaway must be a cogniser. Such a conception of the self enables Janaway to 
shed light on Nietzsche’s idea of self-affirmation, and notions like Amor Fati, both 
important for a project of self-formation. Janaway suggests that a self qua cogniser, who 
is able to self-consciously adopt attitudes, and possess some degree of self-knowledge, is 
able to partake in first-order and second-order willing (the latter being crucial for 
something like Amor Fati).  
Janaway (2012) distinguishes between first-order and second-order willing, stating that 
animals have only the former, but it is the fact that humans have the latter which enables 
them to take up attitudes of self-affirmation. He concedes that ‘no human being has 
complete knowledge of his drives, and no one is in full rational control of their presence 
or mode of expression’ (2012:11), but that we may still take up attitudes to ourselves. 
Amor Fati requires that an individual would be well disposed to desire their life again, 
embracing all aspects of it, including all imperfections. Whilst the idea of desiring the 




begin to see how this process might be feasible: ‘numerous events in any life will be 
undergone, remembered, or anticipated with a negative first-order attitude; but that is 
compatible with a second-order attitude of acceptance, affirmation, or positive evaluation 
towards one’s having had these negative experiences’ (2007:257-8).  
In order to carry out this second order willing, Janaway argues that a self qua cogniser, 
which is able to have the affects within his control and manipulate them ‘in accordance 
with a higher goal’ of the revaluative project, is necessary. In this way, revaluation and 
self-affirmation depend on a relatively unified and autonomous self that can stand over 
and above the affects. Janaway is careful to note that this is a self which is not to be 
achieved by everyone (and not even to be achieved to a full extent), only the Sovereign 
Individuals:  
The fact that self-knowledge (likewise selfhood as such, as Gemes shows 36 ) 
is hard, that most have very little of it, and even that no one ever attains it 
completely—none of this shows that self‐knowledge is impossible: only that it 
is rare among human beings, that it is a task set for a few of us rather than a 
given, and that its achievement is a matter of degree. 
(2009:17) 
Janaway aligns this kind of cognitive achievement with the notion of unification - Einheit.  
This idea of a unified multiplicity is emphasised by Nietzsche in several works. In Beyond 
Good and Evil he states that ‘only this should be called greatness: the ability to be just as 
multiple as whole, just as wide as full’ (BGE 212), and in Twilight of the Idols he cites 
Goethe as the ideal unified individual: ‘what he wanted was totality; he fought against the 
separation of reason, sensibility, feeling, will…he disciplined himself to wholeness’ (TI 
‘Skirmishes’, 49). 
Nietzsche frequently considers greatness in terms of the properties of and relations 
between an individual’s drives and affects. He discusses: a) the strength of drives, b) their 
plurality, and c) the fact that they are held in a unity despite being in constant conflict 
with one another, e.g. ‘the highest man would have the greatest multiplicity of drives, in 
the relatively greatest strength that can be endured. Indeed, where the plant “man” shows 




controlled’ (WP 966 cf. BGE 212, TI ‘Skirmishes’ 49). Such a model of unity is reminiscent 
of Heraclitus’ diapheromenxon-sympheromenon (‘internal variation’ and ‘coherence’).7 In 
this way the self appears as a scaled down Heraclitean cosmos.  
The notion of improving and cultivating this Einheit, thus achieving the ‘task’ of the self, 
can be explained by Janaway’s account of self-affirmation through second-order willing: 
‘in the human case there is the possibility of attaining a greater degree of unity in the 
process of taking attitudes to oneself’ (2012: 11). He uses the example of an individual 
with a strong sexual drive or a strong drive to artistic self-expression:  
While these drives persist, the agent might be continually striving to disown 
them, having set him- or herself to be abstinent and socially conforming. Might 
not the human being who willed themselves to Goethean wholeness be 
someone in whom, by contrast, such conscious striving against drives was 
absent, and whose will aligned itself with as many of the drives as possible, 
thereby constituting the drives as more of a unity? 
(2012:11) 
How does this alignment take place? Through the manipulation of affects via the self qua 
cogniser. Janaway thus takes self-formation to have a fundamentally cognitive element 
with the ultimate aim of unifying a multiplicity of perspectives and attitudes.  
The next section will further explore the notion that the self is a task or achievement. 
Whilst this kind of account is opposed to the fatalism of Leiter’s reading, we will see that 
this achievement is only possible for the few.  
 
 
                                                        
 
7 Heraclitus Fragment 10 ‘Couples are things whole and not whole, what is drawn together and what is 





1.3 Autonomy and Agency (Gemes 2009) 
 
Similarly to Janaway, Gemes (2009a) places great emphasis on the concept of Einheit, and 
takes this unity and personhood to be an achievement or task. Gemes puts forward a 
naturalistic-aestheticist model of the self. Like Leiter, Gemes holds that consciousness in 
Nietzsche is merely epiphenomenal (meaning that, unlike Katsafanas and Janaway, there 
is little talk of conscious thought playing any motivational roles in this account), and that 
there is no ‘I’ above and beyond the structure of the drives and affects: ‘this for Nietzsche 
would be an empty mere geometric point’ (2009a:17)  
However, this is not to say that we must dispense with ideas of self-determination and 
self-awareness. Gemes regards Nietzsche’s comments on free will to be especially 
pertinent to our ideas of the self, and takes the debate about the self to be motivated by 
claims about agency: what kind of self is capable of genuine agency? How should we 
understand agency? In answering these questions, Gemes differentiates between two 
accounts of free will: 1) deserts free will (rejected by Nietzsche) and, 2) agency free will 
(accepted by Nietzsche). This distinction proves to be helpful in explaining apparent 
inconsistencies in Nietzsche’s writings as regards free will: ‘the denials are denials of 
deserts free will and the invocations are invocations of agency free will’ (2009a:2).  
Gemes points out that whilst Nietzsche totally rejects the notion of free will causa sui, he 
equally rejects the idea of an unfree will:  
Suppose someone were thus to see through the boorish simplicity of this 
celebrated concept of “free will” and put it out of his head altogether, I beg of 
him to carry his “enlightenment” a step further, and also put out of his head the 
contrary of this monstrous conception of “free will”: I mean “unfree will,” 
which amounts to a misuse of cause and effect. 
(BGE 21) 
Gemes suggests that Nietzsche’s rejection of the traditional free will is due to the fact that 
it usually works in such a way as to instil guilt, resulting in a passive attitude to the world: 
‘the rule of the ‘Thou shall not’s’’. He also sees an unfree will as inimical to active 




willed.’ Such statements from Nietzsche seem to be problematic for Leiter’s fatalistic 
interpretation- it seems that Leiter is operating in the free/unfree wills paradigm, rather 
than the strong/weak wills paradigm which Nietzsche calls for.  
So how should we understand agency given that there are strong/weak wills? And how 
does the resultant picture of agency relate to the self? Given that Gemes thinks the self or 
personhood is something to be achieved, this implies that we must have some degree of 
freedom to carry out the task. On Gemes’ account freedom equates to self-determination. 
So how can we determine ourselves?  
Gemes distinguishes between deserts free will and agency free will. Deserts free will 
relates to the question of whether an individual could have done otherwise, and is tied to 
ideas of punishment and reward. This is rejected by Nietzsche for the reason that he does 
not accept a free will causa sui. In Human, all too Human Nietzsche writes of the ‘fable of 
intelligible freedom’:  
Now one finally discovers that this nature [of man] cannot be responsible, 
since it is completely a necessary consequence and is assembled from the 
elements and influences of past and present things; consequently, one is not 
responsible for anything, not for his nature, nor his motives, nor his actions, 
nor his actions nor for his effects. Thereby one achieves the knowledge that the 
history of moral sensations is the history of an error, the error of responsibility 
which rests on the error of freedom of the will. 
(HAH 39) 
It is thus clear why Nietzsche would not accept the notion of deserts free will, since agents 
cannot be responsible in the way that deserts free will would demand, i.e. the agents do 
not possess a will autonomous from the causal order. The idea of punishment and reward 
thus does not make sense. Later Nietzsche writes that:  
for he who is punished does not deserve punishment; he is merely being 
employed as the means of henceforth deterring others from certain action; 
likewise, he who is being (p.36) rewarded does not deserve his reward: for he 





We may compare this with the analogy of the lambs and birds of prey in the Genealogy 
(GM I:13) - neither can act otherwise.  
Nevertheless, Gemes argues that Nietzsche ‘wants to reject the notion that in doing such 
and such one might have done otherwise, yet he wants to affirm that genuine agency is 
possible, if only for a select few’ (2009a:2). Agency free will may therefore be more 
appropriate. This conception of free will relates to the question of agency itself, i.e. what 
constitutes an action as opposed to a mere doing.  Gemes suggests that ‘the type of 
freedom Nietzsche is invoking here does not involve freedom from the causal order, nor 
is it bound to questions of deserts. Plainly it is tied to the question of what is it to have 
genuine agency’ (2009a:7). Passages relating to the Sovereign Individual clearly mention 
autonomy in some sense; in the Genealogy Nietzsche outlines the Sovereign Individual as 
one who is ‘autonomous… the man who has his own independent, protracted will…the 
master of a free will’ (GM II:2).  
So, how should we understand this autonomy?  
Gemes suggest that there is a parallel between Nietzsche’s notion of free will and Hume’s 
claim that a ‘liberty of spontaneity’ (free will) is consistent with a denial of ‘liberty of 
indifference’ (determinism). Hume claims that a free act is one which stems from one’s 
character or dispositions. Gemes claims that the same thought occurs in Nietzsche albeit 
with a more robust account of character as ‘a stable, unified, integrated, hierarchy of 
drives’ (2009a:6): The freest act is that in which our own most strongest, most finely 
practiced nature springs forth, and in such a way that at the same time our intellect shows 
its directing hand. (KSA 10:258, Spring–Summer 1883)8.   
Gemes then goes on to say: 1) this ‘freedom’ is a very demanding condition that most of 
us will fail to meet since not all of us are genuine selves i.e. Sovereign Individuals cf. 
‘“people” . . . the “person” is a relatively isolated fact (KSA 12:491), and 2) genuine agency 
                                                        
 
8 Noticeably Gemes does not discuss the role of ‘intellect’ in his account. It is not clear whether he assumes 
that Nietzsche takes it to be a separate faculty above or on a par with the drives/a drive itself and there is 
no discussion of how we ought to understand the relation between intellect and nature.  In this quotation, 




and freedom is only possible under the right conditions. So, on this account freedom and 
agency are open only to the special few and even then, the right conditions must persist 
in order for this to be achieved.  
Gemes does not specify exactly what these conditions are but it is made clear that such 
‘fortuitous circumstances’ (2009a:11) involve a combination of the internal (a strong 
master drive), and the external. Should these conditions obtain then those with a ‘strong 
will’ will exercise genuine agency and self-determine through taking command of, 
ordering, and organising lesser drives. This is what Gemes understands Nietzsche to take 
genuine selves to be: ‘to indulge the fable of “unity”, “soul”, “person”, this we have 
forbidden: with such hypotheses one only covers up the problem’ (KSA 11:577, June–July 
1885). The problem which this being covered up is, according to Gemes, that ‘unity, soul, 
personhood are not pre‐given existences but rare achievements to be gained by hard 
effort. The fable is in the notion that these have already been achieved, that we as mere 
humans already have unity, are persons’ (2009a:13).  
Presenting agency, freedom, and personhood as tasks to be achieved is according to 
Gemes, less of a serious metaphysical claim than a means of engendering ‘active creative 
engagement’ with the world: ‘Nietzsche aims to change his preferred readers from being 
mere conduit points of a vast array of conflicting inherited drives into genuinely unified 
beings’ (2009a:14).  
Gemes’ account seems to focus more on Nietzsche’s ideas on freedom and agency, rather 
than outlining a detailed model of the self. Several elements seem to be somewhat 
neglected namely: 1) the distinction between drives and affects, and the relationship 
between them, 2) the notion of first-person subjectivity, and 3) the role of consciousness, 
meaning that we are left with a rather thin, impersonal account of the self.  
Gemes does not make any claims to be discussing a first-person account: ‘first, it does not 
seek to explain the phenomenology of free will, what if feels like when one feels one is 
freely choosing to do A rather than B. Second, it does not place the subjective I at the core 
of the account’ (2009a:16). This is because he views character as being glossed in terms 
of the ordered multiplicity of drives. Consciousness is reduced to an epiphenomenon on 




consciousness’ (2009a:16), and he refers to this passage in The Gay Science to support 
this claim:  
Leibniz's incomparable insight that has been vindicated not only against 
Descartes but against everybody who had philosophized before him—that 
consciousness is merely an accident of experience and not its necessary and 
essential attribute.  
(GS 305) 
However, it seems that like Leiter, Gemes does not address many other passages which 
suggest that consciousness cannot so easily be reduced to epiphenomenon.  
Gemes’ account sees Nietzsche as outlining very narrow specifications for what it means 
to be a self. It appears that only the Sovereign Individual can be classified as a self, and as 
capable of achieving the task of self-hood. In this way, self-formation emerges as a very 
exclusive phenomenon on this account.  
 
Repository Self (Anderson 2012)  
 
Like Gemes, Anderson (2012) also sees the self in Nietzsche as something to be carried 
out and achieved, and the idea of self-formation as self-governance is central to 
Anderson’s account. However, unlike Gemes, Anderson takes the Nietzschean self to be a 
distinct psychological object, conceived of as an ‘I’ over and above the drives. In his 
account, he argues that Nietzsche outlines a thicker notion of the self than is seen in 
naturalistic interpretations- Anderson terms it a ‘minimal self.’  
This minimal self is seen as a repository of drives and affects, and its boundaries are 
porous. Like Janaway, Anderson believes the self to possess a degree of plasticity in that 
‘there is nothing to prevent my forming and acquiring new drives and affects, nor driving 
some of the ones I have out of existence’ (2012:17). In this way, Anderson wishes to 
account for the influence of external factors upon the drives and affects. Anderson takes 




Autonomy is central to the rare form of strong individuality he praises: the free 
spirit he idealizes is supposed to be independent from custom and tradition; 
she ‘creates herself’ precisely in the sense of giving herself values or laws of 
her own; she has ‘independence of the soul’ (see GS 98, 99, 335, 347; BGE 29, 
41, 43–4, 203; GM II, 1–3; et passim).  
(2012:3) 
Autonomy is thus tied to self-governance and self-formation. 
How exactly should we understand the ‘I over and above the drives’ in Anderson’s 
account? He specifies that the self as ‘a whole is something over and above the constituent 
drives and affects, but it is not a simple, essentially unified and conscious, transcendental 
ego, which is fundamentally different in kind from the attitudes that compose it’ 
(2012:17). In this way, Anderson resists both naturalistic and transcendentalist readings.  
Unlike Gardner, Anderson does not see the need for a transcendental self in Nietzsche’s 
account: ‘this minimal self lacks the strong features of a transcendental ‘I’; it is complex, 
not simple, and its boundaries do not coincide with those of consciousness’ (2012:1). By 
envisaging the soul as a multiplicity 'soul as society of drives and affect' (BGE 12) 
Nietzsche denies that 'whatever is subjective at all must exhibit a strong and essential 
unity proper to consciousness as such, and thus to deny that there is any need to postulate 
a unified transcendental ego' (2012:8). Gardner's claim that there is a 'buried 
transcendental dimension' in Nietzsche's thought thus appears problematic.  
Transcendentalist accounts like Gardner's are motivated by normative concerns 
regarding value creation. For an individual to create values, a precondition is for them to 
have a conception of themselves as a unified practical agent who is the source of these 
values: 'even if the values she posits are influenced by the drives within her, the individual 
self must (first-personally) think of them as her own—and not merely the demands of 
some dominating drive—on pain of a ‘profound self-alienation’ (Gardner 2009:9)' 
(2012:4). Here the idea of possession of drives in a personal manner is important.  
However, it is not obvious that this is the only way of thinking about preconditions for 
value creation. Like Katsafanas, Anderson suspects that the psychological apparatus 




creation which is essential to self-formation. He suggests that the explanatory resources 
of Nietzsche's moral psychology are infinitely richer and more diverse than a naturalist 
belief/desire psychology, and it would seem strange to ignore the complexity of the 
psychological apparatus Nietzsche offers.  
How does Anderson understand the drives and affects?  
Here, Anderson argues that in terming the soul a ‘social structure of the drives and affects’ 
and a ‘subjective multiplicity’, Nietzsche resists strong eliminativism or any reductionist 
positions (contra naturalistic interpretation), about the relation between the self and its 
constituents. According to Anderson the mentions of ‘social structure’ implies: 
something that goes beyond the individuals who participate in it – a more or 
less definite group reality that may or may not characterise those individuals 
and their relations’ and ‘subjective multiplicity’ suggest ‘a structure with the 
subjective capacity to inhabit attitudes of its own, including, potentially, 
attitudes towards its constituent drives and affects. 
(2012:10) 
These characterisations of the soul heavily imply for Anderson that the self has some 
emergent reality over and above its constituent drives and affects.  
Like Katsafanas, Anderson views drives as having two-place complements (in contrast to 
something like perception of an object which has a one-place complement), and extends 
this model to affects, i.e. drives have an aim/object structure and affects have a stimulus 
object/default behavioural response: ‘the attitude itself colours the salience and 
evaluation of the stimulus object and it governs both the pattern and the manner of the 
agent’s default response’ (2012:12). Both drives and affects already come ‘evaluatively 
pre-loaded’, i.e. ‘the feeling component of affect carries evaluative baggage (p.220) that 
shapes and colours our perception of the stimulus and governs the manner characteristic 
of the default action path it suggests to us’ (2012:13).  
Anderson then goes on to claim that drives and affects work together:  
by associating with an affect, a drive acquires sensitivity to a stimulus and 








Here we get a sense of the mutual recruitability of drives and affects. It is this idea of 
recruiting which Anderson suggests explains ambiguous attitudes. He uses the example 
of an artistic drive to destroy: should this particular drive recruit or be recruited by the 
affect of a ‘Dionysian overflowing of joy and superabundance’ (2012:15) then this is a 
fruitful relationship conducive to flourishing. Conversely, if the same drive recruits or is 
recruited by a vengeful affect such that it expresses a hunger, then this is a relationship 
which is inimical to flourishing. Actions are deemed conducive or inimical to flourishing 
by virtue of the configuration of the drive/affect interaction.  
Anderson then sketches the model of drives and affects in more detail, proposing that the 
‘affects form a cross-hatched, mutually supporting structure of attitudes, whose 
integration rests on the way they are structurally tailored to recruit one another’ 
(2012:15). He also specifies that there exists a ‘one-many’ relation between drives and 
affects, whereby the same affect can be recruited by many different drives, just as the 
same drive can be recruited by various affects. This image of a ‘cross-hatched’ structure 
with one-many relations between drives and affects via recruitability, highlights a crucial 
difference between Nietzsche’s account of the self and Hume’s bundle theory of the self, 
since it does not appear that drives are ‘completely loose, distinct existences’ (2012:16). 
There is some shape to this structure. Anderson also suggests that this structure is not a 
‘mere ‘stage’ upon which they enter and exit for one-off causal interactions. Instead the 
self should be seen as a ‘repository of recruitable drives or affects that are always (p.224) 
available to complete any of its given active drives or affects’ (2012:16). Moreover, 
several drives from the repository may combine to create more complex drives.  
It is this notion of self qua repository which leads Anderson to claim that Nietzsche allows 
a ‘minimal self’ to emerge. Anderson argues that although the minimal Nietzschean self is 
‘built out of the drives, affects, and other attitudes, and could not be what it is without 




Nietzschean self either, in that, for example, the typical complements and contents, and 
hence the functional capacities, of a given attitude will depend on which other drives and 
affects are available for it to recruit’ (2012:16) – hence the idea of the self as a repository 
is required.  
He suggests that this is further supported by the fact that many of these drives and affects, 
far from being ‘fleeting occurrent states à la Hume’, actually persist over time (although 
as previously mentioned, this is not to say that drives and affects cannot be acquired or 
lost, since the boundaries of the minimal self are porous). Since the drives/affects 
generally persist, Anderson argues that the minimal self must have its own:  
separate, diachronic identity, which persists across changes of drives and 
affects.  The minimal self is thus but one psychological structure among the 
others. It acquires the right to the name ‘self’ simply in virtue of being the 
emergent structure that encompasses all of the substructures (p.227) 
available for recruitment by one another. 
(2012:18) 
This model of the minimal self provides Anderson with an interesting way of accounting 
for responsibility in the Nietzschean self. He achieves this by claiming that ‘the self—qua 
the emergent structure encompassing all the co-recruitable attitudes—can suffer from a 
‘gap’ between its own activity and that of some constituent(s)’ (2012:18). Although drives 
and affects are recruitable, this does not guarantee that they will be successfully recruited 
in the appropriate circumstances.  
In such a case, the drive in question remains part of the totality, in that it still exists within 
the repository that is the minimal self. In this way, Anderson claims:  
the minimal self can remain ‘responsible’ for a recalcitrant attitude as 
something that belongs to it—by contrast to a mastering drive or a 
‘crystallization’, wherein any attitude that is not presently and actually 






Here, Anderson is able to preserve some element of the personal, and of ownership. The 
question remains whether this is a satisfying conception of responsibility. It may be 
helpful at this point to recall Gemes’ distinction between deserts free will and agency free 
will: if we assume that Nietzsche accepts agency free will, rather than deserts free will. 
then perhaps this notion of responsibility which Anderson advances in his account seems 
appropriate.  
With this idea of the minimal self, we are left with a conception of responsibility where 
notions of punishment and reward (required for deserts free will) are not applicable, or 
appropriate. Instead all we have is a more detailed description of what occurs during the 
self during agency: some drives or affects may or may not be recruited successfully in the 
appropriate circumstances, and this will be dependent upon the various other 
configurations of drives/affects operating at the time and the external circumstances. Any 
sense of free will is purely in the minimal self’s capacity qua emergent psychological 
structure to stand apart from its configuration of drives and affects.  
It is this which allows the self to:  
have the capacity to take up attitudes (including evaluative attitudes), towards 
the world, and also towards itself and its drives and affects. These reflexive 
attitudes may include consciously reflective, or even deliberative attitudes, 
such as the control of affective interpretations involved in perspectivist 
objectivity, or the more or less explicit attitudes of self-management involved 
in Nietzschean self-overcoming, self-mastery, and so on. 
(2012:19) 
So how should we make sense of self-formation?  
Anderson is however careful to note that:  
the minimal self is just a certain moral psychological structure among the 
drives and affects, no matter how conflictual and disunified they may be’ and 
maintains that ‘one must attain something further to become a self in the 





Anderson here differentiates between two manifestations of the self: 1) the basic minimal 
self and, 2) the normative self which has been created and realises a form of autonomy. 
Can we progress from one to the other, and if so how can this be done?  
Anderson notes that the minimal self is not unified:  
The degree of unity possessed by the minimal self is limited, not only in that 
drives and affects may be unavailable to central consciousness and completely 
non-transparent to one another, but also in that (p.225) different constituents 
of the self may stand in oppositional, even quite conflictual, relations, resulting 
in weakness of will, and the like. 
(2012:17) 
The normative self by contrast cultivates some unity, specifically self-generated unity:  
What makes such unity count as one’s own is precisely its having been self-
generated—that is, the unity among my drives and affects arises from 
regulating control over them that is exercised by and through the attitudes 
proper to the emerging self: to be noble is ‘to have and not have one’s 
affects…at will; to condescend to them…to make use of [them]…’ (BGE 284). 
(2012:22) 
Here, Anderson claims that this is merely an ideal for the relation that ought to obtain 
among the drives and affects, and that ‘whether any individual person attains that ideal 
or not is an empirical question, to be settled by the best interpretation of the person’s life’ 
(2012:22). Self-formation on this account would seem to rely somewhat on external 
factors, which would influence the repository of drives and affects, which then go on to 
mutually recruit each other in ways which are conducive to flourishing, and which would 
generate a more ‘unified’ structure.  
But what should we make of Anderson’s conception of unity? Here we see that Anderson 
assumes that transparency of drives and affects is vital for unity, along with the idea that 
they must be available to a ‘central consciousness’ (he does not, however, go into detail 




the self9). He also makes the assumption that unity is dependent upon synthesis, and 
suggests that the relations between drives and affects cannot be one of synthesis, since 
this would imply that said synthesis is achieved by some separate, unified agency 
(drawing us dangerously close to the Kantian picture). However, as Janaway suggests in 
his account we would do better to think of Einheit in Heraclitean terms where no notion 
of synthesis is required yet there is still unity.  
Anderson thus characterises the self as plastic and capable of creative agency. With his 
notion of recruiting, he illuminates the interactions between the drives and affects, and 
brings in the notion of diachronic identity. The distinction between a minimal self and a 
normative self means that self-formation is something to be achieved, but Anderson does 
not limit this possibility only to the ‘Sovereign Individual’.  
1.4 Evaluation of the Debate  
 
Having examined some of the interpretations of the self in Nietzsche it seems that in no 
way are the various accounts equivalent,10 and this largely due to the fact that they are 
motivated by different concerns. These concerns range from:(i) normativity, (ii) agency, 
(iii)autonomy and freedom, (iv)cognition, (v)conscious willing, (vi)self-knowledge, (vii) 
self-governance, and (viii) first-person subjectivity.  
The extent to which commentators pay attention to the specific workings of the 
components of a Nietzschean self seems to vary. Accounts such as Gemes’ tend to focus 
more on the possibility of autonomy and freedom than the inner workings of the self: 
                                                        
 
9 All that is said regarding consciousness in Anderson’s account pertains to his assertion that the self for 
Nietzsche cannot be transcendental: ‘moreover, the boundaries of the minimal self, unlike those claimed 
for the transcendental ego, are not identical with those of consciousness. In fact, the boundary mismatch 
obtains in both directions: the minimal self encompasses drives and affects it is not aware of, and it may 
have apparent conscious awareness of powers (e.g. the will) that are illusory. Thus, there can be no a priori 
argument from the alleged unity of consciousness to a strong, transcendental unity proper to the minimal 
self.’ However, Anderson does not clarify the status of consciousness in his account of the minimal self; it is 
not clear whether consciousness exists in the repository at the same level of the drives and affects or 
whether it exercises any influence on the process of recruitment.  
10 In the following groupings and comparisons (see table) I wish to only point out general trends amongst 
the commentators not to say that in each account the commentator does not discuss x, y, or z at all or that 




whilst these topics certainly overlap, it is not clear that Gemes pays sufficient attention to 
the actual mechanics and make-up of the self. Similarly, neither Gardner nor Leiter offer 
any detailed treatment of the psychological apparatus Nietzsche provides. Katsafanas, 
Janaway, and Anderson by contrast, look at the operations of within the self in great 
detail, and attempt to trace the exact workings of these psychological elements. But only 
Janaway and Katsafanas attend to the cognitive aspects of the self.  
Commentators also seem to work with different understandings of the following notions: 
(i) free will (incompatibilist notions versus compatibilist notions), (ii) consciousness 
(consciousness qua awakeness/ awareness/ substantive faculty/ reflection/ or self-
consciousness), and (iii) the self (qua state versus qua achievement). The definitions 
adopted can greatly influence accounts: for example, taking consciousness to be bare 
awareness accords consciousness a far more passive role than if we viewed it as a 
reflective capacity. Not all of the accounts discussed make it clear what they take these 
notions to be in Nietzsche’s works, or they offer very selective readings which ignore 
other alternative interpretations, e.g. Leiter on consciousness or free will.  
A running theme in many of the accounts (Gemes, Janaway, Katsafanas) is the idea that 
there are two levels of the self: 1) the self qua state and, 2) the self qua achievement i.e. a 
‘better’ self. This distinction introduces a normative dimension and directly speaks to the 
notion of self-formation. It is not always clear, however, how we ought to go about 
progressing from one to the other: neither Gemes nor Anderson, for example, provide 
much information as to how this may be achieved.  
Comparing and contrasting the accounts examined so far in the table below is helpful to 
see the amount of variation and weighting of concerns in these interpretations: 
 

















Leiter static no yes naturalistic no no 




Katsafanas plastic yes no other no n/a 
Janaway plastic yes no other yes yes 
Gemes static no yes naturalistic yes yes 




We can see that various models of the self emerge, which can be radically different, and 
alongside them, varying understandings of what self-formation might consist in. At times, 
the debate in the secondary literature appears somewhat unclear– perhaps this 
confusion would be avoided if we had a clearer sense of what self-formation entails. Each 
model seems to assume a different understanding of self-formation. Sometimes it looks 
like the process should culminate in an individual who is: (i) free and/or autonomous 
agent, (ii) displays a highly aestheticized notion of Einheit, (iii) capable of self-
governance, (iv) possesses self-knowledge, (v) possesses perspectival knowledge, or (vi) 
capable of self-affirmation. It is not obvious what Nietzsche had in mind with the idea of 
self-formation; whether this process privileges one of the above characteristics, or 
involves a combination of these features.  
Reconstructing a model of a Nietzschean self would be impossible without detailed 
discussion of the drives and affects. However, it seems that we also require a sustained 
discussion of the other aspects of the self, which Nietzsche discusses, e.g. memory, 
imagination, forgetting, intellect, to provide an exhaustive analysis of a Nietzschean self. 
It is not obvious that any of these components can be reduced to a drive or an affect. To 
leave these features out of an account of the Nietzschean self would be somewhat remiss.  
The rest of the thesis will explore some of these components, and note that, from 
Nietzsche’s remarks, they appear to have distinctive regulatory functions. As such, the 
idea of self-regulation may be a useful notion to employ in exploring Nietzsche’s 
treatment of the self. The idea of self-regulation may be helpful in answering the wider 
question: what kind of self can engage in self-formation? One answer is that since 




would be capable of such a feat is one which is relatively stable and resilient. The thesis 
will explore the mechanisms deployed in a Nietzschean self to generate these necessary 
























This chapter aims to elucidate Nietzsche’s understanding of forgetting,11and in doing so, 
sheds light on different structures within the Nietzschean self.12 I suggest that forgetting 
qua capacity has a different functional profile than that of a drive, and that this capacity 
emerges as a crucial regulatory process within the self, providing a necessary condition 
for value generation and reinterpretation.  
Nietzsche presents what seems like an idiosyncratic understanding of forgetting. 
Contrary to the notion of forgetting as a passive, degenerative process i.e.  poor memory-
performance, associated with decline and incapacity, Nietzsche offers us a far more 
nuanced, and (more importantly) positive, understanding of forgetting: ‘it is altogether 
impossible to live at all without forgetting’ (UM II:62).13 The comments he makes 
regarding forgetting are prima facie paradoxical as with the notion of active forgetting in 
the Genealogy: ‘forgetfulness is not just a vis inertiae, as superficial people believe, but is 
rather an active ability to suppress, positive in the strongest sense of the word’ (GM II:1), 
or puzzling as in 'On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense’, where Nietzsche claims that 
we form concepts like ‘leaf’ by ‘forgetting the distinguishing factors’ [durch ein Vergessen 
des Unterscheidenden gebildet]. To what degree can we understand this sort of filtering as 
a case of forgetting?14 It would seem to run counter to our commonsense understanding 
of forgetting: one would presume that we can only forget that of which we have had first-
person awareness: in other words, we might tend to limit forgetting to cases where 
someone, was for a time at least, in a position to remember. However strange or unclear 
                                                        
 
11 I do not have the space here to discuss the broader issue of exactly how Nietzsche’s views on forgetting 
develop across his works. For the purposes of this chapter I shall focus on his remarks on forgetting which 
seem particularly pertinent to the issue of self-regulation, drawing from both early and later works.   
12 Forgetting has hitherto been neglected in accounts of a Nietzschean self by commentators. Even Stern, 
despite offering perhaps the most exhaustive taxonomy of a Nietzschean psychology in his 2014 paper, 
noticeably does not discuss forgetting (not even under ‘miscellaneous’ (2014:9)). 
13 This is not to say that I wish to attribute to Nietzsche a denial of forgetting as understood in common 
parlance. This chapter aims to show that Nietzsche offers an additional rather than alternative 
understanding of this phenomenon.   
14 Here we see Nietzsche’s broader understanding of forgetting. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to 
discuss this in full, but in brief, the use of forgetting as filtering in ‘On Truth and Lies in a non-moral sense’ 
relates to what other philosophers (e.g. the British Empiricists), term ‘abstraction.’ Nietzsche suggests here 
that ‘every concept comes into being by making equivalent that which is non-equivalent’ through 
‘forgetting’ particularising features, and that this gives us the illusion that reality is more stable than it 
actually is. He suggests that this filtering imbues our cognitive processes in general, and strategically 




these remarks may be, it seems important to examine forgetting as Nietzsche frequently 
singles out this phenomenon in his works and stresses its importance: ‘a little tabula rasa 
of the consciousness… active forgetfulness, like a doorkeeper or guardian of mental order, 
rest and etiquette from which we can see there could be no happiness, no hope, no pride, 
no present, without forgetfulness’ (GM II:1).  How should we may sense of this array of 
remarks?  
An initial objection may be that we ought to be cautious about conferring too much 
importance upon this notion of forgetting, and its implications for the self: in the 
Genealogy, Nietzsche presents this phenomenon as part of a larger story about the 
emergence of memory as a capacity required for making and keeping promises (which is, 
in turn, a presupposition of responsibility). This memory-based ability to promise is then 
aligned with, for example the Sovereign Individual and an ideal of free agency (Gemes; 
Poellner; Richardson 2009). However, the status of the Sovereign Individual is somewhat 
fraught (cf. Acampora 200615), which may lead us to doubt the importance of a memory-
based capacity to make promises. I will remain neutral on this particular debate for the 
purposes of this chapter but will merely note that even before considering that question 
it is necessary to ascertain Nietzsche’s stance on forgetting. Moreover, given his 
comments on forgetting throughout his work, it seems that this phenomenon merits 
attention in its own right.   
Examining Nietzschean forgetting will bring up such questions as: how can we 
understand this characterisation of forgetting as active? And just how different is this to 
Freudian repression? I suggest that Nietzschean forgetting is construed as ‘active’ in the 
sense of being an operational subconscious process.  Rather than being viewed as a 
derivative or secondary effect that occurs due to the malfunctioning of some other 
mechanism such as a memory faculty, it is a capacity in its own right. Crucially, it differs 
                                                        
 
15 Acampora (2006) suggests that viewing the Sovereign Individual as one of Nietzsche’s ideals is 
potentially problematic. Aside from there not being very much textual evidence in support of the Sovereign 
Individual (152-153), the very notion does not seem to cohere with what Nietzsche writes about 
subjectivity (specifically the composite nature of the self) in passages like BGE 16-20 and GM I:13. Moreover 
the emphasis on autonomy and free will which we find in the Sovereign Individual potentially rings Kantian 




from the Freudian account in that it involves (at least in its ideal state) a total 
metabolisation of affective material rather than a temporary suppression (where the 
material lies latently and can re-emerge via sublimation). It is this metabolisation which 
accounts for the plasticity of the self. This sense of forgetting, I suggest, is an idealised 
state in the self. Not everyone will be capable of achieving it - Nietzsche seems to restrict 
such a forgetting to the ‘strong’ or ‘healthy’ types. Even those individuals who are capable 
of this forgetting do not consistently achieve this idealised state.16  
Here is the plan for what follows. Section One addresses an objection to the Nietzschean 
concept of ‘active forgetting’, namely that it is prima facie paradoxical. I propose that by 
understanding forgetting as an operative subconscious capacity akin to a faculty,17 (we 
may compare this to a language faculty, functioning but beneath our conscious control), 
Nietzsche provides us with a philosophical psychology which does not in fact come up 
against this paradox.  Section Two examines the functional profile of forgetting, arguing 
that forgetting does not fit the criteria of a drive outlined by commentators such as 
Anderson (2012), Richardson (2004), Katsafanas (2005, 2012, 2016), and Janaway 
(2009), and that it is instead better understood as a capacity. I suggest that this capacity 
is responsive to, and recruited by, the drives in order to reach their ends.18 Section Three 
examines the most important role forgetting has within the self as a regulatory ‘deep-
clean’ procedure, and examines precisely why Nietzsche suggests this mechanism is 
required. This section also discusses how the Nietzschean account of forgetting differs 
from the Freudian model. Forgetting frees up space in the mental economy via alterations 
of the affective valence19 of memories.  Such space is vital for the re-interpretative process 
                                                        
 
16 There is a clear albeit difficult to delineate distinction between individual and collective forgetting (as 
seen in for example On the Genealogy of Morality, where Nietzsche discusses grand cultural forgetting and 
presents the genealogical method as an act of remembering and a means of gaining self-knowledge). For 
the purposes of this chapter I will focus only on individual forgetting.   
17 Bearing in mind Nietzsche’s suspicion of ‘faculties’ (BGE 11) I do not suggest that we straightforwardly 
call forgetting a faculty, but it is a useful way of distinguishing this mental process from something like a 
drive.  
18 The idea of drives recruiting has been discussed by Anderson (2012) and noticeably does not entail that 
we regard the drives as homunculi. Katsafanas (2005) also convincingly argues against the idea of drives 
as homunculi.  
19 There is of course a wide debate in the philosophy of emotion as to how best to understand the notion of 




and allows new values to displace old ones, something which would underpin a 
phenomenon like self-formation. This section also explores the importance of this revised 
model of Nietzschean forgetting for the understanding of several other Nietzschean 
themes such as the Eternal Recurrence and Amor Fati, both key components of his 
practical philosophy.  
 
2.1 The ‘Paradox’ of Active Forgetting 
 
Prima facie, the notion of ‘active forgetting’ seems paradoxical. If I am ‘actively’ forgetting, 
surely I would be undermining my attempts to forget in continually trying to achieve this. 
We might compare this paradox to conscious self-deception or planned spontaneity. Such 
activities defeat their very purpose. Some commentators characterise active forgetting in 
such a way that this paradox does rear its head. Blustein (2014:106) states that for 
Nietzsche ‘who sees volition in both remembering and forgetting…active forgetfulness is 
a reflective and purposive effort’. The term ‘reflective’ immediately has connotations of 
some central controller orchestrating the process.  The status of reflective thought for 
Nietzsche is in any case, contentious; there are passages where he seems to affirm and 
even exalt reflective thought (D 41), but equally passages where he doubts its very 
possibility (BGE 3; D109).20 But is ‘reflective’ the only way to understand ‘active’?  
Let us examine the passage in detail:  
Forgetting is not merely a vis interiae as the superficial imagine; it is rather an 
active and in the strictest sense, positive faculty of repression, that is 
responsible for the fact that what we experience and absorb enters our 
consciousness as little while we are digesting it (one might call the process 
                                                        
 
negative character of memories or an aspect(s) of memories.  The amendment of valence in these cases 
would most likely be a quantitative one, i.e. a lesser degree (amount) of emotion x. 




“inpsychation” [Einverseelung; Einverleibung21] as does the thousandfold 
process, involved in physical nourishment- so called “incorporation”. 
(GM II:1) 
It is not obvious that we need to characterise ‘active’ as ‘reflective’ here. In fact, the 
passage above suggests that this active forgetting is something separate from 
consciousness (where we would normally locate reflective thought), since it controls and 
is ‘responsible’ for what enters, remains, and exits our consciousness.  
So how else may we understand ‘active’ forgetting?  
The word Nietzsche uses is Hemmungsvermögen. A Vermögen may refer to a power, an 
ability, a disposition, or a capacity.  The literal translation of the passage here is that this 
inhibition capacity actively inhibits the digestion of our experiences from rising to the 
surface of consciousness. Whilst we may be accustomed to thinking that we can 
consciously manipulate and direct such things, Nietzsche makes clear that many of our 
mental processes operate covertly at a subconscious level, and that we tend not to have 
any control over them. In this way, an active mental process motivates our actions but in 
such a way that it is not within our conscious control: we can compare this to subsystems 
in the body - circulatory, respiratory etc. which operate automatically. Active is thus 
understood as automaticity in that it is: a) not consciously willed, and b) not something 
that the conscious self can prevent.22 In the next section, I go on to suggest how this 
process is guided by the drives such that the forgetting capacity is active when it is 
enlisted or ‘in use’ by the drives. The psychology we are provided with allows us to call 
forgetting active and enables us to bypass the paradox outlined previously; forgetting is 
understood as the activity of a mental process which operates at a subconscious level 
where we cannot choose to initiate the process or decide its target.  
                                                        
 
21 Einverseelung meaning ‘making it part of the soul’; Einverleibung meaning ‘making it part of the body.’ 
22 This is not to say that active always equals automaticity or that we cannot have active processes which 




In GM II:1 Nietzsche offers a characterisation of forgetting as a capacity in its own right. 
Rather than viewing forgetting as a malfunctioning of memory, i.e. as secondary or 
derivative, Nietzsche refers to forgetting as ‘an apparatus of suppression’ which can be 
‘damaged, so that it stops working’. Here, it seems that forgetting is a stand-alone 
mechanism which can potentially malfunction or be impaired in some way – the person 
whose forgetting mechanism is damaged is compared to a ‘dyspectic’ who ‘cannot ‘cope’ 
with anything’.23  
Forgetting as an active capacity may thus be understood as purposive, but not conscious 
or reflective.  In this way Nietzsche bypasses the paradox (and thereby does not need to 
offer any solution to it). The paradox is only relevant if forgetting is characterised as 
something we can consciously choose to put into practice and direct.  
In the next section, I will explore in greater detail why forgetting for Nietzsche does not 





2.2 How to Understand Nietzschean Forgetting 
 
                                                        
 
23 Striking comparisons may be made here with contemporary neuroscience, and specifically the theory of 
‘motivated forgetting.’ Michael Anderson (2012, 2014) details how mechanisms of inhibitory control exist 
within the mental economy, specifically the suppression of intrusive thoughts via hippocampal activity. 
Such activity prevents memory retrieval and is common in trauma victims who experience memory deficits. 
In this way, forgetting, though not experienced at a conscious level, is far more active than we realise; i.e. it 
is an operational process within the mental economy. With regards to the idea that, as an independent 
capacity, this function can be damaged or impaired in individuals, studies have noted that those suffering 
from post- traumatic stress disorder, exhibit insufficient memory suppression. Here it looks as though this 




The previous section suggests that forgetting is best understood as a capacity.24 Drive-
theory accounts, however, may try to account for the active nature of forgetting by 
characterising it as a drive: Hales and Welshon (2000:168), for example, refer to ‘the 
drive to forget’. However, I argue that forgetting does not fit the criteria of a drive outlined 
by commentators such as Katsafanas (2005, 2009, 2016), Anderson (2012), Janaway 
(2009), all of whom characterise drives as being: a) evaluative, b) directional, and c) 
responsive to other drives and affects. Prima facie it may be tempting to include 
forgetting in this but there are important differences.  
Firstly, drives tend to operate in a particularly specific and targeted manner. Katsafanas 
(2005, 2016) refers to Freud’s distinction between the aim [Ziel] of a drive and the goal 
or target [Objekt] of a drive. Take, for example, a drive to aggression – the aim of this drive 
is just to express aggression but in order to manifest this activity, the drive needs to have 
an object: e.g. in heavy traffic, the object of someone’s drive to aggression might be a slow 
cyclist. We can make sense of the idea of a blanket aggression finding specific targets. It 
seems difficult to map this distinction between an aim and a goal or target on to 
forgetting. If the aim is ‘to forget’, then what is the scope of this aim? It seems somewhat 
extreme to posit some mechanism whose aim is to forget everything. And if we want to 
weaken that aim, and say the aim of the drive to forget is to forget certain things but not 
others, it is not clear what would underpin such limits or rules regarding what is to be 
forgotten. In order to achieve anything as sophisticated as selective forgetting, content 
would have to be evaluated in some way to ascertain whether it should be retained or 
actively suppressed.  To say that a drive to forget is sophisticated enough to choose 
precisely what to forget brings us to the paradox of forgetting. It therefore seems 
problematic to say forgetting has an aim in the sense where calling it a drive proves to be 
explanatory. The functioning of forgetting would therefore be better aligned with a 
                                                        
 
24 It seems odd to characterise forgetting as any of the following components available to us in a 





capacity which does not operate in as sophisticated a manner as a drive, i.e. it does not 
need to select and aim at specific targets.  
Nietzsche refers to conflict between drives, where each drive seeks to dominate and come 
out on top. A drive must therefore at least potentially be able to occupy the seat of control 
amongst other drives. What would a self look like where the drive to forget dominates? 
This seems an unlikely picture: we are left with the amnesiac (in which case this would 
be explained as a secondary effect of the memory faculty being damaged). Even if we posit 
a scenario where it looks as if a drive to forget is dominating (e.g. with someone drinking 
excessively to forget some trauma), then this is explained via other drives or affective 
states (e.g. a drive to shame, disgust etc.). If we then want to suggest that the drive to 
forget is just a drive which necessarily plays a subordinate role to other drives, this is also 
problematic. No other drive seems to be such that it only ever exists in a subordinate 
relational structure, making it difficult to defend the claim that the drive to forget has its 
own distinct structure.  
The last point of difference between a drive and forgetting is the way in which the activity 
of both can be impeded. For the activity of a drive to be inhibited, it must be repressed so 
that other stronger drives dominate and the operation of weaker drives is restricted. In 
D109 Nietzsche describes how we may combat or train drives so as to cause them to 
‘wither away’. However, in such cases it seems all that happens is that the drive exists 
latently. To continue the horticultural metaphor Nietzsche uses in D560 we might 
compare this to a latent flower bulb. The bulb itself is not impaired or damaged: it is 
rather that conditions for its flowering are not present. Similarly, latent drives are not 
impaired or damaged – they retain (if only potentially) their functionality.  A drive is 
therefore not damaged; rather it is restricted by a stronger drive.  Forgetting however 
seems to be a difference case. As discussed in the previous section, Nietzsche makes it 
clear that our ability to forget can be damaged: ‘this apparatus of suppression 
[Hemmungsapparat] is damaged so that it stops working’ (GM II:1).  In this way forgetting 
seems more akin to a faculty in that it can be impaired: we might compare this to the case 
of language (usually characterised as an ability or faculty), and something like Broca’s 




a loss of this capacity. It is not that our ability to construct and operate language is 
repressed, but rather that this ability is damaged.  
For these reasons, it seems we ought to resist characterising forgetting as a drive. 
Conceiving of it as a capacity allows us to: 1) avoid the paradox of active forgetting since 
it operates outside of conscious thought, and 2) account for a weak sense of an aim 
without having to regard forgetting as evaluative and directional.  
This brings us to the question of the relationship between this capacity and other 
components of the mental economy, and specifically the drives and affects. I suggest that 
in examining this relationship, we can come to understand the process of forgetting in the 
self, i.e. how it is that certain material is forgotten and why.  
To explain this, I will draw upon Anderson’s idea that psychological components within 
the Nietzschean self possess the ability to recruit one another. Anderson (2012:14) 
suggests that drives and affects are mutually recruitable: ‘by associating with an affect, a 
drive acquires sensitivity to a stimulus and thereby ‘knows’ when to activate; conversely, 
an affect can give better shape to its pattern of behavioural response by taking up a 
pursuit object from a drive’.  For example, I might be very hungry as I stand waiting in a 
long queue to pay for my sandwich; if someone tries to jump the queue, my drive for food 
might recruit my affect of anger and I snap at the offender, thus ensuring my drive for 
food reaches its object. With the following scenarios, I suggest that the forgetting capacity 
can also function in this manner, i.e. it is sensitive to affective states and responsive to 
drives, and recruited by them to achieve their ends/to reinforce and sustain the 
interpretations they generate.  
In GS 127 Nietzsche gives the example of different perspectives or interpretations of a 
‘violent stimulus’, claiming that whether it is ‘experienced as pleasure and pain is a matter 
of the interpreting intellect, which, to be sure, generally works without our being 
conscious of it; and one and the same stimulus can be interpreted as pleasure or pain’. 
We can imagine that in such a case, these interpretations would need to be reinforced in 
some way such that they maintain sufficient weight for the individual.  To give a specific 
example: running a marathon is at times an undoubtedly painful experience, yet many 




repeatedly sign up to races. Katsafanas (2012) also uses the example of pain during 
exercise, suggesting that it is rendered bearable or even pleasurable by coupling the 
affective experience with the consciously generated interpretation ‘this pain means that 
I am exercising vigorously’. This certainly seems plausible: particularly within the context 
of a race, runners might attend to one or maybe more positive interpretations to motivate 
themselves: ‘this pain means I am exceeding my limits’, ‘this pain indicates I’ll achieve a 
new personal best time’, ‘this pain means I must be a frontrunner in the race’ and so on.  
The idea of interpreting sensations like pain is particularly interesting when we consider 
retrospective interpretations, i.e. how a marathon runner evaluates a race after the event. 
This gives us a good example of how the forgetting capacity can be used to reinforce 
positive interpretations (generated or sustained by e.g. a drive to win, and affects like 
pride), and to allow the individual to avoid placing too much weight on negative affective 
valence, i.e. remembering the degree and intensity of pain experienced during the race, 
and any associated negative interpretations. This kind of explanation may go some way 
in explaining why it is that runners continue to participate in marathons.  
Babel’s (2015) study25 demonstrates that runners do not accurately remember the pain 
induced by physical exercise. When these marathon runners recall a race, we might well 
speculate that something like the capacity of forgetting would be in operation: the 
marathon runner would be able, through this capacity, to dial down any negative affective 
valence i.e. remembering the degree and intensity of pain at the time. If he were able to 
recall this accurately, this could potentially cause him to avoid signing up to races in the 
future. Moreover, remembering this negative affective valence might give negative 
interpretations he held at the time more prominence e.g. ‘I felt like I wasn’t cut out for 
marathons’, and thus discourage him from running again.  
                                                        
 
25 This study consisted of 62 participants who ran the eleventh Cracovia marathon in 2012. Babel gave 
these participants questionnaires a) straight after crossing the finishing line, and b) three or six months 
later to gauge the following: (i) intensity of pain experienced, (ii) unpleasantness of pain, and (iii) their 
feelings of positive or negative emotions. Using a 7 point scale to measure the level of pain, on average, the 
participants reported a level of pain of 5.5 after they had just finished the race. This then dropped to an 




In this way, forgetting would be responsive to other drives, such as the drive to win, and 
other affects such as pride (at winning, in one’s sporting ability), and shame (at losing and 
not meeting one’s standards).26 In such a scenario, both positive and negative 
interpretations related to the event may be retained, but the negative affective valence is 
dialled down.  
We could also see drives recruiting the forgetting capacity in scenarios where the 
material which is deemed inimical to the goal of a drive is external to the individual 
(unlike the case of the marathon runner where the material is internal to his own mental 
apparatus). Katsafanas (2012) refers to the drive to jealousy. This is an interesting 
example as it inevitably involves both an interpersonal element and external factors. 
Under the influence of this drive an individual is inclined to give excessive weight to 
certain features of their environment27 and interactions, e.g. glances, tones of voice and 
so on. However, it is not just that the individual, as Katsafanas suggests, sees justifications 
‘for jealousy everywhere’ or is ‘drawn to certain features of his environment that another 
agent would scarcely notice’ (2012:12).  
The picture is more complicated. A jealous individual not only attributes greater weight 
to features of his environment but simultaneously filters out or suppresses or forgets any 
reason which would counter this jealousy or other elements in his environment which 
would not support his suspicions. For example, a jealous husband tracking his wife’s 
movements may panic at her taking a route which involves passing an ex-boyfriend’s 
house, and forget the fact that this route is the quickest, most convenient route to her new 
workplace (a fact he knows very well). Even if this piece of information is recalled by the 
husband it will be filtered out as not being a viable explanation of his wife’s behaviour. In 
this way, the capacity to forget is recruited to subdue certain factors and enable others to 
                                                        
 
26 Understood in this way, we may, as Blustein (2015:108) notes, draw a parallel between forgetting and 
Hursthouse’s notion of ‘multi-track’ dispositions which are:  concerned ‘with many other actions as well, 
with emotions and emotional reactions, choices, values, desires, perceptions, attitudes, interests, 
expectations and sensibilities.’ 
27 We might compare this to the notions of ‘mood’ and ‘emotion congruence’ in the philosophy of emotion, 
which suggest that affective states tend to draw attention to specific aspects of the surrounding 
environment, sometimes resulting in detrimental epistemological effects for the individual. My thanks to 




come to the fore via the operations of the drive to jealousy. The capacity of forgetting is 
thus able to interact with and be recruited by other drives, forming a subordinate 
relational structure.  
In the previous section, I suggested that in GM II:1 Nietzsche presents forgetting as a 
power [Kraft/vis/Vermögen] that inhibits the becoming conscious of the processing of an 
experience. In this way, Nietzsche’s understanding of forgetting is to be distinguished 
from a momentary incapacity to recall x.  In this section, I have attempted to offer a more 
detailed explanation of this psychological mechanism. In the examples above, we have 
instances of this capacity of forgetting as selective experiences.28 Here we can see how 
the capacity of forgetting interacts with drives and affects to act upon specific material, 
and that this material can be either internal or external to the individual.  
We now have some idea of what kind of psychological structure forgetting is, and how it 
functions and interacts with other components of the mental economy. The purpose of 
this chapter is to elucidate how forgetting acts as a form of self-regulation. The next 
section will examine in closer detail the idea that forgetting as unconscious automatic 
processing, (if it functions correctly), changes affective valences of remembered 
experiences.  
 
2.3 The Role of Forgetting in Self-Regulation   
 
This now brings us to the role forgetting plays in self-regulation. I will explore: 1) why 
Nietzsche thinks forgetting is required for this purpose, and 2) exactly how forgetting 
contributes to self-regulation. I suggest that in amending the affective valence of 
memories, forgetting: a) preserves the strength and health of the mental economy, and 
                                                        
 
28 We might compare this to the notion of a ‘confirmation bias’ in psychology. This is also similar to 
Riccardi’s point in ‘Nietzsche’s Sensualism’ (2011:246ff) about selective perceiving. Using Papineau (2007), 
Riccardi argues that selective perception can be seen as using sensory templates. There is a parallel here 
with the idea of forgetting as filtering where things are interpreted in light of a hypothesis – in the example 




b) creates new mental space needed for value generation. In this way, forgetting provides 
a necessary condition for Nietzsche’s practical philosophy, specifically the idea of 
reinterpretation.   
Contrary to the Platonic emphasis on reminiscence and recollection, Nietzsche proposes 
that forgetting is an important component of healthy cognition and a conditio sine qua 
non of flourishing, repeatedly aligning forgetting with strength: ‘his strength lies in 
forgetting himself’ (UMII: 4; cf. GM I:10, GM II:1, EH ‘Wise’ 2). Nietzsche is almost 
unreservedly positive about the phenomenon of forgetting,29 and this psychological 
mechanism, according to commentators such as Swanton (2015) and Blustein (2014), is 
even elevated to the status of a virtue.30 
For Nietzsche, a key characteristic of the strong and healthy is that they are able to ‘forget’ 
in the sense of ‘moving on from x’ or ‘not dwelling on x.’ ‘X’ here stands for experiences 
which one has found to be unpleasant (including one’s own misdemeanours). Why does 
Nietzsche advocate this process of moving on from x or not dwelling on x? In order to 
understand the full weight of this, it is worth briefly examining Nietzsche’s idea that we 
need to have the right kind of relationship to the past.  
What would this relationship look like? We can begin to sketch out an answer to this 
question by looking at examples where Nietzsche seems to detail problematic 
relationships with one’s personal past. In works such as the second Untimely Meditation 
and On the Genealogy of Morality31, there are passages where Nietzsche displays a clearly 
                                                        
 
29 In the Preface to The Gay Science Nietzsche even aligns forgetting with the artistic: ‘oh how we now learn 
to forget well, and to be good at not knowing, as artists!’ and contrasts it with the less admirable ‘will to 
truth’ which seeks to uncover and unveil what should remain hidden.  
30 As Swanton suggests, forgetting is viewed as being ‘a virtue of considerable psychological importance 
which also underlines other virtues like justice’ (Swanton 2015: 161), and in this way, it appears as a virtue 
which possesses both intrinsic and foundational importance. Blustein (2014:107) also refers to forgetting 
as a Nietzschean virtue.  
31 This is not to say that Nietzsche is wholly negative about memory in these works. In the second Untimely 
Meditation and his discussion of critical history, Nietzsche appears very positive about the use of memory 
vis-à-vis culture and history at some larger level. In the Genealogy, the very method of genealogy appears 




ambivalent or even negative attitude towards the idea that our past plays a role in 
shaping us.  
I suggest that two characteristics to be avoided emerge: 1) an over-preoccupation with 
these memories (regardless of whether the memories are good or bad) as seen at the 
beginning of the second Untimely Meditation, 2) a tendency to utilise negative affective 
content from unpleasant memories to facilitate phenomena like ressentiment, as seen in 
the Genealogy with the example of the slaves.  
If an individual displays this kind of relationship with their past, the kind of self which is 
then constituted allows past events too much influence on their emotional lives, their 
attitudes, and their actions. Given the emphasis Nietzsche places upon reinterpretation, 
it seems that this kind of relationship with one’s personal past is problematic. 
Let us look at this idea of over preoccupation with the past in closer detail. Whilst much 
of the second Untimely Meditation is concerned with the past qua history or culture on a 
grand-scale, certainly at the beginning of this work, I take many of Nietzsche’s remarks 
to apply to the past of an individual. Here, Nietzsche first presents the idea that we can, 
at times, be overly-preoccupied or overly-dependent upon the past, and that this can 
occur regardless of whether the content of our memories is positive or negative. A 
consequence of this over-preoccupation with the past is that it may impede present and 
future projects, thus debilitating the individual.  In this way, autobiographical memory 
has the potential to be a psychological burden – Nietzsche describes it as a 'chain': 
He also wonders at himself, that he cannot learn to forget but clings relentlessly 
to the past: however far and fast he may run, this chain runs with him. And it 
is a matter for wonder: a moment, now here and then gone, nothing before it 
came, again nothing after it has gone, nonetheless returns as a ghost and 
disturbs the peace of a later moment.  
(UM II:61) 
Here Nietzsche focuses on the relationship one has to the past and one’s memories, and 
the idea that this relationship is one of over-dependence upon and an over-preoccupation 
with the past. The mention of 'chain' suggests a binding relationship where the individual 




as an obstructive capacity, preventing the individual from fully engaging with present or 
future projects. 
It is particularly easy to understand this thought with the idea that an individual is 
plagued by painful memories, which act as ‘a dark, invisible burden’ (UM II:61). For 
example, we might think of trauma victims who are unable to move on from past events 
and whose lives continue to be dictated by these events. But this could equally happen 
with more pleasant memories: we can also imagine someone who is overly nostalgic and 
unwilling to let go of the past: in this scenario, the memories will have positive affective 
experiences associated with them and the individual may wish to ‘re-live’ these moments- 
perhaps to such an extent that they are disengaged with or even hostile to the present 
and/or the future. In this passage, Nietzsche remains neutral on the actual content of the 
memories or the affective experiences associated with them: the point seems to be that, 
regardless of the semantic content of the memories and their associated affective content, 
we can be overly-dependent on them such that this has a debilitating effect.  
Later Nietzsche crystallises this over-preoccupation with the past into a single phrase ‘it 
was’, describing it as ‘that password which gives conflict, suffering and satiety access to 
man so as to remind him what his existence fundamentally is – an imperfect tense that 
can never become a perfect one [ein nie zu vollendendes Imperfectum]’ (UM II:61). This 
reference to the imperfect could suggest something bittersweet. As a tense, the imperfect 
at once situates an action in the past (meaning that this is something that we no longer 
have access to), whilst suggesting that there is a continuous or repetitive aspect to the 
action (meaning that there is some sense that the action was never fully completed). In 
this way, Nietzsche suggests that our actions and projects will inevitably be disturbed or 
frustrated, and that our memories, whether good or bad, serve as reminders of this fact. 
Fixating on the past in this way, therefore only makes us aware of transience. Another 
way of understanding the ‘it was’ is as continued or repeated reverberation of (painful) 
memories. It is perhaps for this reason, that in the third Untimely Meditation, Nietzsche 
suggests that our relationship to memory and our past is in fact one of fear:  
everyone is familiar with the strange condition in which unpleasant memories 
suddenly assert themselves and we then make great efforts, through vehement 




which are going on everywhere reveal that we are all in such a condition all the 
time, that we live in fear of memory and of turning inward.  
 (UM III: 158) 
An over-preoccupation with one’s memories therefore has the potential to be a 
distracting or even incapacitating force. It seems that with the idea of moving on from x 
or not dwelling on x, Nietzsche is suggesting that we do not get tied down to the past and 
avoid this inertia or continuation of suffering.  
In On the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche gives another insight into how one’s 
relationship with the past can be troubling, namely the idea that individuals retain and 
utilise negative memories to fuel current negative affective experiences. In this work, 
Nietzsche contrasts the ‘prodigious memory’ (Deleuze:1962:108) of the slaves to the 
ability of the nobles to forget past misdemeanours (whether their own or those of 
others)32.  
Constantly oppressed by the nobles, the slaves amass unpleasant experiences and 
memories of these experiences, and allow associated negative affective content to linger 
in their mental economies. In Ecce Homo Nietzsche describes what happens if these 
memories and the associated affective content is retained–individuals are unable to 'get 
rid of anything, you do not know how to get over anything, you do not know how to push 
anything back, -everything hurts’ (‘Why I am so Wise’ 6). Without forgetting 'men and 
things come importunately close, events strike too deep, the memory is a festering 
wound' ('Why I am so wise' 6). Here the thought seems to be that if one's mental economy 
becomes oversaturated with (presumably painful) memories, this creates trauma for the 
individual – a thought echoed in Thus Spoke Zarathustra when Nietzsche calls memory 
the will's ‘loneliest misery’ where the individual ‘impotent against that which has been' 
is reduced to 'an angry spectator of everything past' (TSZ ‘On Redemption’). 
                                                        
 
32 ‘A man like this shakes from him, with one shrug, many worms which would have burrowed into another 




This seems to be precisely what occurs in the case of the slaves – rather than forgetting 
painful events they have undergone, they hold on to these moments, building up feelings 
of ressentiment: 'he knows all about keeping quiet, not forgetting, waiting, temporarily 
humbling and abasing himself’ (GM I:10). The danger here is not merely that these 
memories are retained but rather the individual then utilises them in further self-
destructive projects. In GM III:15 Nietzsche suggests that the slaves mine their unpleasant 
memories they have stored up, to further facilitate feelings of ressentiment within their 
psychology: 
The sufferers...enjoy being mistrustful and dwelling on wrongs and imagined 
slights: they rummage through the bowels of their past and present for 
obscure, questionable stories that will allow them to wallow in tortured 
suspicion, and intoxicate themselves with their own poisonous wickedness.  
(GM III:15) 
These negative memories provide them with 'evidence' for their suspicions and foster 
feelings of mistrust. In this way, their memories bolster negative affective content – the 
slaves use memories to amplify and justify their current emotional states. This activity 
contributes to a sense of self which is primarily reactive- the slaves constitute themselves 
in such a way that their present self is determined by resentment towards past 
experiences. In this passage, with the references to intoxication and poison [am eignen 
Gifte der Bosheit sich zu berauschen] Nietzsche seems to suggest that this process is 
unhealthy.  
We are now in a position to see why Nietzsche advocates forgetting in the sense of moving 
on from x or not dwelling on x. It permits a healthier relationship with the past: enabling 
the individual not to feel tied to their past such that it prevents them from engaging in 
future projects, and allowing them to disassociate from negative affective content.    
2.3.1 How to Forget 
 
In what way should we ‘move on’ from unpleasant memories? There are several options. 
The ‘healthy’ form of forgetfulness Nietzsche advocates, is, as Swanton (2015:163) notes, 




caused’, and b) 'a form of weak forgetfulness which is a form of escape from self'.  In this 
way, Nietzsche does not promote callousness or total indifference. Such an attitude would 
not involve any real confrontation with past events. In order for painful memories to be 
fully processed they must first be acknowledged (we may think of the confrontational 
lion in ‘The Three Metamorphoses’ here).  
The 'strong' form of forgetting Nietzsche has in mind has more to do with moving on and 
not dwelling on past transgressions via a total absorption of these experiences.  The 
failure of an individual to fully process memories in this manner results in self-hate, guilt, 
and regret and is a sign of weakness. So how are we to understand this notion of 
absorption?  
If we return to GM II:1 we can see how Nietzsche utilises the analogy of digestion to 
illustrate this idea:  
Forgetting …. is responsible for the fact that what we experience and absorb 
enters our consciousness as little while we are digesting it (one might call the 
process "inpsychation") as does the thousandfold process, involved in physical 
nourishment—so called "incorporation”.  
(GM II:1)  
The analogy here is complex33 and aligns the mental with the physiological. Nietzsche 
mentions three processes: (i) absorption, (ii) digestion, and (iii) incorporation. 
Absorption implies that material is taken in indiscriminately just as a sponge soaks up 
water. The idea of digestion, however, is more nuanced. The act of ingesting food is 
usually reflectively conscious but the processing or digesting of the food is not – it merely 
occurs automatically without our being reflectively conscious of it (unless of course you 
suffer from indigestion and consciously experience stomach pains). Nietzsche seems to 
suggest here that the case of experience and memory is analogous – we experience events 
consciously but the process of what he calls “inpsychation” or “incorporation” is 
unconscious. If the experiential material is something which seems particularly resistant 
                                                        
 




to being incorporated (for example, experiences that generate anger or jealousy or 
something like a trauma, i.e. things that are difficult to move on from), then this could be 
experienced consciously. Emotions like anger or jealousy seem particularly salient to us. 
In such cases, Nietzsche suggests that, as a ‘positive faculty of repression’ the forgetting 
capacity would become operational, and inhibit this material from rising to the surface of 
consciousness.  
At this point, we might think that Nietzsche is presenting something like an account of 
Freudian repression where material is effectively censored. In BGE 68 Nietzsche gives the 
example of the drive to pride dominating and suppressing memories: ‘“I have done that”, 
says my memory. “I cannot have done that,” says my pride, and remains unyielding. 
Eventually – memory yields.’34  
However, Nietzsche is not being proto-Freudian. As Conway suggests what Nietzsche is 
advocating is a 'deep forgetfulness', i.e.  ‘a complete metabolisation of experience rather 
than the repressive forgetfulness that Freud’s later concept of the Unconscious 
introduced into the mental economy, where what is put there clamours to be made 
conscious and so is not deeply forgotten' (2012: 38). On Freud’s model the suppression 
is only temporary, and material can continue to manifest itself via maladaptive 
behaviours and anxiety, thus still exercising a potentially toxic effect on the individual. 
For example, we might think of someone who, as a child, was bullied mercilessly, 
managed to repress those experiences, but as an adult is often overly defensive at work, 
and as a result is a very difficult colleague. In this scenario, it seems that the original 
negative affective valence of that childhood experience still plays some motivational 
component in the individual’s behaviour in later life. This is a crucial difference between 
                                                        
 
34 In this passage Nietzsche presents something similar to Freudian repression, and explains it through the 
activity of the drives: here we see an agonistic process whereby the drive to remember loses out to the 




Nietzschean forgetfulness and Freudian repression.35 In order to understand this 
difference, we must return to the notion of digestion.  
Nietzsche’s analogy suggests that just like food, experiential material is not taken in in a 
haphazard manner. Just as nutrients are extracted from the food and incorporated into 
the body to serve certain ends (e.g. calcium strengthens bones), experiential material is 
also sorted and processed. Once the material has been taken in and made use of, it is then 
properly eliminated with no harmful residual existence: ‘… forgetting plays a role in the 
regulatory process that permits us to appropriate our experience such that we take from 
it what is necessary and rid ourselves of what is not' (Acampora 2006: 149).  This seems 
to be an important point: if forgetting is really meant to be a mechanism to maintain 
mental health -'a doorkeeper, a preserver of psychic order, repose, and etiquette’- then 
ensuring that harmful material is properly eliminated seems to be more effective than 
simply repressing it, whereby it can re-emerge in other (potentially) destructive ways. 
The use of ‘he cannot “have done” with anything’ implies that there needs to be this 
finality of moving on in forgetfulness.36  
Nietzsche returns to the analogy of digestion later in the Genealogy, explicitly aligning the 
ability to process experiences in this manner with a strong and healthy individual:37  
 
a strong and well-formed man digests his experiences (including deeds and 
misdeeds) as he digests his meals, even when he has hard lumps to swallow. If 
he ‘cannot cope’ with an experience, this sort of indigestion is as much 
                                                        
 
35 This is not to say that on the Nietzschean model it is never the case that there is material which is not 
forgotten – this process of ‘total metabolisation’ is for Nietzsche an ideal, and only achievable by certain 
individuals.  
36 It seems that in order to achieve this finality, forgetting must work upon not only occurrent beliefs but 
also dispositional beliefs.  
37 Cf. UM II: 63: ‘There are those who are so little affected by the worst and most dreadful disasters, and 
even by their own wicked acts …The stronger the innermost roots of a man’s nature, the more readily will 
he be able to assimilate and appropriate the things of the past’; GM I:10: ‘of what concern are my parasites 
to me? It [a society of strong individuals) would be entitled to say. May they live and prosper: I am strong 




physiological as any other- and often, in fact, just one of the consequences of 
that other.   
(GM III:16) 
This ability to ‘cope’ with an experience is translated into the physiological. In this way, 
we see how forgetting an experience and digesting it is both a sign of and a means to 
preserving or augmenting a strong constitution.38  
Processing experiences in this fruitful manner – via assimilation and appropriation- 
affords strong individuals even more strength and endurance.39 At this point, we ought 
to emphasise the distinction between evaluative content of an experience on the one 
hand, and affective valence of an experience, on the other. The former can be understood 
as an assessment of the experience, e.g. ‘breaking my leg was horrifically painful’, ‘I didn’t 
enjoy playing in my grade 2 piano exam at the time’, ‘I was really proud of myself when I 
passed my driving test’, whilst the latter can be seen as relating to the degree and 
intensity of the emotion experienced at the time, such that the individual is able to, to an 
extent, re-live the experience.    
I suggest that an experience is digested if and only if: a) the evaluative content (positive 
or negative) of the experience is retained, b) any positive affective valence associated 
with the experience is retained, and c) negative affective valences associated with the 
experience are reduced or removed such that they no longer play any motivational role 
in the individual’s attitudes and/or behaviour (unlike in the example of the bullied child). 
Not everyone is able to process experiences in this manner. So called ‘weaker types’, with 
a substandard drive configuration, are more likely to retain these past experiences in full 
affective detail, i.e. retaining the negative affective valences, which weakens them further: 
‘there are people who possess so little of this power that they can perish from a single 
                                                        
 
38 The idea that forgetting is an integral capacity is underlined by Nietzsche’s remarks on mnemonics and 
the memory of the will in GM II:3 where he suggests that it is only through great pain that we can counteract 
forgetting: ‘a thing must be burnt in so that it stays in the memory: only something that continues to hurt 
stays in the memory.’ 




experience, from a single painful event, often and especially from a single subtle piece of 
injustice, like a man bleeding to death from a scratch’ (UM II:62).40  
At this point, we might question whether the idea of retaining negative affective valence 
need always weaken the individual, as Nietzsche suggests. It seems that this will depend 
on the specific emotional form this negative affectivity takes, for example there may be 
cases where the emotion of shame has strengthening effects, such as compelling the 
individual to cultivate certain character traits, which will ensure he will not be confronted 
with those sorts of difficult (shame-inducing) situations again.  It may be better then, to 
restrict Nietzsche’s claim to self-reflexive emotions that signal situations the individual 
cannot do anything about (these may well arise in the bullied child case). In such cases, it 
makes sense to say that the negative affective valence would have a debilitating effect on 
the individual if retained.  
The idea of incorporation (as ‘digestion’ of experiences) engendering strength gains 
further traction in GS 110: ‘the strength of knowledge lies not in its degree of truth, but 
in its age, its embeddedness, its character as a condition of life.’  The suggestion here is 
that in strong individuals only memories which serve to strengthen their hierarchy of 
drives (be these pleasant or unpleasant memories) are permitted to remain. The ‘degree 
of truth’ of such a mental item is not of primary importance.   
Nietzsche extends the metaphor of the physiological beyond his analogy of forgetting as 
digestion to include medical language. The emphasis on forgetting as recuperation is 
striking. In GM I:10 he declares: ‘to be unable for any length of time to take his enemies, 
his accidents, his misdeeds themselves seriously – that is the sign of strong, full natures 
in which there is an excess of formative, reconstructive, healing power which makes one 
forget,’ and in UM II: 62: ‘the capacity to develop out of oneself in one’s own way, to 
                                                        
 
40 We may recall the slaves of the Genealogy who possess a ‘prodigious memory’ (Deleuze: 1962: 108), 
which leads to guilt and ressentiment. They must remember precisely so they can continue to deny and ‘say 
no to what is ‘outside,’ what is ‘different,’ what is ‘not itself.’’ (GM I:10). This is not to say however that 
Nietzsche is wholly negative about memory. In (UM II:63) he suggests that a balance ought to be struck 
between memory and forgetfulness: ‘cheerfulness, the good conscience, the joyful deed, confidence in the 
future – all of them depend…on one’s being just as able to forget at the right time as to remember at the 




transform and incorporate41 into oneself what is past and foreign, to heal wounds…’42 
The image of the self which emerges here is one of malleability: a strong individual heals 
themselves via this ‘plastic power’ (UM II:62) of forgetting by incorporating painful 
experiences in such a way that their damaging effects are curbed, i.e. the negative 
affective valence of the experience is diminished.43  
It can, of course, be objected that, by Nietzsche’s own standards, remembering one’s 
experiences vividly in fully affective detail is a sign of strength or health.  We might think 
of so-called “artistic types,” such as writers, poets, artists, musicians, or actors who often 
draw on their experiences in their works, re-engaging with and challenging the affective 
valence of these experiences. One of Nietzsche’s favourite examples of an “artistic type” 
is Goethe, and it seems unlikely that Goethe necessarily forgot full affective detail in 
processing his experiences. One way we might account for such a worry is to say that in 
the case of these individuals the drive to artistic creativity, being particularly dominant, 
is able to channel and transform this affective valence. The idealised state of forgetting I 
discuss in this chapter is thus not the only ideal for healthy individuals, but rather one 
amongst other possible ideals which are conducive to flourishing, such as the artistic 
ideal.   
The language of convalescence Nietzsche uses suggests that, through forgetting, the self 
is able to regulate itself. By absorbing and incorporating experiences in such a way as to 
avoid the damaging effects, the self is able to stabilise itself and preserve its strength.  
Forgetting aspects of certain experiences may affect the way other drives and affects 
                                                        
 
41 Huddleston (2017:13) discusses the merits of incorporation over extirpation, suggesting that for 
example with elements of the self, such as pride, lust to rule, sensuality etc., ‘the healthier response, often, 
is to be able to incorporate or integrate these elements into the whole that one potentially is.’ 
42 Cf. ‘Only now do I believe you healed: for healed is who forget’ (7. Friedrich Nietzsche, Zwiegespräch, in 
Gedichte, R. Kray and K. Riha, eds. (Frankfurt: Insel Taschenbuch, 1994), p. 54: "Jetzt erst glaub ich dich 
genesen: / Denn gesund ist, wer vergass.") 
43 This narrative of resilience to sickness via incorporation is also extended to whole cultures: ‘it is precisely 
at this injured and weakened spot that the whole body is as it were inoculated with something new; its 
strength must, however, be as a whole sufficient to receive this new thing into its blood and to assimilate 
it…  a people that becomes somewhere weak and fragile but is a whole still strong and healthy is capable of 




interact with each other, subduing or augmenting their activity according to the 
experiences forgotten, affording the individual a sense of therapy. 
The phenomenon of self-regulation seems vital for allowing an individual to take up 
second-order attitudes against their experiences. Janaway invokes this notion of second-
order attitudes in relation to taking up an affirmative stance and being ‘well-disposed’ to 
one’s life, noting that:  
Nietzsche does not speak of assessing or judging the amount of good that a life 
contains. Rather his question seems to be: given the amount of suffering, lack, 
boredom, and triviality in a life, how well-disposed can you be towards it? 
(2009:196) 
Becoming well-disposed involves second-order attitudes. Janaway suggests that: 
numerous events in any life will be undergone, remembered, or anticipated 
with a negative first-order attitude; but that is compatible with a second-order 
attitude of acceptance, affirmation, or positive evaluation towards one’s having 
had these negative experiences. 
(2007:257-8) 
It seems plausible that we might take up such attitudes of acceptance or positive 
evaluation with regards to unpleasant or difficult scenarios, in which there is some kind 
of instrumental payoff: consider for example, a painful trip to the dentist – here we can 
recognise this event as involving a negative first-order attitude, but there seems to be 
some purpose to it which we would positively evaluate, i.e. maintaining good dental 
health. This kind of scenario is in keeping with a thought that Nietzsche sometimes seems 
to express – what doesn’t kill me, makes me stronger. But this thought, and Janaway’s 
suggestion, seem somewhat difficult to transpose to extreme cases, e.g. traumatic 
episodes where there does not seem to be any instrumental payoff available. I suggest 
that from Nietzsche’s remarks on forgetting, we can infer that, at times at least, he 
advocates something different to the ‘what doesn’t kill me makes me stronger’ stance, 
and seems to put forward a means of treating our experiences, such that we can 




Forgetting facilitates such second-order attitudes: it allows a process of digestion to take 
place. We may acknowledge and remember that a past event was unpleasant (thus 
retaining evaluative content, both positive and negative), but we manage not to dwell on 
this in such a way that it paralyses us. For example, if every time I ride a bike, I remember 
the very first time I attempted this, and the painful crash which resulted, I would not be 
able to cycle without some trepidation. Such a memory may of course be recalled in exact 
detail (i.e. the evaluative content: ‘I crashed into a tree’, ‘I needed stitches’ ‘it was a 
horrible incident’ and so on) but the strong affective valence of fear, pain, and humiliation 
is dialled down, and consequently we will not re-live the experience in the same manner. 
Recalling and re-living seem to be phenomenologically different episodes, and the 
distinction is important.44  
In this way affirmation need not always be an enthusiastic celebration but can instead be 
characterised as a somewhat neutral acceptance. The unpleasant event does not affect 
me in the same way anymore (although I am able to acknowledge how and why it was so 
unpleasant); I am able to move on from it having taken the strengthening ‘nutrients’ from 
the experience. Forgetting therefore should not be understood as re-editing or censoring 
but as this phenomenon of digestion.  
The sense of affirmation that forgetting affords is particularly important for two key 
themes in Nietzsche’s practical philosophy, namely Amor Fati (EH ‘Why I am so clever’ 
10; GS 276) and the Eternal Recurrence (GS 285; 341; TSZ ‘On the Vision and the Riddle’). 
In Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche states that ‘the child is innocence and forgetting, a 
new beginning, a game, a wheel rolling out of itself, a first movement, a sacred yes-saying’ 
(I: Three Metamorphoses). Here forgetting is explicitly linked with affirmation.  This is 
not the place for a full analysis of Amor Fati or the Eternal Recurrence, and, bearing in 
mind that there is little interpretative consensus, I do not take a strong stance here, but, 
for the purposes of this chapter, I will refer to one popular interpretation of the themes 
as existential tests or challenges cf. Ridley ‘the best way to construe Amor Fati throughout 
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Nietzsche's work, then, is as an ethical injunction concerning one's attitude towards the 
world, rather than as a (disguised) metaphysical thesis about how much of the world is 
necessary’ (2005: xvii). Understood this way, it is worth noting the tension that emerges 
between: 1) the strong rhetoric of ‘innocence’, and 2) the idea that in order for the test to 
be real, we have to remember the totality of our life’s events.  
It seems that, on this picture, not everyone will be able to resolve the tension and pass 
the test. Those who remember the full affective valence of past events may not pass the 
test (as the episodes would be deemed too unpleasant to affirm), neither may those who 
either did not have a full-blown affective experience in the first place and were 
completely disengaged (e.g. the masters in the Genealogy who exhibit a ‘water off a duck’s 
back’ attitude), or those who have forgotten the affective experience in a traditional sense 
(i.e. that memory is not available for recall). We could imagine, however, how those who 
are able to remember past events with the second-order willing which forgetting permits, 
whereby the affective valence of events has been amended or dialled down, could be 
successful. 
The notion of absorption via forgetting is a key component of a healthy individual for 
Nietzsche. It also attests to his conception of health as an ideal rather than as a norm. 
Contrary to a static, non-personal notion of health, Nietzsche instead suggests that health 
is individual and contextual, and something which must be constructed45 (GS 120; HAH 
I:286). Health is dependent upon ‘your goal, your horizon, your energies, your impulses, 
your errors, and above all on the ideals and phantasms of your soul’. The inclusion of 
‘errors’ here is important – it suggests that we have to find some means of dealing with 
such experiences. Forgetting presents itself as a viable method for processing ‘errors’ by 
limiting the affective impact of unpleasant recollections: ‘that which such a nature cannot 
subdue it knows how to forget’ (UM II:63). In a strong individual, forgetting will be 
especially active, treating material in response to other drives (e.g. the drive to pride) 
such that the individual is able to work towards goals.   
                                                        
 




2.3.2 Mental “Space” and Reinterpretation  
 
The proper ‘digestion’ of experiences due to forgetting has the added benefit of freeing 
up mental “space”. Such space should not be characterised in terms of storage or capacity; 
i.e. it is not a matter of deleting memories to make room for new ones. Rather, according 
to Nietzsche, forgetting amends the affective valence of our memories, and avoids an 
overloading or congestion of affective states which would impede further attitudes and 
actions. (On the Freudian model, by contrast, the problem is that for the analysand the 
affective valence of repressed past events does remain unchanged.) The “space” can thus 
be understood as a freeing up of mental energy. In this way, the capacity to forget 
performs a ‘deep-clean’ procedure within the mental economy: 
To close the doors of consciousness for a time…a little quietness, a little tabula 
rasa of the consciousness, to make room for new things, above all for the 
nobler functions and functionaries, for regulation, foresight, premeditation 
….so that it will be immediately obvious how there could be no happiness, no 
hope, no pride, no present, without forgetfulness. 
(GM II:1) 
This space is therefore essential for: a) the well-being or ‘happiness’ of the individual, b) 
their agency, and c) their ability to engage in the re-interpretative project. Nietzsche first 
links happiness and forgetting in ‘On the uses and disadvantages of history for life’ where 
he suggests that ‘it is always the same thing that makes happiness happiness:46the ability 
to forget.’ Remembering and re-living all past events in full affective detail has a highly 
detrimental effect upon an individual, congesting their memory and overloading their 
affective responses.47 In the same work, Nietzsche suggests that forgetting is part and 
parcel of agency – without this phenomenon we would be left unable to act:  
                                                        
 
46 The happiness Nietzsche describes here is contrasted with ‘the dark, invisible burden’ and ‘pressure’ of 
the past (UM II:61).  
47 This claim strikes a chord with cases of hyperthymesia, a condition whereby individuals possess an 




Imagine the extremest possible example of a man who did not possess the 
power of forgetting …. such a man would no longer believe in his own being, 
would no longer believe in himself…he would in the end hardly dare to raise 
his finger. Forgetting is essential to action of any kind.48  
(UM II:62) 
Forgetting here is seen as a facilitator or enabler of action and further experiences. By 
limiting any affective congestion, the individual is able to properly entertain and engage 
with future-directed thoughts and projects, i.e. the ‘nobler functions’ of ‘regulation, 
foresight, premeditation’.   
Nietzsche further develops the idea that forgetfulness is necessary for action (in that it 
facilitates other drives),49 and specifically value creation, in the second Untimely 
Meditation by aligning it with the ‘unhistorical’. The ‘unhistorical’ is characterised as ‘an 
atmosphere within which alone life can germinate, and with the destruction of which it 
must vanish.’50 Nietzsche describes the unhistorical as a creative hotbed for values. 
Initially the unhistorical individual, who is not tied down by thoughts of the past, is 
blinded and overwhelmed by the present, making it difficult for him to evaluate (UM 
II:64).  However, this state is the necessary precursor to value generation and contains 
within it all denominations of values: ‘it is the condition in which one is the least capable 
of being just….and yet this condition unhistorical, anti-historical through and through – 
is the womb not only of the unjust but of every just deed too.’  In effect, we must wipe the 
                                                        
 
anonymiser ‘AJ’) reported her condition to Parker, Cahill, and McGaugh (2006) as being ‘totally exhausting’ 
and ‘a burden.’  Marshall (2011) in examining the case of AJ suggests that ‘it isn't just about retaining the 
significant stuff. Far more important is being able to forget the rest.’ This is echoed in Borges’ story ‘Funes 
the Memorious’ in which Funes suffers due to his incredible ability to recall events. Constant remembering 
thus has a debilitating effect upon the subject and is inimical to their well-being.  
48 Acampora (2006:159) nicely sums this idea up: ‘forgetting, it seems is an important condition for 
experience – important for giving the shape, form, rhythm, texture, and depth that make the seemingly 
endless stream of possible objects of concern and attention an experience, to recall Dewey’s famous 
distinction, not simply by piling experiences up or onto another, but by taking some away, by encouraging 
some to fade, recede, fall away.’ 
49 ‘No painter will paint his picture, no general achieve his victory…without having first desired and striven 
for it in an unhistorical condition’ (UM II:64).  
50 Life is a notoriously difficult term to unpack in Nietzsche’s writings but more often than not, it is 




slate clean via forgetting before we can create anew: ’he forgets most things so as to do 
one thing.’  
The forgetting that Nietzsche advocates provides the necessary conditions for value 
generation. It importantly involves confronting past experiences and values before 
absorbing them in order to clear mental space and arrive at a ‘tabula rasa’: before the 
‘new beginnings’ of the child in Zarathustra, we have the lion whose task is not ‘to create 
new values… but to create freedom for itself for new creation (I: The Three 
Metamorphoses). Forgetting appears as a means to creating this freedom, and a 
necessary condition for the freedom to create values and interpretations (such as second-




In conclusion, I have suggested that Nietzschean forgetting is best characterised as a 
capacity. This allows us to bypass any potential paradox yet still account for its active 
nature. When recruited by the drives and/or affects, the forgetting capacity underpins 
the selectivity of our perspectives, meaning that our actions are explained and facilitated 
not only by drives but also by forgetting. In this way, I have attempted to draw attention 
to aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology other than drives and affects.  
I hope to have shown that forgetting is a vital component of a Nietzschean self, and one 
which plays a key role in Nietzsche’s practical philosophy, particularly the idea of re-
interpretation. When understood as the generation and reinterpretation of (‘healthy’) 
values, this project calls for a self which is able to regulate itself, and process experiences 
in such a way that the health of the mental economy is not only preserved but bolstered. 
From Nietzsche’s remarks on forgetting, it seems that this mechanism goes far to explain 
how it is that we are able to create room for new interpretations and process old 
interpretations in such a way (i.e. via incorporation rather than censorship), that the 
plasticity and strength of the self is preserved. In this way forgetting allows the self to be 




In a post-Freudian context, it might seem that the idea of forgetting as necessary to a 
healthy life is widely recognised. So what does Nietzsche contribute to this recognition? 
The apparent truism of forgetting being required for health is in actual fact ambiguous.  I 
have argued that upon closer inspection it emerges that Nietzsche presents a very 
different (and more positive) theory of forgetting than that of Freud’s theory of 
repression. The emphasis here is on confrontation and incorporation of experiences, as 
opposed to mere suppression or avoidance.  
As such Nietzsche offers a far more therapeutic understanding of forgetting, and by 
characterising it as active, one which is not passive or degenerative. This component of 
























In the previous chapter, we saw how Nietzsche holds that we can, at times, have an 
unhealthy relationship to the past, and that memories can sometimes have a detrimental 
effect on us. In these cases, past experiences have an inordinate and/or negative impact on 
individuals’ emotional lives, attitudes, and actions. This chapter will explore what a healthy 
relationship with the past would look like according to Nietzsche, and the idea that 
autobiographical memory in particular can play a role in this healthy form of self-
constitution.  
I suggest that autobiographical memory can be understood as a plastic and creative capacity, 
which is responsive to, and works alongside the drives. The interactions between 
autobiographical memory and the drives work to create a narrative identity for the 
individual through the reinterpretation and incorporation of events. Whilst memory has 
often been invoked in relation to discussion of diachronic identity cf. Lockean accounts51, 
where identity is understood as numerical identity persisting over time, the notion of 
narrative identity, which I suggest we find in Nietzsche, is much richer. Narrative identity is 
more sophisticated in that an individual’s narrative coheres with a deeper sense of how 
events are related to their character (understood on the Nietzschean picture, as their 
constitution of drives), and/or future projects. We should note that there is an assumption 
of diachronic identity underlying the reinterpretive activities of the drives and 
autobiographical memory, as they interact to create an individual’s narrative identity. In this 
                                                        
 
51 This notion of identity is relevant for legal scenarios, e.g. whether or not I am the same person who 




chapter, I suggest that this notion of narrative identity is helpful in filling out the kind of ‘I’ 
which emerges on a Nietzschean account.  
The idea of a narrative self in Nietzsche has been interpreted in a number of ways. Passages 
like BGE 54 might encourage us to view this narrative self as fictionalist or instrumentalist, 
cf. Dennett (1992), where the ontological status of the self is akin to something like the 
centre of gravity, i.e. a ‘useful fiction’; cf. Gardner (2009). Meanwhile, passages such as GS 
290, could, as Nehamas (1986) suggests, lead us to view the self as a work of art. However, 
as Gardner points out, adopting a fictionalist view of the self is problematic with regards to 
Nietzsche’s practical philosophy, and Rutherford (forthcoming:7) cautions us against ‘giving 
inordinate weight to an aestheticized conception of the self.’ Following Tubert (forthcoming) 
and Rutherford (forthcoming), I will therefore appeal to a more robust notion of a narrative 
self as put forward by Schechtman (1996, 2011) where narrative 'is not simply a static set 
of facts’ about an individual ‘but rather a dynamic set of principles, a basic orientation 
through which, with or without conscious awareness, an individual understands himself and 
his world (Schechtman: 1996: 116).  
In this chapter, I use Ecce Homo52 as a case-study of how autobiographical memory 
contributes to a narrative self and fills in notions of ‘I’, ‘me’, and ‘mine’. Although Ecce Homo, 
has been seen as an aestheticized instance of self-formation, I will use it solely as an example 
of autobiographical memory, as it functions broadly in individuals.  As Bermudez (2017:182) 
notes, autobiographical memory is a type of memory which is ‘self-specifying’: the memories 
involved here are about the individual and their personal past. In this way, first-person 
perspective is a key feature of autobiographical memory, and is such that it allows the 
                                                        
 
52 Commentators often approach Ecce Homo with caution ‘even R.J Hollingdale, Nietzsche’s excellent and 
sympathetic biographer, has problems with this book’ (Ridley: 2005: ix). I am inclined to follow Ridley’s 
suggestion that many passages in this work can be seen ‘as helpful dramatizations of a distinctive strand in 
Nietzsche’s later philosophy, a strand having to do with freedom and self-realisation – with what, in the 
subtitle to Ecce Homo, he calls ‘becoming what you are.’’ If nothing else, the text offers a case-study of 
memory and can be seen as an interpretation and evaluation of Nietzsche’s past. Ridley suggests there are 
good reasons for viewing the interpretation and evaluation here as honest: ‘the first thing to say is that 
Nietzsche remains fully committed at this period to values of honesty and the intellectual 
conscience….’How much truth can a spirit tolerate, how much truth is it willing to risk? This increasingly 
became the real measure of value for me’… these are not the words of a witting fantasist, or of one bent on 




individual to identify themselves in relation to events, and to see these events as meaningful 
and contributing to the story of ‘who they are’. In Ecce Homo, as Rutherford (forthcoming: 
6) suggests, it is obvious that Nietzsche explores this very question: ‘Nietzsche’s writings 
make clear his preoccupation with the question “Who am I?” His final, ironic autobiography, 
Ecce Homo, carries the subtitle “How One Becomes What One Is.’ It seems that Nietzsche 
attempts to find the answer to this question by drawing upon autobiographical memory; in 
Ecce Homo, Nietzsche offers a retrospective of his works and events in his life, and he 
envisages this retrospective in terms of narrative: ‘and so I will tell myself the story of my 
life [und so erzähle ich mir mein Leben]. 
The first section explores the idea that a narrative self has ‘I’ content, and that this is 
provided by autobiographical memory. The kind of ‘I’ present in the narrative self goes some 
way to addressing Gardner’s concern that ‘the eliminativist-cum-fictionalist’ theoretical 
account of the self which emerges if we take drive-theory accounts seriously, is inconsistent 
with ‘the role Nietzsche accords first-person thinking in practical and axiological contexts’ 
(2009:1). In this way, we may be able to locate some degree of first-person subjectivity in a 
Nietzschean self.  
The second section then examines three features of autobiographical memory which help 
generate the narrative self, and the ‘I’, and how these manifest in Nietzsche’s writings. 
Firstly, I discuss the idea that autobiographical memory provides an awareness of a self 
persisting through time. This feature is necessary for two other facets of autobiographical 
memory, namely how it enables a) a degree of self-knowledge regarding past perspectives, 
and b) a sense of first-person perspective which is tied to affectivity.  
We will see how this narrative self which emerges via autobiographical memory is important 
for self-regulation: experiences are interpreted and incorporated into a narrative, leading to 
a sense of selfhood. Without this, individuals are left feeling unanchored and unstable, 
something which could impede engagement in future projects. A narrative self is therefore 
important for agency and well-being, meaning that autobiographical memory emerges as an 






3.1 First-Person Subjectivity and The Nietzschean self – The Concern  
 
This section will outline how a narrative self involves ‘I’ content, why this is desirable when 
giving an account of a Nietzschean self, and how autobiographical memory contributes 
towards this ‘I’ content.  
When constructing any theory of the self, an integral component is the matter of first-person 
subjectivity i.e. a sense of ‘I’. We tend to align this ‘I’ with notions of ownership and identity: 
‘this is my unique and particular perspective on my cognitive processes, my affective 
experiences, and my actions.’ First-person subjectivity is the kind of thing which provides an 
insight into who we are, or who we take ourselves to be, and how we situate ourselves in the 
world. It is seen as providing access not only to self-knowledge, but to knowledge of mental 
states in general. Shoemaker states that ‘it is essential for a philosophical understanding of 
the mental that we appreciate that there is a first-person perspective on it, a distinctive way 
mental states present themselves to the subjects whose states they are’ (Shoemaker 
1996:157), and Zahavi highlights the importance of first-person subjectivity for accounts of 
consciousness in particular, claiming that we ‘must take the first-personal or subjective 
givenness of consciousness seriously, since an important and nonnegligible feature of 
consciousness is the way in which it is experienced by the subject’53 (2007:67). Korsgaard 
highlights the importance of first-person subjectivity from a practical standpoint – we seem 
to want to attribute actions to a self or a person, as opposed to impulses, i.e. something that 
happens to a person: ‘to regard some movement of my mind or my body as my action, I must 
see it as an expression of my self as a whole rather than as a product of some force that is at 
work on me or in me’ (2009:18).  This notion of first-person subjectivity therefore seems 
crucial to an idea of a substantive self.  
One immediate concern with Nietzsche’s views on the self, which Gardner raises, is that this 
first-person perspective is difficult to locate if we take the drive theory account seriously. 
                                                        
 
53 Zahavi does raise the concern that focusing on first-person perspective may be problematic in that it 
could give us a ‘slanted view’ of what subjectivity amounts to (2007:70). For the purposes of this chapter I 
will not be addressing this concern, but will merely explore whether there is room for first-person 




Commentators generally agree that drives are evaluative, directional, and responsive to 
other drives and affects cf. Katsafanas 2005, 2009, 2016, Anderson 2012, and Janaway 2009, 
and that there is a worry that what goes on at this sub-personal level is not accessible from 
a first-person perspective. On many accounts, it would seem that drives are solely 
responsible for agency, and that there is no sense of a unified self above and beyond these 
subpersonal components. As Guay notes (2006: 218) ‘these arguments typically aim to show 
that a distinctive subject or ‘‘self’’ is epiphenomenal, or simply absent, by demonstrating that 
the subject plays no useful role in explaining either belief or action; the illusoriness of the 
subject is then inferred from its explanatory impotence’.   
In many passages, Nietzsche seems to undermine the idea that we have some kind of 
privileged first-person perspective to ourselves (D 116), leading to a worry that there is a 
fundamental lack of transparency regarding our attitudes and actions: ‘as long as one sees a 
point in seeking another explanation, there can be additional conceptual resources to 
invoke, additional drives to posit, and additional explanations to set forth’ (Guay: 2006: 219). 
This non-transparency of the self is particularly problematic with regards to Nietzsche’s 
practical philosophy.  
Gardner suggests that ‘the eliminativist-cum-fictionalist’ theoretical account of the self 
which emerges is inconsistent with ‘the role Nietzsche accords first-person thinking in 
practical and axiological contexts’ (2009:1), and that there remains a ‘puzzle’ between ‘(1) a 
first-person practical standpoint in which we must take it to be up to us what is to be done 
with and about our drives and (2) a third-person theoretical perspective in which drives 
decide what happens or is done with us’ (2015:381). Given that in works such as Ecce Homo, 
Nietzsche seems to write with a clear sense of first-person perspective, this concern is 
especially pressing.  
Particularly when we consider a narrative self, this notion of first-person subjectivity seems 
paramount. Given that the narrative self speaks to concerns regarding who I am, and, how 
and why I am the way I am, without appealing to first-person subjectivity, it is not clear that 
the story I am telling is my story as opposed to someone else’s. If I feel disassociated from 
the story, the chances are it will not have much bearing on my sense of identity. Whilst I 
could certainly recount a simple story consisting of facts about myself linked up in some way 




article and so on, unless I identify myself in relation to these events through a certain level 
of first-person awareness and self-referentiality, the narrative does not have the same force. 
In this way, the kind of narrative involved here is more sophisticated; by referring to 
attitudes, thoughts, actions, emotions, all of which are imbued with this first-person 
awareness, I can view past episodes as meaningful to me in some way and as contributing to 
my sense of identity. A famous example from Perry (1979) hammers home this point – 
following a trail of sugar on the supermarket floor and searching for the shopper with the 
torn sack of sugar is one thing, but realising that the shopper with the torn sack of sugar is 
actually me is another. This introduction of the ‘I’ concept changes the force of the episode 
in my cognitive economy in some way, e.g. a different set of responses may be generated.  
Autobiographical memories can provide the kind of sophisticated narrative which carries 
this first-person awareness: we often recall autobiographical memories as embedded within 
some kind of narrative arc:  
Episodic memory54 has been thought to involve re-experiencing events from 
one’s past, thus providing its owner with content by which he or she is able to 
construct a personal narrative, that is, his or her life stories (see, for example, 
Eakin 2008; Fivush and Haden 2003; Klein 2001; Klein and Gangi 2010). 
(Klein 2012:680) 
For example, an individual may think of past events in terms of turning points, or definitive 
moments so that driving a car for the first time is seen as the first real moment of 
independence, getting married is seen as a shift in one’s identity and so on. In this way, the 
memories attest to certain personality traits, feelings, attitudes, all of which develop within 
an overarching narrative, which is taken to explain how and why I am the kind of person I 
am.  
With regards to locating first-person subjectivity in the Nietzschean self, Gardner’s 
treatment of this problem is ultimately aporetic. I suggest, however, that some degree of 
                                                        
 




first-person subjectivity may be salvaged on a Nietzschean account, through the use of 
autobiographical memory and the way in which it provides ‘I’ content in a narrative self.  
The next section will further explore how certain features of autobiographical memory 
enable this sense of ‘I’ present in a narrative self. Specifically, through the way in which 
autobiographical memory provides: a) an awareness of a self persisting through time, b) an 
insight into past perspectives i.e. a degree of self-knowledge, and c) a first-person 
perspective which is tied to affectivity. I suggest that the latter two features are particularly 
important in allowing a sense of first-person subjectivity, I will draw on examples from 
Nietzsche’s writings to illustrate these three features of autobiographical memory.  
 
3.2.1  A Self Persisting through Time  
 
Sometimes Nietzsche presents an awareness of ourselves as situated in time as troubling. In 
the second Untimely Meditation, he suggests that in gaining an awareness of our temporality, 
we also gain an awareness of the fact that our projects can be hindered, frustrated or 
interrupted. We are confronted with the ‘it was… an imperfect tense that can never become 
a perfect one [ein nie zu vollendendes Imperfectum]’ (UM II:61). This can create feelings of 
dissatisfaction and disillusionment for the individual – if we come to feel that our 
endeavours are inevitably futile, then it seems very difficult to retain any motivation or 
direction vis-à-vis our actions, and we become aware of transience: ‘existence is only an 
uninterrupted has-been’ (UM II:61). But there is another way to think of ourselves as 
situated in time. This section will explore the idea that through autobiographical memory, 
we gain a sense of self as persisting through time, and that this sets up a more positive 
relationship with the past. 
In autobiographical memory, we are able to view ourselves as enduring: although various 
actions, events and relationships have come and gone, we have remained to carry out new 
actions and encounter new events and relationships. The main character, as it were, is a 
constant, though the plotlines change. Moreover, this idea of persistence leaves open the 
possibility that an individual may develop and improve. Particularly if those past events are 




themselves as having come through those events affords them with a feeling of triumph. 
Acknowledging this facet of autobiographical memory may provide the individual with a 
sense of coherence or unity55 – qua protagonist they have prevailed even in adverse 
circumstances. This can certainly be seen in passages in Ecce Homo, particularly when 
Nietzsche reflects on his poor health over the years cf. ‘Why I am so wise 1’ ‘Why I am so 
clever 2.’  
In drawing upon these past memories, the individual is able to use their experience of the 
past as relevant for the present, something which Nietzsche touches on in his discussion of 
the ‘historical man’ in the second Untimely Meditation:  
Let us call them historical men; looking to the past impels them towards the 
future and fires their courage to go on living and their hope that what they 
want will still happen, that happiness lies behind the hill they are advancing 
towards. These historical men believe that the meaning of existence will come 
more and more to light in the course of its process, and they glance behind 
them only so that, from the process so far, they can learn to understand the 
present and to desire the future more vehemently. 
(UM II:65) 
Whilst Nietzsche advocates caution with regards to focusing exclusively on the past, he does 
allow that some anchoring in past memories affords the individual with an awareness of 
different modes of existence. Linking past selves with the present self, allowing them to 
inform the present, and assimilating experiences forms a sense of unity with the individual’s 
psychology such that they are better prepared for future actions. In this way, Nietzsche 
introduces a more refined notion of happiness (which was previously only equated with a 
capacity to forget), and suggests that we require some balance between acknowledging our 
past, and not dwelling too extensively upon it: 
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Cheerfulness, the good conscience, the joyful deed, confidence in the future - 
all of them depend, in the case of the individual as of a nation, on the existence 
of a line dividing the bright and discernible from the unilluminable and dark; 
on one's being just as able to forget at the right time as to remember at the right 
time; on the possession of a powerful instinct for sensing when it is necessary 
to feel historically and when unhistorically…the unhistorical and the historical 
are necessary in equal measure for the health of an individual, of a people and 
of a culture.  
(UM II: 63) 
The ‘unhistorical’ here is understood as an absence of the awareness of temporality where 
the individual lives completely in the present, with no sense of the past or the future. The 
‘historical’ meanwhile sees the individual relating themselves to the past, sometimes 
excessively so, such that the past becomes a ‘dark, invisible burden’ and ‘a chain’ (UM II:61). 
Whilst an excess of the historical sense can be problematic psychologically, this does not 
mean that the unhistorical is the superior mode of existence. Instead a balance between the 
two must be struck.  
One way in which this thought becomes concrete is if we apply it to the notion of selfhood, 
and consider the case of amnesiacs. As Klein and Nichols note (2012), it is not the case that 
amnesiacs lack a sense of selfhood per se. Amnesiacs are often unable to retrieve memories 
of themselves living through certain events, i.e. autobiographical memories, which poses a 
problem for a memory-based sense of diachronic identity, i.e. a sense that an individual is 
the same person they were, for example, five years ago. In such a scenario, it seems that this 
sense of identity and the feeling of persisting through time will not be available to the 
amnesiac. However, as Klein (2012) argues there still remains some thin sense of self:  
Indeed, even when a person experiences cognitive chaos so extreme that it 
partitions conscious access to his thoughts, memories, and perceptions into 
intervals of one second (that is, awareness of current thought and perception 
fades and is replaced each passing second!), a sense of self-unity and continuity 
reportedly is felt during each momentary slice of awareness. This held for 
Storring’s ‘Patient B’ (Storring 1936). The patient under discussion was unable 




exceeding his brief limit of continued awareness, yet he had a sense of himself 
as an existing, continuous entity. 
(2012: 681) 
Klein and Nichols go on to suggest that the amnesiac has a sense of self beyond bare first-
person awareness, i.e. waking up in hospital and thinking ‘where am I?’  
Instead, they posit that the amnesiac is seen as having some unwavering feeling of personal 
continuity, which is tied to what they term ‘trait self-knowledge’. Trait self-knowledge is a 
sub-system within semantic memory which ‘stores information about one’s own personality 
in the form of trait generalizations (for example, Self: Usually stubborn)’ (2012:681). This 
kind of self-knowledge emerges as especially resilient:  
An extensive review of the available research (Klein and Lax 2010) shows that 
knowledge of one’s traits (a) is immune to loss in the face of multiple, often 
severe, neurological and cognitive insult (including total retrograde and 
anterograde amnesia, autism, Alzheimer’s Dementia, and Prosopagnosia), (b) 
is empirically dissociable from trait knowledge of others (even well-known 
others such as the patient’s family members) as well as from purely factual, 
non-dispositional self-knowledge, and (c) can serve as a firmly entrenched 
foundation for one’s sense that one ‘is, was, and will be’ (for a similar view, see 
Rathbone et al. 2009). 
(2012:682) 
In this way, knowing something about one’s character traits, e.g. stubbornness (something 
that might become evident in the present moment e.g. the amnesiac’s interactions with the 
doctors might provide an arena for his stubbornness to manifest), may provide a basis for 
one’s sense of being a continuing, experiencing self even if there is a deficit of 
autobiographical memory, and one is excluded from one’s personal past. 
This kind of self-knowledge about one’s traits, like whether one is stubborn or not is not 
sufficient, however, for a narrative self. There is reason to believe that individuals 
(consciously and/or unconsciously), strive for a thicker notion of selfhood such as can be 




order to supplement their sense of selfhood.56 As Hales and Welshon note, an individual who 
is missing autobiographical memories struggles with issues of selfhood: ‘no recalled 
ambitions, episodes, or even an existential context out of which to construct a life, and yet 
the sense of self must be maintained’ (2000:164). In these cases, confabulations act as a 
compensatory mechanism indicating that individuals, at least to a certain extent, require 
some anchoring in the past, in order to make sense of their identity. Without it their well-
being, sense of direction, and sense of self can suffer. Through confabulating and ‘filling in 
gaps in the story’, individuals are able to create a narrative self. This kind of activity is 
reminiscent of Nietzsche’s remarks in the Genealogy on the importance of creating meaning 
and purpose for ourselves and the experiences we encounter: ‘any meaning at all is better 
than no meaning at all’ (GM III:28).  
It is in this way that Nietzsche’s suggestion that a balance between the ‘unhistorical’ and 
‘historical’ being essential for healthy individuals, becomes pertinent. As Klein, Loftus, and 
Kihlstrom (2002) highlight, a worrying consequence of an absence of autobiographical 
memory is the inability of individuals to imagine themselves into the future. The thought 
here could be that a sense of persistence provides the individual with the reassurance and 
security needed to feel able to engage in future projects- if one thinks of oneself as entirely 
transient, it may be difficult to maintain any sense of ‘I’, ‘me’, or ‘mine’, and to find 
motivations for future endeavours. In providing that consciousness of ourselves as situated 
and persisting in time, autobiographical memory in particular, has an important role to play 
creating a sense of stability and allowing for a sense of first-person subjectivity.  
The next section will explore how once an individual has this feeling of persisting through 
time, they are then able to engage in reinterpretative projects related to perspectives and 
affects.  
 
                                                        
 




3.2.2  Self-Knowledge and Reinterpretation of Past Perspectives  
 
Another way in which we might cement our sense of first-person subjectivity and narrative 
self is by coming to learn about our previous perspectives and attitudes. In Ecce Homo, 
Nietzsche seems to utilise autobiographical memory in order to evaluate past events and to 
discover what they might indicate with regards to his character. For Nietzsche, the idea that 
we might acquire self-knowledge is complex. In certain passages, this possibility of self-
knowledge hardly seems open at all: ‘all actions are essentially unknown’ (D116), ‘we are 
necessarily strangers to ourselves, we do not comprehend ourselves’ (GM, Preface 1), and 
yet we must square such remarks with his preoccupation with matters of personal identity 
and coming to know himself in Ecce Homo.  In the Preface, Nietzsche declares that ‘it seems 
imperative to say who I am’ and in the final chapter, the question ‘have I been understood?’ 
is repeated four times – we get the feeling that this question is aimed not just at the reader, 
but at Nietzsche himself.  
Whilst the possibility of self-knowledge as pertaining to current actions and attitudes seems 
difficult on a drive-theory account where ‘neither further acts of introspection nor reliance 
on conscience will be particularly helpful in attaining comprehensive self-knowledge’ 
(Katsafanas:2015:119), I concur with Katsafanas’ suggestion that Nietzsche does allow for a 
degree of self-knowledge to be gained through retrospective evaluation, and by ‘looking 
away from oneself.’  
The idea of gaining self-knowledge through hindsight is a familiar one, and one which 
Nietzsche picks up on in Human, all too Human:  
[I]mmediate observation [unmittelbares Selbstbeobachtung] is not nearly 
sufficient for us to know ourselves; we require history [Geschichte] since the 
past flows inside us in a hundred waves; we ourselves are, indeed, nothing but 
that which at every moment we sense of this continued flowing 
[Fortströmen]…. 
(HAH II/1 223)   




[T]hat motives or forces present in the deep recesses of the past still persist in 
the present. For example, the ascetic priests embraced the values of humility, 
inoffensiveness, and compassion out of ressentiment; so, somehow, when I 
embrace those values today, I am still doing so out of ressentiment  
and argues that this ahistorical claim is highly implausible:  
the fact that one type of person in a completely distinct social, cultural, and 
historical setting embraced a value because it experienced a certain affect does 
not entail that I, in circumstances that could hardly be more different, must 
embrace the same value out of the same affect. 
(2015:125) 
Instead, Katsafanas argues, Nietzsche’s claim in Human, all too Human should be interpreted 
as appealing to the notion of genealogy, i.e. examinations of ‘long stretches of human 
behaviour rather than isolate moments of choice’ which allow us to identify: a) gradual 
changes in and subtle influences upon our behaviour, and b) ‘unnoticed aspects of our 
conceptual schemes through which we experience and interpret the world’57 (2015: 126).   
Although Katsafanas does briefly note the possibility that this kind of genealogical 
exploration could be applied to one’s personal past: ‘one way in which I can learn something 
about myself by looking away from myself is by detecting—either in historical characters, 
or even in my own history—gradual shapings of behaviour that result from apparently 
minor factors’ (2015:126), he does not take up this suggestion in detail.  
It seems, however, that with Ecce Homo, Nietzsche gives us a case-study of just that: a 
retrospective analysis of his own personal past. We should note that this kind of 
retrospective analysis need not be limited to a genealogy, but can also be achieved via 
narrative. The important factor is that there is enough evaluative distance. In this case, the 
distance is twofold - the fact that the objects being analysed are autobiographical memories 
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(temporal distance), combined with the fact that this analysis comes in the form of a 
narrative (narrative distance), creates the requisite distance for ‘looking away from 
oneself’58 cf. Goldie: 
[T]his way of thinking of oneself, in one way thinking of oneself as another, in 
another way thinking of that other absolutely as riveted to oneself, is by no 
means a confusion: it is at the heart of how we think back ironically on our past, 
and how we make plans and resolutions for our future in the light of our past. 
(2012b: 1065) 
Nietzsche qua narrator is therefore able to take up an evaluative stance on his own personal 
history. This kind of evaluative stance is important for the individual, in that it enables them 
to probe deeper into their narrative: just as we would try to analyse a character in a book in 
order understand them better, we might endeavour to amass self-knowledge.   
In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche makes it clear that this retrospective analysis and the answer to the 
question ‘Who am I?’  will be achieved through the use of autobiographical memory: ‘I looked 
backwards, I looked out, I have never seen so many things that were so good, all at the same 
time’ [Ich sah rückwärts, ich sah hinaus, ich sah nie so viel und so gute Dinge auf einmal]. The 
use of ‘sehen’ here is important, having connotations of ‘witnessing’ or ‘beholding’ rather 
than ‘searching’ – in this way we get the sense that Nietzsche is observing past selves in 
order to draw conclusions about his character based on past events and choices. As well as 
narrating the story of his life, he also seems to be, at the same time, ‘reading’ it. We can 
therefore see that 'autobiographical memory proper is something more than pure episode 
recall, where the former is characterised as going beyond 'recalling the who, what, where, 
and when of an event, to include memory of how this event occurred as it did, what it means, 
and why it is important' (Fivush et al 2011:322). The way in which these events are narrated 
can be seen to determine such factors.  
In Ecce Homo, we see evidence of the evaluation process: 
                                                        
 





My proof for this, among other things, that I have always instinctively chosen 
the correct remedy for bad states; whilst complete decadents always chose the 
means that hurt themselves. As summa summarum I was healthy; as a niche, as 
a speciality, I was decadent.  
(EH ‘Why I am so wise’ 2) 
Here we see a retrospective assessment of both strengths and weaknesses- Nietzsche 
acknowledges that he has, at times and in certain ways, been decadent. The passive, almost 
clinical tone that is evident in this passage, further reinforces the idea that an evaluation is 
taking place: ‘'the way I compelled myself no longer to let myself be cared for, served, 
doctored – this betrayed an unconditional certainty of instinct as to what at that time was 
needful above all else’ (‘Why I am so wise: 2). The fact that Nietzsche not only recalls, but 
also appraises past events through autobiographical memory provides him with an insight 
into his past actions and attitudes.  
The narrative which autobiographical memory creates facilitates this activity of evaluation. 
As Watson (2015: 270) suggests there is the initial evaluation of an event which takes place 
at the time – broadly speaking this is composed of the individual’s emotions and cognitions. 
The narrative component of autobiographical memory then:  
adds a second temporal level to the event sequence by transporting it from the 
past of experiencing the events to the present situation in which it is 
remembered and narrated. Because of the temporal distance, narrators and 
listeners can evaluate events retrospectively, externally. These evaluations 
may differ from the internal evaluations made at the time of the events. 
in this way, the individual qua narrator looks back on themselves as a protagonist- the 
combination of the original experiential content found in the narrative, and the external 
adjudication from the narrator provides a new perspective on past events.  
It might be objected that leaving aside Nietzsche’s concerns about the possibility of self-
knowledge, there is the further problem of whether self-knowledge is even desirable? There 
are passages in Ecce Homo where Nietzsche appears to warn against attempts to acquire 
self-knowledge. He declares that ‘nosce te ipsum (know thyself) is the recipe for decline’, that 




that ‘becoming what you are presupposes that you do not have the slightest idea what you 
are.’ How are we to square such statements with his clear preoccupation (in the very same 
work) with uncovering who he is?  
A possible resolution might be to say that these warnings are aimed against trying to know 
your current self, and that they do not need to preclude knowledge of perspectives on what 
you were or have been in the past. In fact, acquiring perspectives on past selves can be 
fruitful. In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche explicitly invokes this idea of perspectives, and suggests 
that reflecting on and analysing the past throughout his life has allowed him to gather new 
perspectives:  
To be able to look out from the optic of sickness towards healthier concepts 
and values, and again the other way around, to look down from the fullness and 
self-assurance of the rich life into the secret work of the instinct of decadence 
– that was my longest training, my genuine experience, if I became the master 
of anything, it was this. I have a hand for switching perspectives: the first reason 
why a ‘revaluation of values’ is even possible, perhaps for me alone. –  
(‘Why I am so Wise’ 1) 
In works like On the Genealogy of Morality¸ Nietzsche encourages a multiplicity of 
perspectives, declaring that:  
There is only a perspectival seeing, only a perspectival ‘knowing’; the more 
affects we are able to put into words about a thing, the more eyes, various eyes 
we are able to use for the same thing, the more complete will be our ‘concept’ 
of the thing, our ‘objectivity’. 
(GM III:12) 
In this way, he extols ‘the capacity to have one’s Pro and Contra in one’s power, and to shift 
them in and out, so that one knows how to make precisely the difference in perspectives and 
affective interpretations useful for knowledge’ (GM III:12).  The ability to amass and 
manipulate perspectives, which autobiographical memory provides, seems invaluable, not 
only when applied to Nietzsche’s project of the ‘revaluation of values’, but also to his project 
of establishing his sense of narrative identity. These perspectives give us an insight into 




experiences and internal processes, which we think have been overlooked, in their totality 
[Gesamtheit] depict the individual character most clearly’ (BAW 2, 269-272). Similar to how 
the genealogical methodology uncovered hidden insights vis-à-vis our moral concepts, the 
kind of retrospective analysis that is possible through autobiographical memory provides a 
degree of self-knowledge, and enables the individual to take up a critical distance against 
themselves, in evaluating these past perspectives.   
Moreover, it seems that, due to the operations of autobiographical memory, rather than 
being mere reportage of past events, these perspectives will instead function as 
reinterpretations of these events. Certain aspects of an event may be augmented or 
diminished in autobiographical memory, such that the perspectives which emerge, will 
avoid the realism which something like ‘nosce te ipsum’ might calls for. 
How does this alteration of memories occur? Commentators such as Hutto (2017), 
Brockmeier (2015), and Schechtman (1994, 2011) suggest that in order to create an 
overarching narrative of the individual’s life, autobiographical memories are often 
summarised, condensed, interpreted, or even constructed. When it comes to memories 
relating to our personal past, we are not dealing with simple, discrete entities which have 
been filed away and can be recalled at will. Instead mental reconstruction is called for, 
meaning that memories are susceptible to a certain degree of distortion59. One question 
which arises is what exactly determines this summarising, condensing, interpreting, and/or 
constructing? 
In BGE 68 Nietzsche gestures towards a potential explanation. He gives an example of the 
memory capacity being responsive to, and working in tandem with an individual’s drives: ‘’I 
have done that,’ says my memory. ‘I cannot have done that,’ - says my pride, and remains 
adamant. At last memory yields.’ In this way, memory can be influenced and shaped by the 
activity of drives. As Jensen suggests (2013), certain drives will be more relevant and 
influential than others:  
                                                        
 
59 As Jensen notes (2013:197) memory is ‘the only faculty by which we can come to a meaningful portrait 




Some drive-based mental states like the feelings of pride, regret, guilt, vanity, 
and nostalgia are intrinsically backward-looking. They bring to mind certain 
facets of our pasts in accordance with what they require to fulfil their 
individuated power aims. A drive to pride will call forth particularly self-
actuating episodes, while a drive towards regret will make our consciousness 
attend to a tragic event for whose outcome we were particularly blameworthy. 
(2013:197) 
In this way, it seems that certain ‘backward-looking’ drives will dictate if and how a specific 
memory is altered in some way, and will play a role in shaping the individual’s narrative. 
This kind of resulting narrative will vary according to the ‘health’ of the individual - placing 
accents upon and exaggerating certain memories and downplaying others means that, in a 
healthy individual, drives and memory interact in such a way that the individual’s self-
esteem is safeguarded and bolstered, and a celebratory, triumphant narrative emerges.60 For 
example, when remembering a school Sports Day, I might recall the memory in such a way 
that the fact that my team won stands out as the defining feature of the memory, rather than 
the fact that I was picked last for my team. We can imagine that in an unhealthy individual, 
the interactions between drives and memories might create a very different narrative (or 
indeed no obvious narrative at all).  In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche seems to suggest that 
subpersonal mechanisms can function to ensure that even the unpleasant episodes in one’s 
life can be seen as meaningful and necessary: 
If you look at it this way, even life’s mistakes have their own meaning and value, 
the occasional side roads and wrong turns, the delays, the ‘modesties,’ the 
seriousness wasted on tasks that lie beyond the task […] - - in the meantime, 
the organising, governing ‘idea’ keeps growing deep inside – it starts 
commanding [sie beginnt zu befehlen], it slowly leads back from out of the side 
                                                        
 
60 Cf. Hutto (2017:200) ‘Engaging in narrative practices, those that involve giving accounts in rich storied 
content, has been shown to correlate positively with mental health. A number of findings demonstrate that 
people 'who are able to narrate the emotional events of their lives in more self-reflective ways show better 





roads and wrong turns, it  gets the individual qualities and virtues ready, since 
at some point these will prove indispensable as means to the whole. 
(‘Why I am so Clever’ 9) 
As Ridley notes, passages like this have often led commentators to view Ecce Homo as an 
opportunistic way of whitewashing or twisting unpleasant past episodes cf. Jensen 
(2013:184) ‘through selecting, exaggerating, underplaying, and manipulating the raw data 
of the past, Nietzsche was allegedly trying to forge for himself a palatable self-image for the 
sake of fate-affirmation…choosing only those colorations of events that one is already happy 
to affirm.’ It is not obvious, however, that this needs to be particularly problematic; as Ridley 
suggests (2005: xxi), it is not ‘very troubling to think that it might be taken as a self-help 
manual, as a promoter of positive thinking. Positive thinking is surely better than the 
reverse’ and that: 
Confronted with some grim facts about our past, we can of course try to forget 
it; indeed Nietzsche speaks warmly and often about the value of forgetting. But 
if that is not possible, it is scarcely opportunistic to try to see it instead as 
something “that must not be missing,” that has ‘a profound significance and use 
precisely for us.’ To refuse to recuperate what we can out of life is to turn our 
backs on it. 
(2005: xxi) 
In this way, Ecce Homo emerges as a good example of how the self can recuperate and 
regulate itself through this use of autobiographical memory. The idea that the drives interact 
with autobiographical memory, and create a favourable narrative looks very much like a 
method of reinterpreting and incorporating past events.  It seems that this kind of activity is 
better viewed as incorporation – a phenomenon that Nietzsche repeatedly advocates (GS 
110, UM II:62; see Chapter Five for further discussion), rather than whitewashing. It is not 
so much that past events are glossed over, covered up or that the individual refuses to 
engage with them, but instead they are utilised as part of a narrative (it could even be the 
case that the interactions between the drives and autobiographical memory could be so fine-
grained that specific elements of unpleasant events may still be retained and occupy a role 
in the narrative). The individual thus still has to engage with this material; it is not simply 




The operations of autobiographical memory, namely the condensing, summarising, 
interpreting, and constructing can all serve to mitigate unpleasant past events or to provide 
coherence to random happenings61. As Schechtman (1994) suggests this may be a response 
to the overwhelming amount of information we receive about our lives, which necessitates 
some sort of processing if we are to garner any valuable knowledge about our lives:  
Our knowledge of what we have done is, however, at the same time knowledge 
of who we are and what we are like. Memory of what we have done and felt 
and experienced is one of the most important sources of self-knowledge we 
have. If, therefore, we wish to glean useful information about ourselves from 
what we know about our pasts, it will again be necessary to process and 
interpret the information we take in…The goal of making sense of the unfolding 
of our lives—of writing our own biographies—would require that we interpret 
and reconstruct our experiences to create a coherent life history. Anomalous 
events may thus be recast, representative ones emphasized, and other changes 
undertaken to make one's past more smooth and comprehensible. 
(1994:11)  
The plasticity of autobiographical memory and how it interacts with drives, therefore seems 
crucial to this project of meaning and coherence vis-à-vis personal identity.  In this way, as 
Conway suggests (2004) autobiographical memory recall is steered by two forces (i) 
correspondence i.e. ensuring the memory is an accurate representation of past events, and 
(ii) coherence i.e. ensuring that the narrative which develops as a result of these memories 
is in line with the individual’s well-being, and promotes the self in the best possible way. It 
seems that this force for coherence will be particularly active in healthy individuals, and 
may, at times usurp a need for correspondence - accurate representations of past-events 
may therefore be allowed to fall by the wayside in favour of mental well-being and self-
regulation cf. Schechtman (1994:9): ‘in memory we often condense experiences, presenting 
                                                        
 
61 As Goldie notes (2012b: 1065) this notion of ‘coherence’ does not necessarily require any deep narrative 
coherence: ‘stuff happens, and not all narrative are narrative explanations, which succeed in explaining 
why stuff happens’ but that there is ‘coherence in your autobiographical narrative in the sense that it is a 
narrative of your life.’ In Ecce Homo, it does look like we get a slightly thicker notion of narrative than this 




to ourselves a fictitious event or experience which is a composite of the essential features of 
a series of real ones.’ 
Self-knowledge gained through this retrospective analysis and the ensuing narrative has the 
potential to influence future outlooks and actions. As Wilson (2003) notes there is a bi-
directional link between autobiographical memory and identity:  
[I]ndividuals' current self-views, beliefs, and goals influence their recollections 
and appraisals of former selves. In turn, people's current self-views are 
influenced by what they remember about their personal past, as well as how 
they recall earlier selves and episodes. People's reconstructed evaluations of 
memories, their perceived distance from past experiences, and the point of 
view of their recollections have implications for how the past affects the 
present. 
In this way, retrospective self-knowledge bolsters a sense of first-person subjectivity in 
that it provides insight into our past commitments and generates additional perspectives. 
In healthy individuals, the narrative created by the interaction between the drives and 
autobiographical memory will be such that it informs an individual’s sense of identity, 
and allows them to make sense of past events without being overwhelmed by them.  
 
3.2.3  First-Person Perspective: Affectivity and Autonoetic-Consciousness 
 
So far, I have suggested that autobiographical memory and the narrative it generates can 
contribute to first-person subjectivity by providing an awareness of the self persisting 
through time, and allowing for retrospective self-knowledge. But more needs to be said 
about the precise nature of first-person involved here. I suggest that autobiographical 
memory provides us with an ‘I’ that is tied to affectivity, and that this element of affectivity 
is particularly crucial for the sense of ‘mineness’ which is characteristic of autobiographical 
memory.  
Bermudez (2017:7) describes autobiographical memory as crucially involving first-person 
content and suggests that there are: (i) episodic memory images which preserve an 




judgements which have first-person contents, i.e. contents that would standardly be 
expressed using the first-person pronoun62. These judgements originate in and are 
grounded by the episodic memory images. Often these judgements can involve affective 
components.  
One feature of autobiographical memory which allows individuals to re-engage with the 
affective content of memories is what commentators often refer to as autonoetic 
consciousness. This is the idea that individuals mentally ‘time-travel’ to revisit 
autobiographical memories and re-engage with them (Tulving 1983, Schacter, et al., 2007; 
Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007). So, for example, rather than recalling events about one’s 
life as mere facts, e.g. ‘I won a prize in a piano competition when I was seventeen’, ‘I crashed 
my car into a tree when I was twenty’, auto-noetic consciousness would involve an element 
of mental reconstruction, such that the individual would, in some way, re-live the emotions 
associated with the event (albeit in a weakened sense: it is highly unlikely that one would 
experience the exact same affective experience, or experience it to the same degree as 
originally felt).63  
With the example of the piano competition, I might re-engage with the anxiety I felt whilst 
waiting to hear the announcement of the winner at the piano competition, the sense of 
preoccupation as I was trying to evaluate how well I’d played the pieces, the surprise and 
elation when my name was announced and so on. This kind of ‘mental time-travel’ seems 
plausible if we think of past events which were highly emotionally charged. Whilst memories 
of facts might just lead to an ‘awareness of the past that is limited to feelings of familiarity 
or knowing’ (Gardiner 2001: 1351), the idea of auto-noetic consciousness in 
                                                        
 
62 Whilst the majority of autobiographical memories are recalled from a first-person perspective, there are 
cases where memories can be retrieved from a third-person perspective i.e. where subjects see themselves 
from the perspective of an external observer (Sutin and Robbins 2008; Rice 2009). As Sutin and Robbins 
(2008) note in some cases, third-person perspective functions to distance the subject from an event which 
might seem incongruent with the current self e.g. traumatic events where the subject is trying to avoid 
psychological pain (McIsaac & Eich, 2004; Kenny & Bryant, 2006) or physical pain (McNamara, Benson, 
McGeeney, Brown, & Albert, 2005).  
63 We can, of course, think of counter-examples e.g. trauma victims who might well feel the emotions 




autobiographical memory provides the individual with a certain phenomenological richness. 
In going back to that moment, I am able to re-engage with the emotions at the time.  
Moreover, since I am narrating these autobiographical memories, qua narrator, I may 
acquire access to additional emotional levels. As Goldie (2009) suggests there can be two 
fundamental kinds of emotional import and emotional response regarding narratives: 1) an 
internal aspect i.e. affective content that is integral to narrative, and 2) an external aspect i.e. 
the response to the narrative itself. Goldie highlights how dramatic irony may play a role 
here: ‘the emotion that is internal to the narrative differs in type from the external emotion 
because the narrator was not aware of certain crucial facts about what happened until later’ 
(2009:99), meaning that: 
you the thinker, the ‘external narrator’, can think of yourself in past episodes, 
doing and saying things, and you now do this in a way that enables you to 
conceive of the episode as having an emotional import that you did not 
recognize at the time, and thus you are now able to have an emotional response 
that you did not have at the time.  
(2009:103) 
Do we see anything like this in Ecce Homo? I suggest that Nietzsche describes this kind of 
mental time travel and re-engagement, and this is particularly evident when he is 
remembering and assessing his works. Throughout Ecce Homo, whenever Nietzsche 
recounts certain events and moments in his life, he does so not in terms of mere semantic 
memory, i.e. memories of dates, places, times, but rather by utilising autobiographical 
memory and autonoetic consciousness to re-construct these episodes and re-live them. This 
is suggested by the level of sensory detail that appears in the descriptions, for example when 
he reflects on writing The Birth of Tragedy:  
[Y]ou would never believe that it was begun in the thunder of the battle of 
Wörth. I thought these problems out in front of the walls of Metz during the 
cold September nights when I was serving as a medical orderly. 
(EH ‘The Birth of Tragedy’ 1) 
or the way in which, when discussing Human, all too Human, he makes his emotions at the 




The beginnings of this book belong in the middle of the first Bayreuth festival; 
it presupposes a deep sense of alienation from everything around me 
there…just like a dream…and where was I? I did not recognise anything, I 
hardly recognised Wagner. 
(EH ‘Human, all too Human’ 2) 
Then his frustration  
Ten years had gone by, and during that time the nourishment of my soul had 
come to a complete standstill, I had not learnt anything useful, and I had 
forgotten an absurd moment for the sake of some scrap of dusty, scholarly 
junk. To creep through ancient metrists with diligence and bad eyes – that is 
what I had come to! 
(EH ‘Human, all too Human’ 3) 
When starting to discuss Daybreak, his use of the present tense conveys a sense of 
immediacy and implies that he is transported back to that moment: ‘my campaign against 
morality begins with this book’ [Mit diesem Buche beginnt mein Feldzug, gegen die Moral] (EH 
‘Daybreak’ 1) This is presented as a turning point: in this way we can see how narratives are 
marked out by such moments. Later, we get the sense that this moment still reverberates:  
Even now, when I chance to light on this book, every sentence becomes for me 
a spike with which. I again draw something incomparable out of the depths: its 
entire skin trembles with tender shudders of recollection. 
(EH ‘Daybreak’ 1) 
In this way, these descriptions suggest that in recalling these memories of events which he 
experienced first-hand, Nietzsche is able to re-engage with past thoughts, and feelings 
through this notion of mental time-travel. The memories are not recalled as mere facts about 
an event but crucially involve a first-person perspective which is often linked to past 
emotions: this suggests a phenomenological proximity and plausibly contributes to a sense 
of memory ownership.  
It is noteworthy that Nietzsche reflects upon these thoughts and feelings as his, and not as 




of ‘I’ which emerges in a narrative self.  Riccardi notes that we are accustomed to thinking of 
first-person perspective as something that is causally efficacious cf. Campbell ‘our pattern of 
use of the first-person is heavily invested in the idea that the self is causally significant’ 
(2012:373).  The general consensus is that Nietzsche is deeply suspicious of such an 
assumption: ‘in the passage from BGE 16…Nietzsche stresses how expressions like ‘I think’ 
suggest that the mental verb in question – in the example ‘think’ designates a kind of ‘activity’ 
which the ‘I’ is supposed to be causing’ (2015:44). However, it is not obvious that to do away 
with this understanding of an ‘I’ as causally efficacious is to do away with the ‘I’ per se.  The 
use of autobiographical memory here and autonoetic consciousness which I have flagged 
above, could be seen to gesture towards an ‘I’ which is merely something to which thoughts, 
drives, affects and so on pertain.64 The first-person perspective which is tied to affectivity in 
autobiographical memory can serve to create a sense of ‘mineness.’ It could be that this sense 




 In conclusion, I have argued that autobiographical memory as seen in Ecce Homo emerges 
as an important factor in constituting a narrative self for Nietzsche, and goes some way to 
allowing us to locate the sense of first-person subjectivity required for such a self. I have 
attempted to begin to address Gardner’s concern that the philosophical psychology 
Nietzsche provides us with does not leave any room for first-person subjectivity: by 
involving other capacities in the self such as autobiographical memory, alongside the drives, 
it seems we can retrieve some sense of this.  
Autobiographical memory can be understood as a plastic and creative capacity that is 
responsive to, and works alongside drives. Through the activities of condensing and 
                                                        
 
64 We might compare this with the view Anderson (2012) presents of a Nietzschean self as a ‘repository.’ 
On this view, the claim that drives and affects are causally responsible for actions and attitudes is 
maintained, but this does not prevent there being a self which is a distinct psychological object, which 




summarising, (in healthy individuals) a coherent and intelligible (and more or less, accurate) 
narrative emerges. This narrative is such that it provides the individual with a sense of ‘I’, 
‘me’, and ‘mine’, something which autobiographical memory achieves through the following 
ways: 1) by generating an awareness of a self persisting through time, 2) by providing an 
insight into past perspectives and, 3) by allowing for a first-person perspective which is tied 
to affectivity. The sense of persistence allows the individual to have a thicker notion of ‘I’ and 
to avoid the problems caused by conceiving of oneself as transient, i.e. if someone feels that 
they have persisted throughout events and will continue to do so, they are more likely to feel 
motivated to pursue future projects. A degree of self-knowledge is made available to the 
individual retrospectively, thus allowing them to appraise past perspectives and providing 
them with some insight into their past characters. In healthy individuals, through the activity 
of the drives, this evaluative process allows for reinterpretation of past events such that they 
may be incorporated into the narrative self (and we should note that this process is not to 
be confused with whitewashing of the past). Finally, autobiographical memory involves a 
first-person perspective which is tied to affectivity - this allows the individual to re-engage 
with past affective content and to take up an evaluative stance against such episodes in order 
to uncover aspects of their emotional life which were perhaps not obvious at the time. In this 
way, autobiographical memory plays a role in unpacking the phenomenological richness of 
a self. The combination of the above seems crucial for a narrative self – in order to view this 
narrative as answering to questions of who I am, and why I am that way, it needs to include 
a first-person awareness of one’s past thoughts, attitudes, actions, and emotions. This sense 
of selfhood is important for ensuring that the individual feels stable enough to engage in 














This chapter examines the use of self-deception as a mode of self-regulation. In On the 
Genealogy of Morality Nietzsche provides us with a case study of self-deception, 
presenting it as a phenomenon exhibited by the weak and impotent as a response to their 
oppression: ‘the counterfeiting and self-deception of powerlessness’ (GM I:13). In the 
Genealogy, this activity of self-deception is contrasted with the strong, healthy capacity of 
forgetting, which is used by the nobles to avoid occurrences of ressentiment (GM II:1), and 
the implication is that self-deception is the main method of self-regulation open to ‘the 
unfortunate, the downtrodden, the broken…the weakest’ or ‘the sick’ (GM III:14).  
In exploring the mental states involved in self-deception, and how self-deceptive beliefs 
can be maintained, I will focus on the slaves rather than the priest in the Genealogy. The 
reason for this is that the self-deception of the slaves provides us with a more clear-cut 
and plausible example of self-deception as self-regulation. Nietzsche presents the priest, 
qua orchestrator of the slave-revolt in morality65, as power-hungry (a trait displayed by 
the nobles, causing us to recall that the priestly caste is a faction of the nobles cf. GM I:6-
7), and somewhat self-aware – it seems likely that the priest knows that he is using the 
newly minted values as tools for revenge. The slaves’ self-deception, by contrast, appears 
to have a therapeutic motivation cf. GM III:14, and as such is closer to a more general case 
of self-regulation: ‘that sublime self-deception whereby the majority of the dying, the 
weak and the oppressed of every kind could construe weakness itself as freedom, and 
their particular mode of existence as an accomplishment’ (GM I:13). In this way, it seems 
that the slaves’ engagement with self-deception is a means of allowing them to feel better 
about themselves and their situation.  
                                                        
 
65 The slave revolt in morality i.e. the introduction of ‘slavish’ values such as humility, patience, compassion 




How precisely is this mechanism of self-deception to be understood? Which instances of 
self-deception occur here? And how is it that this self-deception appears to be relatively 
stable? Nietzsche presents this phenomenon of self-deception as a key driving force in 
the Genealogy¸ and it does not appear that the slaves relinquish their self-deceptive 
beliefs.  
In this chapter, I will offer a taxonomy of the self-deceptive beliefs present in the 
Genealogy¸ drawing a distinction between the slaves’ value-facing beliefs (‘I believe that 
humility is intrinsically good’), and their person-facing beliefs (‘I am humble’), and 
exploring how these beliefs can be maintained. I suggest that the biggest potential threat 
to the slaves’ self-deception is their affective experiences, namely their ‘secretly 
smouldering emotions of revenge and hatred’ (GM I:13). The particular 
intensity/frequency/duration of certain emotions serve to create cognitive dissonance 
for the slaves, and threaten to undermine the slaves’ person-facing beliefs, in particular.  
I will then suggest that in the Genealogy, Nietzsche gestures towards one possible means 
of resolving this tension between affective states and person-facing beliefs, namely via 
the mechanism of pretense. Pretense here is broadly understood as an imagined-state, 
which plays an intermediary role between the subject’s affective states and their beliefs. 
These pretense-states allow for a second-order reinterpretation of emotions like 
vengefulness, such that they are re-framed and brought into line with the subject’s self-
deceptive beliefs. In the Genealogy, these pretense-states take the form of rich, vivid 
narratives (GM I:15), and provide a context in which their emotions are deemed 
acceptable and in keeping with their self-deceptive person-facing beliefs.  
In this way, pretense-states tie in with Nietzsche’s remarks on the importance of 
falsehoods and ‘saving illusions’ (BT; GS 107; GM III:24). As Anderson (2005:186) 
suggests ‘Nietzsche’s direct concern is not the existence or possibility of truth and 
knowledge, but their value’– in this way, imagined-states may displace knowledge or true 
belief as more appropriate or valuable. In the Genealogy pretense-states enable 
individuals to endure in the face of adversity, and play a therapeutic role, allowing for 





4.1 Self-Deceptive Beliefs in the Genealogy 
 
The first question we must ask is what kind of self-deceptive beliefs do we find in the 
Genealogy? One feature of the slave-revolt is that the slaves desire to feel morally superior 
to the nobles. Poellner (2004) and Elgat (2015) both focus on the idea that in order for 
the slaves to feel morally superior, they must genuinely believe that their new slavish 
values of humility, compassion, patience, moderation etc. are good in themselves, and not 
merely instruments for revenge (cf. Elgat 2015: 526).  For these new values to take root, 
there must not be any sense that the slaves have knowingly tricked themselves into 
holding these values: ‘one cannot feel superior to another on the basis of values one does 
not really care about oneself’66 (Elgat:2015:526). Acknowledging that these new values 
are held as part of a plan for revenge, might result in the slaves feeling superior in the 
sense that they are intelligent enough to successfully trick the nobles. But this would not 
be a case of feeling morally superior – intelligence would not suffice in this scenario. To 
feel morally superior the slaves would need to believe that their set of values is morally 
good.  
The slaves must therefore believe that they are motivated to hold a certain value because, 
and only because, that value is intrinsically good, and consequently ought to be held. But 
it is not just a matter of being self-deceived about one’s motivations; the slaves must also 
come to believe that they are exhibiting, (or at least intending to exhibit), these values, 
i.e. they must really think that they are, (or aiming to be), humble, compassionate, patient, 
mild. In this way, it seems that we end up with two kinds of beliefs: (i) beliefs which are 
orientated around the values themselves – value-facing beliefs, and (ii) beliefs which are 
orientated around the agents who exhibit these values – person-facing beliefs.  
In the Genealogy, it seems that both types of self-deceptive beliefs are important for 
enabling this feeling of moral superiority. These new values must be seen to be exercised 
                                                        
 
66 It is worth emphasising that the superiority referred to here is moral superiority in particular. It is 
plausible that someone could feel superior to another for reasons which they would, when being honest, 
admit are arbitrary and fatuous. One such case might be the British class system. My thanks to Eliot 




practically so that the slaves feel they are fully invested in these values, not just that they 
are lauding them in a detached, abstract manner, and for this we need person-facing 
beliefs. It is worth noting that value-facing beliefs and person-facing beliefs do not always 
overlap, for example a slave could believe that patience is intrinsically good but also 
believe that they themselves are not patient. In such a case, the slave would consider 
himself to be falling short of this value or sinning. Thus, the person-facing belief would be 
interpreted in such a way that it would not be seen to undermine the value-facing belief 
that patience is intrinsically good.  
Are there ever instances where either value-facing and/or person-facing self-deceptive 
beliefs might be called into question? Self-deception is notoriously fragile (Gendler 2010, 
Audi 1988); should a self-deceptive belief be doubted by the subject, there is an obvious 
risk that this self-deception becomes unstable. One way this might occur is by becoming 
aware of the fact that you hold contradictory beliefs. If we take value-facing beliefs 




(A1) the slaves' beliefs about their newly adopted slavish values (e.g. humility) i.e. 'I 
believe that humility is intrinsically good'  
(A2) the slaves' beliefs about their motivation for holding these values, i.e. ‘the reason I 
believe humility is good is because I can use this value to exact revenge on the nobles'  
 
The idea in [A] is that an awareness of (A2) would threaten (A1) in that the realisation 
that the reason one holds value x is primarily instrumental would undermine the belief 
that value x is intrinsically good (and should be held only for that reason).  So, if the slave 
comes to see that the only reason he is propagating and committing to a virtue like 
humility is because this activity provides him with a means of gaining some sort of 
superiority over his oppressors, thus functioning as a form of revenge, then it becomes 




the belief in (A1) would cease to have the force it previously held in the slave’s 
psychology.  
Is there any way this kind of conflict could be avoided? One way [A] would not see any 
conflict in the subject's psychology is by understanding it as a case of (motivated rather 
than accidental) mistaken belief. Deflationary accounts67 pursue this line of thought and 
characterise self-deception as systematic error due to a biasing factor(s), which operates 
unbeknownst to the subject.  
In the case of the slaves, they erroneously believe (A1) even though the state of affairs in 
(A2) is actually the case - they are simply unaware of their true motivations.  It seems that 
in this scenario the slave could quite happily maintain their mistaken belief, and (A2) 
drops out of the picture. This lack of self-awareness seems plausible – nowhere in the 
Genealogy do we find evidence that the slaves possess the kind of self-referential belief 
we find in (A2) – in this way (A2) appears far too sophisticated for the slaves. Instead we 




(A1) the slaves' beliefs about their newly adopted slavish values (e.g. humility) i.e. 'I 
believe that humility is intrinsically good'  
(*) the slaves’ desire to feel morally superior to the nobles 
 
Elgat (2015) refers to Mele’s deflationary account (2000) which explains self-deception 
via certain motivational biases, i.e. a desire regarding p or related to p, which causes the 
                                                        
 
67 Deflationary accounts do not require any intention of the part of the subject to engage in self-deception, 
nor do they require the subject to be in two contradictory mental states. This is in contrast to intentionalist 
accounts of self-deception which broadly take self-deception to be modelled on interpersonal deception 





subject to view and evaluate evidence in a biased way, resulting in a false belief. The 
resulting false belief is genuinely held by the subject. In Mele’s account such desires will 
trigger two specific biases: (i) a confirmation bias and, (ii) a vividness of information bias. 
With the former, when the subject S possesses a desire related to p, S will tend to look for, 
both in memories and real life, confirming instances rather than disconfirming instances 
for p, and these confirming instances will be recognised more readily by S. With the latter 
kind of bias, S is more likely to recognise, attend to, and recall vivid data than pallid data, 
meaning that vivid data related to p will have a disproportionate influence on S's 
formation and retention of beliefs. Either or both of these biases will, according to Mele, 
be enough to structure and sustain a false belief.  
How would this apply to the case of self-deception in the Genealogy? Elgat suggests that 
in the case of the slaves, a desire, namely to feel morally superior to the nobles, triggers 
these motivational biases, and we may speculate that: 
under the influence of the confirmation bias the slaves would tend to be on the 
lookout for evidence that support their desired belief and would thus gladly 
seize upon and be satisfied with the priest's teachings while downplaying or 
ignoring any countervailing evidence (their objective miserable predicament, 
the fact that throughout their lives they adhered to masterly values, etc.). 
Furthermore, the slave's desire for superiority would cause the priest's 
teaching to appear especially vivid in a way which would powerfully influence 
the slave's formation of beliefs. 
(2015:536) 
In this way, the slaves are able to misinterpret evidence, such that the facts seem to 
support their desire to feel morally superior. This evidence, as Elgat notes, comes in the 
form of the priest's teachings. Alongside the slaves, Nietzsche introduces the character of 
the priest, who through religious teachings, initiates the reinterpretation of the status 
quo:  
The wretched alone are good; the poor, impotent, lowly alone are good; the 
suffering, deprived, sick, ugly alone are pious, alone are blessed by God, 




contrary the evil, the cruel, the lustful, the insatiable, the godless to all eternity; 
and you shall be in all eternity the unblessed, accursed, and damned! 
 (GM I:7)  
The priest's rhetoric of the oppressed as good and the oppressors as evil, thus offers the 
slaves a confirming instance of their belief that they are superior to the nobles: ‘the lambs 
say to each other, ‘These birds of prey are evil; and whoever is least like a bird of prey 
and most like its opposite, a lamb – is good, isn’t he?’’ (GM I:13). These teachings are then 
accepted due to the slaves' biases.  In this way (A2) is replaced by (A*), i.e. the desire to 
feel superior to the nobles, and we avoid the conflict between (A1) and (A2). The slaves 
therefore come to genuinely believe (A1) without realising that they lack good reasons 
for doing so.  
The deflationary account outlined in [A*] seems able to avoid a characterisation of the 
slaves as holding conflicting belief-states, and thus avoids one instance of cognitive 
dissonance68. But there is a more pressing concern. It is not clear that this deflationary 
approach acknowledges the full force of Nietzsche’s descriptions of the slaves as being 
intentionally deceived. Nietzsche outright refers to the phenomenon as a ‘sublime self-
deception’ [sublime Selbstbetrügerei] (GM I:13) in which the subject is far from being an 
innocent party: ‘the man of ressentiment is neither upright nor naïve nor honest and 
straightforward with himself. His soul squints’ (GM I:10). As Poellner (2004) notes, 
Nietzsche is insistent on this element of mendacity:  
The subject of ressentiment does not simply find herself, by the operation of 
some to her inscrutable mental mechanism, with ‘moral values’ which happen 
to be resources answering to her desires. Rather, the re-interpretation of her 
hatred of the object of ressentiment as a righteous disapproval of wickedness 
                                                        
 
68 Another advantage of a deflationary approach is that it is able to avoid the static and dynamic paradoxes 
which often beset intentionalist models of self-deception. The static paradox focuses on the problem of 
simultaneously believing p and ¬p, whilst the dynamic paradox focuses on the apparent impossibility of the 
process in which a subject tries to hold a belief that p when they know or believe that ¬p. Appeals to split-
mind models, sub-personal agency, or unconscious beliefs are often made by intentionalists in an attempt 




is the result of intentional action: hatred is ‘masked’ and ‘counterfeited’ (GM 
III, 14) as virtue…there is copious textual evidence that Nietzsche regards the 
subject of ressentiment as genuinely self-deceived. 
(2004:47) 
One standard criticism which has been levelled against this sort of deflationary account 
of self-deception is that it becomes difficult to distinguish self-deception from wishful 
thinking (Porcher 2012). On this account to be self-deceived the subject only needs to 
hold a false belief that p, possess evidence that ¬p, and have some desire or emotion that 
explains why p is believed and retained. It is not clear this this fully captures the element 
of mendacity which Nietzsche emphasises. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to enter 
into this particular debate regarding ways of distinguishing deflationary accounts of self-
deception from other forms of motivated believing such as wishful thinking, but I suggest 
that this worry is particularly pertinent for the Genealogy since Nietzsche makes clear 
that this is an instance of self-deception, rather than wishful thinking. 
So, what are the slaves attempting to intentionally ‘conceal’ or ‘mask’? As previously 
noted, it does not appear that the slaves possess the degree of self-awareness required 
for a belief such as that in (A2), i.e. a belief about their motivation for holding these values, 
i.e. ‘the reason I believe humility is good is because I can use this value to exact revenge on 
the nobles.' But one thing which they are aware of is their phenomenology, i.e. the 
emotions they experience.  
As Poellner (2004) notes, the potential tension(s) in the slave’s psychology could include 
not only belief-on-belief tension, but also tension arising due to affective mental states. 
Poellner offers a Sartrean-inspired account to accommodate a notion of intentional 
deception vis-à-vis belief-states, which in part draws on a distinction between 
unacknowledged, implicit conscious contents and implicit attitudinal character of 




other.69In an example like [A] the belief-states (A1) and (A2) are retained but in such a 
manner that no cognitive dissonance arises for the subject, and the self-deception 
remains intact.  
However, as Poellner himself notes ‘while the Sartrean approach has a good answer to 
the question how ressentiment can consistently involve a project of concealment (6), it is 
not clear how it can plausibly account for what is concealed’ (2004:59). In the self-
deceiving ressentiment-driven subject, what is concealed are not just beliefs, motivations, 
or intentions, but crucially emotions. 
Since it seems there is no evidence to suggest that the slaves possess self-referential 
beliefs regarding their motivations, the slaves’ emotions are therefore the most pressing 
problem vis-à-vis the stability of their self-deception. These emotions are of such a 
palpability that they cannot go unnoticed by the subject, (as would be required by the 
Sartrean approach). Poellner flags this concern:  
What could the method of concealment or ‘masking’ (GM III:14) of a present 
conscious state with high affective intensity possibly consist in, given that such 
states are necessarily in the foreground of consciousness, conspicuously 
manifesting their presence?  
(2004:60) 
Elgat also briefly raises this worry: ‘it would be implausible to hold either that they are 
unaware of the raging of ressentiment inside them or of how such strong emotions could 
cloud one’s judgement and influence one’s thinking’ (2015:538).  It seems that if we turn 
                                                        
 
69 On this picture, something like (A2) would not be noticed or acknowledged by the subject, but is in 
principle noticeable via a shift of attention: ‘those contents of consciousness we cannot acknowledge 
without realizing our practical inconsistency are indeed conscious, but pre-reflectively: they are 
unattended yet nevertheless skilfully negotiated ‘background’. Avoiding explicit awareness of them is no 
more unproblematic than avoiding bumping into a piece of furniture without paying attention to it while 
perambulating engaged in intense conversation in a familiar environment’ (2004:58). As to the question of 
what prevents the subject from shifting attention to the implicit content, (and thereby becoming aware of 
it), a Sartrean-inspired approach involves the subject ‘intentionally adopting a non-reflective stance vis-à-
vis her own intentional behaviour in certain contexts; and this stance includes itself among the items it pre-




our attention to some of the emotions present in the subject’s psychology, there is a very 
real chance of cognitive dissonance.  
This section has examined the possibility of belief-on-belief tension arising in the slave’s 
psychology, as outlined in [A], along with two different treatments of [A], one deflationary 
and one intentionalist. With both approaches, it seems cognitive dissonance can be 
avoided. However, as both Poellner and Elgat note, the real threat to the stability of the 
slaves’ self-deceptive beliefs comes from their emotions.  
In the next section, I will further investigate this worry and explore precisely how such 
cognitive dissonance can arise in the Genealogy, which emotions are involved, and the 
nature of their manifestation, i.e. whether their degree, frequency, and their duration 
makes a difference in generating this conflict in the subject’s psychology.  
 
4.2 Emotions in the Genealogy 
 
How might emotions contribute to generating this cognitive dissonance, and threaten an 
individual’s self-deceptive beliefs? We may first note that emotions need not necessarily 
create cognitive dissonance in the self-deceived subject: there are cases in which 
emotions serve to underpin and bolster a self-deception, and work to avoid any conflict 
in the subject’s mental economy. Mele (2003) discusses the role emotions may have in 
driving a self-deception. He gives the example of the self-deceived husband, Bob, who 
believes his wife Ann is not having an affair. Bob experiences certain emotions which help 
to generate, and support what Mele understands to be his self-deceptive belief: ‘Bob’s 
love for Ann, or his fear that he cannot get along without her, may be a partial cause of his 
desire that she is not having an affair and, thereby, of his being self-deceived about this’ 
(2003: 169). In such a scenario, it seems perfectly plausible that Bob’s emotions would 
set to work generating confirmation and vividness of information biases such that Bob 
would misinterpret evidence, e.g. Ann’s guilt regarding her affair manifests as her cooking 
an elaborate meal for Bob: Bob takes this gesture to be evidence of her love for him. Bob’s 




If we turn to the emotions described in the Genealogy however, it seems we do not have 
an analogous case. I suggest that the affective experiences Nietzsche describes are at odds 
with the person-facing beliefs held by the slaves– in these cases the emotions seem to 
threaten, rather than support the self-deception.  Whilst Mele’s deflationary account is 
attractive in that it can give an explicit role to emotions in generating, and sustaining self-
deceptions, it is not clear how he would explain emotions which undermine the viability 
and stability of a self-deception.  
So how are these emotions experienced, and how and when do they become problematic? 
Throughout the Genealogy Nietzsche is careful to emphasise the affective experiences of 
the slaves.  As a result of their ambient environment, i.e. a constant state of oppression by 
the nobles, the slaves are described as feeling ‘powerless’ (GM I:10), ‘miserable’ (GM 
I:14), full of ‘secretly smouldering emotions of revenge and hatred’ (GM I:13) and ‘rankled 
with poisonous and hostile feelings.’ They experience ‘a deep sadness’ and cultivate ‘a soil 
of self-contempt’ (GM III:14). Any happiness the slaves experience ‘manifests itself as 
essentially a narcotic, an anaesthetic, rest, peace, ‘sabbath’, relaxation of the mind and 
stretching of the limbs’ (GM I:10). This suggests that their emotions associated with being 
oppressed are (i) the status quo (rather than acute, isolated episodes), and (ii) 
experienced in a palpable manner – the idea being that one is only in need of an 
anaesthetic if one is consciously experiencing pain. As Poellner notes, the descriptions 
Nietzsche offers of these emotional states: ‘suggest strongly that the original negative 
affective state the subject ‘sees’ but ‘want[s] not to see’ continues to be ‘visible’, i.e. 
phenomenally conscious, to the self-deceiver (2004:48). We can therefore assume that at 
least some of these feelings of powerlessness, hatred, vengefulness etc. are experienced 
by the slaves in such a way or to such a degree that they are aware of them.   
Whilst there is an extensive literature on the philosophy of emotions for example whether 
emotions are best understood via a cognitivist account (Lazarus 1991, Nussbaum 2004) 
or a perceptual account (Prinz 2006, Damasio 1994), for the purposes of this chapter, I 
will remain neutral on these debates, and focus on the particular viscerality of the 
emotions described in the Genealogy, suggesting that from Nietzsche’s descriptions, the 
phenomenology of these emotions is of such an intensity that some kind of content is 




Genealogy, and how the degree/frequency/duration of these affective experiences may 
undermine self-deceptive beliefs. The particular case studies I present are by no means 
exhaustive, (it is highly plausible that we may think of many different combinations of 
beliefs and emotions for the slaves), but are designed to show scenarios where conflict 
due to these affective experiences may not arise, and cases where conflict seems 
unavoidable.  
Given the palpability of the slaves’ affective experiences, how exactly can they generate 
cognitive dissonance and threaten their self-deceptive beliefs? In the previous section we 
drew a distinction between the slaves’ beliefs which were value-facing and their beliefs 
which were person-facing.  
If we first focus on a value-facing belief and the emotions of anger and humiliation 
experienced by the slaves, we have model [B]: 
 
(B1) The slaves' beliefs about their motivations for holding their newly adopted slavish 
values, i.e.  'I believe that humility is intrinsically good' 
(B2) The slaves' feelings of anger and humiliation  
 
Here it seems that there does not necessarily need to be any conflict. It could be the case 
that the slave holds the belief in (B1) yet palpably experiences feelings of anger and 
humiliation. Particularly if, for example, anger is experienced as directed towards the 
nobles, this can be understood as anger at the fact that the nobles do not respect values 
like humility. In this scenario, this anger is seen as righteous anger, and as such there is 
no conflict between (B1) and (B2).  
What if the anger is experienced in a more inchoate manner, i.e. the anger does not seem 
to be clearly directed at any particular target? Again, this need not conflict with (B1).  
Given the context of the priest’s teachings, this kind of emotion could be interpreted as 
the emotion of someone falling short of their values, i.e. the sinner. In such a framework, 




and shortcoming, a lack of self-worth, guilt and shame, and so on, all the while still holding 
to his belief that a value like humility is intrinsically good.   
In such a scenario (B1) and (B2) are not incompatible – the particular emotions 
experienced serve to reinforce the self-deceptive belief.  The reason the ‘sinner’ feels so 
bad is because he holds certain values in such high esteem and aspires towards them.  
The case of [B] thus poses no problem for Mele’s account, and is in line with the role he 
accords to emotions in being able to drive and sustain a self-deception. The emotions in 
(B2) play a part in leading the slaves to select and/or misevaluate evidence to support 
their biasing desire (i.e. to feel superior to the nobles). As previously suggested, this 
evidence comes in the form of the priest’s teachings. Given that the rhetoric of the priest’s 
teachings plays upon feelings of humiliation - ‘they tell me that their misery means they 
are God’s chosen and select, after all, people beat the dogs they love best; perhaps this 
misery is just a preparation, a test, a training’ (GM I:14), anger, and envy – ‘one day their 
kingdom will come too’ (GM I:15), it makes sense that the emotions in (B2) only serve to 
reinforce the slave’s self-deceptive value-facing beliefs.  
In this way, the emotions of anger and humiliation present in [B] do not create any 
cognitive dissonance for the subject and the self-deception is not threatened. We should 
note, however, that this works better with intermittent and relatively moderate 
experiences of anger – if anger is experienced constantly as high intensity rage then it is 
not clear that the sinner story could accommodate this. If the subject comes to realise that 
they feel this intense rage very frequently and for prolonged periods, they may well 
question what has prompted this and/or what it might indicate (plausibly something 
aside from falling short of virtues).  
With [B] we have seen an example of how the slaves’ emotions need not threaten their 
self-deceptive beliefs, in this case, value-facing beliefs. I will now examine a case [C] 
where the slaves’ emotions do cause cognitive dissonance, and potentially undermine 
their self-deceptive beliefs. It seems that, in this scenario, the cognitive dissonance arises 
when we turn to the slaves’ person-facing beliefs (which relate to an evaluation of their 




emotions experienced by the slave, namely hatred, envy, and vengefulness. Here, the 
conflict could be as follows: 
 
 [C]  
(C1) A belief the slaves hold about their character, i.e. 'I am humble’ 
(C2) The slaves' feelings of hatred, envy, vengefulness vis-a-vis the nobles 
 
This time it seems that a tension does arise between the beliefs in (C1) and the emotions 
experienced in (C2). Whilst on [B] the slaves’ emotions did not pose a problem for their 
self-deceptive beliefs, if we shift firstly from focusing on value-facing beliefs like ‘I believe 
that humility is intrinsically good’ to focusing on person-facing beliefs like ‘I am humble’, 
and secondly from emotions of anger and humiliation to emotions of hatred, envy, and 
vengefulness, the self-deception becomes problematic.  
In [C] these emotions seem to directly contradict the beliefs held in (C1). How can we 
square immediate and intense feelings of hatred and envy with a belief that one is meek 
and mild? Or acute feelings of vengefulness with a belief that one is kind and 
compassionate? It seems a huge stretch to try to understand these particular emotions 
within the framework of being a sinner, as we did in [B].  Even without any insight into 
their real motivations for holding these values, the very phenomenology of the slaves 
makes it difficult for them to avoid calling their self-deceptive beliefs in (C1) into 
question. It seems that self-deceptive person-facing beliefs are particularly at risk of 
being directly undermined by the subject’s emotions.  
How can a self-deception be sustained in the face of such high-intensity affective 
experiences which cannot be ignored by the subject? One way we might dissolve the 
tension in [C] is to draw a distinction between a character trait attribution like ‘I am 
humble’, and an episodic emotion attribution, i.e. ‘I hate x on this particular occasion’ or 
‘I feel envious of x on this particular occasion.’ One common-sense understanding of 
character traits is that they are deep facts about a person which are relatively stable and 




behaviour which might suggest the contrary of that trait, e.g. a normally calm individual 
becoming annoyed when another driver cuts in front of them. Here, the behaviour of that 
individual would be seen as justified in an exceptional situation, and would not cause us 
to doubt the original assigned character trait.  
In the case of the slaves, they might very well take a person-facing belief like ‘I am humble’ 
to be a character trait attribution, whilst also experiencing an emotion like hatred or envy 
episodically. This emotion would merely be viewed as a reasonable, yet uncharacteristic 
response to an extreme situation, i.e. being oppressed by the nobles who are so much 
better off than the slaves materially, socially, and politically. These responses could easily 
be understood as not conflicting with how the slave thinks of his character in general.  
However, we might question whether certain emotions are easier to explain away in this 
manner than others. Whilst something like hatred or envy could be viewed as an 
uncharacteristic, and basic response in an extreme or exceptional situation, an emotion 
like vengefulness is potentially more problematic.  
We might want to say that something like vengefulness belongs to class of emotions 
which are more sophisticated. It seems like vengefulness needs to be associated with a 
particular end, and is tied to very specific future-directed desires and intentions. These 
may preoccupy the subject to the level of obsession. Vengefulness also involves an 
element of planning, strategising, or plotting: the individual ends up partaking in some 
kind of project (whether in a real sense or an imaginary sense, e.g. a schoolchild being 
punished might daydream about how to get revenge on their teacher).  In this way, the 
individual is forced to engage with this emotion in a way that need not be the case with 
something like anger. Hatred or envy may be experienced at the foreground of 
consciousness in a palpable manner, but need not necessitate that the individual engage 
in any kind of project – with vengefulness, structurally this emotion seems to call for such 
activity.  
The option to explain away an emotion like vengefulness is still open but would require 
a far more complicated story as to why the individual can still retain character traits. For 
example if someone believes themselves to be a generally benevolent and forgiving 




connotations of vindictiveness, spite, and insidiousness associated with vengefulness 
seem particularly problematic.   So even if we attempt to dissolve the tension we saw in 
[C] by understanding (C1) as an enduring character trait and (C2) as an episodic emotion 
which is merely an uncharacteristic response to exceptional circumstances, this still 
necessitates some explanation or story to re-frame the emotion such that it does not 
undermine the trait observed in (C1). 
The shift from [B] to [C] therefore demonstrates how the particular combination of beliefs 
and emotions affects whether the self-deception becomes threatened. It seems that with 
person-facing beliefs like ‘I am humble’ and the emotion of vengefulness (being a more 
sophisticated class of emotion) that we see a problem. Vengefulness does not look like it 
can be easily explained away with something like the sinner story in [B] or the character 
trait/episodic emotion distinction in [C]. For any tension to arise in the subject’s 
psychology we would also have to assume that this emotion of vengefulness is 
experienced in an extreme manner, i.e. the experiences are of a high intensity, occur 
frequently, and last for significant periods of time. (Infrequent, mild, short-lived bouts of 
the emotion may go relatively unnoticed by the subject thus avoiding any cognitive 
dissonance).  It appears that vengefulness, in particular, will need to be dealt with in some 
way to preserve the subject’s self-deceptive person-facing beliefs.  
Both Poellner and Elgat agree that high-intensity affective experiences must be managed 
in some way if the self-deception is to be sustained by the subject, and suggest that the 
solution may lie in reinterpreting or rebranding the affective content. How should we 
understand this notion of re-interpreting?  
Elgat suggests that the entire project of the slave revolt in morality is itself revalued when 
the revenge and hatred present in ressentiment is reinterpreted as a call and hope for 
justice: ‘as a consequence, the slave revolt in morality is now itself deemed as ‘just’: it is 
not an act of vengeance but is rather motivated by justice’ (2015:539). In this way, he 
suggests that Nietzsche envisages the revaluation of ressentiment and the emotions 
involved as ‘a meta-revaluation of the entire act of revaluation. It is thus a creative act of 
a higher order’. He then goes on to claim that with regards to the affective experiences of 
the ressentiment subjects, this process ‘serves as a powerful (though not absolutely 




deception’ (2015:540). Poellner also picks up on this potential solution of a re-branding 
of these emotions and suggests that we see evidence for such a phenomenon in (GM 1:14): 
‘what they hate is not their enemy, no! they hate ‘injustice’, they hate ‘godlessness’.  
How viable is re-interpreting emotions as a solution? Poellner raises a concern:  
This re-interpretation of negative affect as disapproval of ‘immorality’ makes 
possible its acknowledgement as well as its modification (into an experience 
of moral superiority). The problem of how current, conscious, emotional 
episodes like hatred could possibly be actively concealed from the subject 
therefore vanishes — they could not and do not need to be intentionally 
concealed. Yet, does this solution not merely replace one problem with 
another? 
(2004: 63) 
Poellner goes on to argue that there are two problems with this possible solution of re-
interpreting. Firstly, given that a reinterpretation of the emotions would require the 
subject to utilise concepts like humility, there is a circularity worry. He suggests that the 
ressentiment subjects do not have any real acquaintance with any of these new values 
such as humility, (presumably because this was not part of the prevailing value-set of the 
nobles), and consequently have no concept of the values to utilise in the modification and 
re-interpretation of their affective experiences.  As such, it would seem that the subjects 
are not able to manage their cognitive dissonance.  
One way that Poellner (2004:63) suggests we might overcome this worry is to consider 
two possibilities: 1) a second-hand acquaintance with the concepts - ‘it is conceivable, for 
instance, that ….the subject utilises values which she has no acquaintance with, if she is 
aware that these values are recognised by others in her culture’, or 2) the subject does 
have, in other contexts, a genuine (non-self-deceived), albeit relatively weak grasp of the 
values instrumentalised in ressentiment.  
Poellner maintains that Nietzsche does not consider 2). He then goes on to argue that this 
problem undermines Nietzsche's claim in GM I:10 that 'ressentiment itself turns creative 
and gives birth to values’. Instead we can only view ressentiment as a derivative or 




value it instrumentalises’. In order for the ressentiment subjects to utilise concepts like 
humility to reinterpret their emotional experiences, they must already recognise such 
concepts, having acquired them from elsewhere, rather than creating them themselves. 
So, on Poellner’s account, not only are the slaves unable to reframe their emotions 
because they lack the concepts to do so, but we will have to rethink a key characteristic 
of ressentiment itself, namely that it is creative and can give rise to values.  
However, in the next section, I will suggest that this dead-end may be avoided and that 
we may supplement both Poellner's and Elgat's account, by developing the idea of 
subjects reinterpreting their affective experiences such that the self-deception is 
preserved.  
I suggest the following: (i) that the possibility Poellner offers in 2), i.e. that ressentiment 
subjects do have a genuine albeit weak grasp of these concepts is in fact accommodated 
for by Nietzsche, (ii) this is achieved specifically through the use of pretense-states, which 
through their narrative component enable the subject to entertain a relatively weak (and 
non-instantiated) but genuine grasp of the values, (iii) this grasp of the values allows the 
subject to modulate their affective states in such a way that they are brought into line 
with their self-deceptive beliefs.  
The effect of these intermediary pretense-states therefore softens any tension between 
the subject’s self-deceptive beliefs and their affective experiences, thus allowing the self-
deception to be maintained.  The next section will examine the nature of these pretense-
states in the Genealogy, and how it is they provide subjects with a weak grasp of concepts 
such as humility.  
 
4.3 Re-framing through Pretense  
 
As outlined in the previous section, it seems that in the Genealogy, whilst ressentiment 
subjects may be able to avoid the kind of belief-on-belief tension we see in [A], the picture 
becomes more complicated once we factor in certain emotions. Specifically, it seems that 
a tension could arise between the subject’s self-deceptive person-facing beliefs such as ‘I 




prolonged feelings of vengefulness. The conflict in [C] is such that it could undermine and 
threaten the stability of the subject’s self-deception.  
Due to the particular palpability and nature of an emotion like vengefulness (in that it 
forces whomever is experiencing it to engage with it in a way we do not encounter with 
an emotion such as anger), the subject’s phenomenology alone may call their self-
deceptive beliefs into question as it would be seen to directly undermine their beliefs 
about their moral character, i.e. why am I so overwhelmed by feelings of vengefulness if 
I am so humble /compassionate /patient /forgiving etc?  This kind of tension would need 
to be alleviated in some way in order to allow the self-deception to be preserved.  
In this section, I will suggest that one means of softening this kind of tension can be found 
in the Genealogy, namely, the use of pretense. I will begin by outlining what constitutes a 
pretense-state in the Genealogy, and how they are to be differentiated from belief-states. 
Following Gendler (2007), I will suggest that these pretense-states are generated by the 
imagination, and engagement with such states crucially involves an element of make-
believe. However, I will depart from Gendler’s account in that I do not believe, in the case 
of the Genealogy at least, that such pretense-states, qua pseudo-beliefs occupy the role 
normally assigned to belief in the subject’s mental economy and governance of their 
actions. Moreover, as Porcher notes (2014:304), Gendler makes a very strong claim in 
saying that ‘self-deception just is pretense, that is, the product of self-deception is 
pretense (a state that is belief-like but that falls short of constituting full-blown belief)’ 
and that this is very different from ‘allowing a role for pretense in the explanation of the 
process of (some forms of) self-deception.’ I believe my account here advances this latter 
view in allowing a role for pretense-states in generating and sustaining a self-deception.  
I suggest that these pretense-states: 1) specifically play an intermediary role between the 
subject’s affective states and beliefs, and 2) modify the subject’s affective states such that 
they are brought into line with the subject’s self-deceptive beliefs. Modification of these 
affective states, however, should not be understood as an actual transformation in kind 
of the emotion but rather as a second-order reinterpretation of it cf. Poellner:  
It is very important to bear in mind that the process Nietzsche is describing is 
not a transformation of an emotion of one type into a different emotion. It is 




cannot be expressed, actually transformed into a different emotion, say, a love 
of egalitarian justice’ so not a transformation in kind.  
(2004: 48) 
 In this way, I suggest that the subject is able to reinterpret their phenomenology by 
reframing emotions via these pretense-states, and that the key feature of pretense-states 
which allows for them to play this role is their narrative and imaginative richness.  
How should we understand pretense-states, and how exactly can we distinguish them 
from beliefs? For the purposes of this chapter, I will take pretense to be broadly construed 
as an imaginative episode, i.e. where the subject S forms a mental representation of p 
(where p can include both propositional and non-propositional content), regardless of 
whether p actually obtains in the real world. This mental state is to be distinguished from 
other mental states such as perception, supposition, remembering, believing, desiring 
and so on (although an imaginative episode can be prompted or driven by any of these 
states). S engages with this mental representation via the activity of make-believe (cf. 
Gendler 2007:235), and this imagining can lead to other mental states, in particular 
affective experiences.  In the Genealogy, I will suggest that the relevant pretenses take the 
form of rich, vivid narratives.  
Since our concern here is how the subject’s self-deception can be retained in the face of 
emotions which directly call some of those self-deceptive beliefs into doubt, we must ask 
why this necessitates a pretense, rather than, say, another belief. I suggest in this section, 
that the key function of pretense-states in the Genealogy is to soften tension between a 
subject’s self-deceptive beliefs and their affective experiences by modulating and 
reframing emotions. But could this role also be performed by a belief? In the case of the 
slaves a belief that ‘I am righteous’ could plausibly reframe feelings of anger as 
experiences of righteous anger. Such an emotion suddenly seems justified. In this way, 
we could say that another belief-state would be sufficient for reframing the emotions.  
However, there are reasons for thinking that a pretense-state will be more effective in 
bolstering a self-deception than an additional belief-state. This is because of an important 
distinction between pretense and belief.  A first pass at setting up such a distinction might 




these countervailing emotions would not affect the subject imagining that p), whereas 
beliefs are truth-tracking, and will be revised or dropped in the face of any counter-
evidence.  
However, this does not always appear to be the case. For example, we might think of an 
alcoholic, who, when questioned about their excessive drinking, comes up with a series 
of beliefs to explain their drinking on that particular occasion, e.g. ‘I found out my wife 
was cheating on me/ I had a tough day at work/ I had to wine and dine a client/ I had 
some trouble sleeping last night.’ These beliefs would appear to be robust against 
evidence, i.e. the alcoholic neglects to factor in the repeated occasions where he had 
lacked any real ‘reason’ to drink, or the fact that his boss/friends/family/spouse have all 
expressed concern over his excessive alcohol consumption. In such a scenario, if the 
alcoholic is challenged on one particular belief, and encouraged to revise it, another belief 
can simply take up the slack, and he does not need to face up to his alcoholism. In this 
way, a series of beliefs may function in such a way that they are robust to any 
countervailing evidence. So feasibly, at least in some cases, beliefs can possess the same 
characteristic – robustness to evidence- that pretenses can. 
However, in terms of the impact on our phenomenology, it could be the case that on 
certain occasions a belief is simply too thin. Pretense has been noted for its ability to 
generate affective responses.70Moran (1994) contrasts imagining with mere supposition 
and suggests that the former has a tendency to give rise to affective episodes where the 
latter does not, and the literature on fictional emotions documents how we are able to 
have strong emotional responses to imagined situations. In terms of differentiating 
between the affective response generated by a belief compared to those generated by a 
pretense, we might compare our emotional reaction to a belief that slavery is bad with 
our emotional reaction to watching a film about slavery which involves our imaginatively 
engaging with graphic and harrowing content. It would seem that in the latter case, our 
affective response would be heightened after having been forced to imaginatively engage 
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with the narrative. The ‘simulative off-line processing’ (Gendler:2007:235) that the 
characters and plotline provide enable us to emotionally engage in a way which might 
not be possible with the mere belief that slavery is wrong. The effect on our 
phenomenology in such a case is stronger.71 The important difference between a pretense 
and belief for our purposes, therefore seems to be its imaginative, narrative richness.  
So, do we find these sorts of pretenses in the Genealogy? Nietzsche seems to refer to the 
imaginative capacity of the slaves at several points throughout the text. Throughout the 
first essay Nietzsche emphasises this role of imagination vis-à-vis the slaves’ response to 
their oppression. In GM I:10 it is made clear that the slaves are relatively impotent in 
terms of actions but are able to draw on their imaginative resources to come up with a 
response to their oppression: ‘the ressentiment of those beings who, denied the proper 
response of action, compensate for it only with imaginary revenge’, and ‘the distortion 
with which the entrenched hatred and revenge of the powerless man attacks his 
opponent – in effigy of course’.  
This ‘effigy’ is part of the imaginary world the slave constructs – Nietzsche uses the verb 
‘sich ausdenken’ which can be translated as ‘to imagine’, ‘to dream up’, ‘contrive’, ‘invent’, 
‘think up.’ There is a clear emphasis on the role of imagination here: ‘he has conceived of 
the ‘evil enemy’, ‘the evil one’ as a basic idea to which he now thinks up a copy and 
counterpart’, the ‘good one’ – himself!’ (GM I:10).  In this way, the slave effectively dreams 
up heroes and villains, and in doing so creates an identity for himself – the wronged hero.  
Later in GM I:13 Nietzsche again uses sich ausdenken, suggesting that the slave comes up 
with the notions of good and evil which correspond to these heroes and villains: ‘of good 
as thought up by the man of ressentiment [sich ausgedacht hat].’ Here Nietzsche suggests 
that the slave constructs his own inner world complete with value systems.  
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One term which reinforces the idea that the ressentiment subjects make use of their 
imaginative capacity is ‘Vorwand.’ Often translated as ‘pretext’, ‘Vorwand’ can also be 
rendered as ‘pretense’ or ‘make-believe.’ In GM III:15 Nietzsche claims that the 
ressentiment subject is ‘frighteningly willing and inventive [sind allesammt von einer 
entsetzlichen Bereitwilligkeit und Erfindsamkeit] in their pretexts for painful emotions.’ 
The mention of ‘Erfindsamkeit’ here is pertinent – someone who is ‘erfinderisch’ is 
creative, innovative, imaginative, and Nietzsche suggests that the slave meets these 
criteria- they mischaracterise present scenarios, imagining that they have been wronged 
or they mine their memories to look for ‘stories’ which will allow them to be suspicious, 
(or exercise other 'reactive' emotions), and view others as potential causes for their 
suffering. This is achieved through the use of narratives, none of which correspond to the 
actual states of affairs, but which are designed to alleviate his suffering:  
[T]he man of ressentiment is neither upright nor naïve, nor honest and straight 
with himself. His soul squints; his mind loves dark corners, secret paths and 
back-doors, everything secretive appeals to him as being his world, his security, 
his comfort.  
(GM I:10) 
Here, Nietzsche seems to suggest that the man of ressentiment is somewhat reality-
aversive, preferring to construct fantasies which will distract from the real state of affairs, 
and later in GM I:14 he even refers to them having a ‘phantasmagoria’ of ‘anticipated 
future bliss’ [ihre Phantasmagorie der vorweggenommenen zukünftigen Seligkeit].  
Nietzsche traces the propensity of the ressentiment subjects to generate these pretenses 
to the fact that they are fundamentally unhealthy:  
These worm-eaten physiological casualties are all men of ressentiment, a 
whole, vibrating realm of subterranean revenge, inexhaustible and insatiable 
in its eruptions against the happy, and likewise in masquerades of revenge and 
pretexts for revenge: when will they actually achieve their ultimate, finest, 
most sublime triumph of revenge?  





This link is important because it supports the idea that at no point are the original 
emotions actually changed or removed altogether from the subject’s psychology. If this 
were the case, it would suggest that the slaves would be far less sick and problematic than 
Nietzsche maintains: ‘the sickly are the greatest danger to man: not the wicked, not the 
‘beasts of prey’ (GM III:14). The very fact that the slaves utilise mechanisms such as self-
deception and ‘lie themselves into’ things as opposed to being ‘frank and confident’ with 
themselves as the nobles are - [während der vornehme Mensch vor sich selbst mit 
Vertrauen und Offenheit lebt] - is for Nietzsche, symptomatic of their sickliness.  
Despite their lies, the slaves remain ‘poisoned’ by their emotions. We can therefore see 
why, as Poellner makes clear (2004), no real transformation in kind occurs vis-a-vis these 
emotions, e.g. from hatred of the oppressors to love of equality:  
[I]t is quite clear that no transformation of this kind is supposed to occur in 
ressentiment. Rather, the original negative emotion towards a ‘not-self’ 
continues to motivate the subject, but it is ‘masked’, ‘counterfeited’, ‘lied into’ 
(umgelogen, GM I, 14) something it is not, namely, love of some putative good 
— humility, prudence, justice — for its own sake, and a consequent 
disapproval of moral ‘evil’.  
(2004:48) 
The emotions of anger, humiliation, hatred, envy, and crucially vengefulness therefore all 
remain in the ressentiment subject’s mental economy.  
How precisely do pretenses work to re-frame these emotions so that they are ‘lied into’ 
something they are not? I suggest that the process is twofold. The narratives constructed: 
1) provide the slaves with a weak grasp of concepts such as humility, thus addressing the 
concern Poellner raised regarding whether the slaves have any real acquaintance with 
the concepts needed to reinterpet their affective experiences, (we might think of passages 
from the Bible such as Chronicles 1. 7-12, 7.11-15 where we get narratives extolling 
humility), and 2) provide the slaves with a context in which their reactive emotions are 
deemed acceptable (for example, Ephesians 4:26-27).  
The imaginary simulation of revenge present in these narratives provide the slaves with 




than repress or remove emotions of hatred, anger, vengefulness. The combination of 
these two factors work to ease any cognitive dissonance for the slaves – they are able to 
reinterpret their emotions as justified, i.e. these are the emotions experienced by ‘the 
virtuous’ and ‘the blessed’ who have been wronged.  
In GM I:14 Nietzsche describes the slaves as self-styling themselves as ‘the blessed,’ who 
possess virtues of humility, compassion, patience and so on:  
[A]nd impotence which doesn’t retaliate is being turned into “goodness”; timid 
baseness is being turned into “humility”; submission to people one hates is 
being turned into “obedience” (actually towards someone who, they say, 
orders this submission – they call him God). The inoffensiveness of the 
weakling, the very cowardice with which he is richly endowed, his standing-
by-the-door, his inevitable position of having to wait, are all given good names 
such as “patience”, also known as the virtue; not-being-able-to-take-revenge is 
called not-wanting-to-take-revenge, it might even be forgiveness. 
(GM I:14) 
Effectively this role-playing provides the slaves with a (non-instantiated) and weak grasp 
of concepts such as humility. This character of the virtuous blessed individual is also 
echoed later in GM III:15 with mentions of ‘martyrs’ and a ‘saint’ who speaks ‘as meekly 
as a lamb’.  
Poellner’s concern was that the slaves did not possess any real acquaintance with 
concepts like humility, and that without this they would not be able to reinterpret their 
affective experiences. However, we may object that the notion of acquaintance Poellner 
is relying on here is too strong – it is not obvious that a weaker acquaintance would not 
be adequate for the slaves to reinterpret their emotions. It seems that the particular 
imagined narratives the slaves generate provide enough acquaintance, (albeit very 
weakly), with concepts like humility or patience, such that they are able to utilise these 
concepts to understand their emotions as those exhibited by the wronged, virtuous 
individual. Just as imaginatively make-believing or daydreaming that you have a pet 
unicorn or that you can fly, provides you with a weak and non-instantiated concept of 




patient provide you with a weak concept of these values even though they do not happen 
to be instantiated in real life.  
The other key effect of these narratives is that they provide an acceptable context for the 
slaves’ reactive emotions. Nietzsche provides us with a clear example of this in GM I:15 
with a passage from the ‘enraptured visionary’ [der entzückte Visionär] Tertullian’s De 
spectaculis. Nietzsche introduces the section by referencing Dante’s Inferno and 
suggesting that a more apt inscription to stand over the gateway to ‘Christian Paradise’ 
would be ‘Eternal hate created me as well.’ Here, we get a sense of the slave’s emotions 
playing an important role in structuring and creating their visions and ideals, as Nietzsche 
hints heavily that we ought to equate this ‘paradise’ with these emotions: ‘For what is the 
bliss of this Paradise? . . . We might have guessed already.’ Nietzsche then frames the 
Tertullian passage by placing it directly after a quotation from Aquinas’ Summa 
Theologica: ‘the blessed in the heavenly kingdom will see the torment of the damned so 
that they may even more thoroughly enjoy their blessedness’ –suggesting that we are 
about to see an instance of how the slaves gain relief and satisfaction through these 
imaginary narratives, and more precisely, narratives of revenge.  
The excerpt from Tertullian depicts a spectacle of torment of the damned with the faithful 
gleefully witnessing their persecutors’ punishment:  
At which one shall I gaze in wonder? At which shall I laugh? At which rejoice? 
At which exult, when I see so many great kings who were proclaimed to have 
been taken up into heaven, groaning in the deepest darkness together with 
those who claimed to have witnessed their apotheosis and with Jove himself.72  
(GM II:15) 
The descriptions become progressively more graphic: ‘and when I see those [provincial] 
governors, persecutors of the Lord’s name, melting in flames more savage than those with 
which they insolently raged against Christians!’ and sadistic: ‘then the tragic actors will 
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be easier to hear because they will be in better voice [i.e. screaming even louder] in their 
own tragedy. Then the actors of pantomime will be easy to recognize, being much more 
nimble than usual because of the fire.’ The direct reference to ‘the imagining spirit’ 
implies that it is through their imagination that the slaves will be able to exert power over 
their oppressors.  
This imagined scenario thus provides a cathartic outlet for the slaves’ feelings of 
vengefulness. They are able to execute strategies for revenge with great precision and 
detail, the possibilities for doing so are plentiful (Tertullian speaks of an ‘ample breadth 
of sights’ where each and every one of the persecutors is punished), and the timeframe – 
a ‘final and everlasting day of judgement’ ensures that this opportunity  for revenge is 
never exhausted.  
Vengefulness in particular is thus encouraged and facilitated in this narrative, alongside 
other reactive emotions of hatred, resentment, envy, and anger. Since the narrative is able 
to encompass the whole range of these reactive emotions, it emerges as a particularly 
effective means of reframing the slaves’ affective experiences. It seems that with the 
repeated mention of 'imaginary revenge' throughout the first essay, which is then writ 
large in the Tertullian passage, Nietzsche is outlining something close to fictional 
emotions. Though the narratives or pretexts which the slaves construct are imaginary, 
they still serve to elicit emotional responses and in doing so, provide the slaves with their 
'anaesthetic' for their suffering (GM I:10). These emotions are not repressed or removed, 
but instead expressed via these pretenses- in this way the narratives play a therapeutic 
role for the slaves.  
The combination of allowing the slaves to style themselves as ‘the virtuous’ whilst 
expressing their reactive emotions, particularly vengefulness, works to ease any 
cognitive dissonance in their psychology. Person-facing beliefs that we saw in [C] such as 
‘I am humble’ are able to co-exist alongside emotions of vengefulness, anger, hatred and 
so on, even when these are experienced as being of a high intensity, a high frequency, and 
a long duration by the subject. Pretense-states enable these self-deceptive beliefs to 
remain intact, and sincerely believed by the slaves. The modification of emotions like 




context where they are deemed to be justified: for this, the narrative element of a 
pretense is required. 
 It would be implausible to suggest that the ressentiment subjects are continuously 
engaged in these pretense-states (doing so would be tantamount to being delusional, and 
there is no textual evidence in the Genealogy for such a claim), but it seems that even 
occasional engagement in these pretenses could be sufficient to modify the subject’s 
psychology, and it does not seem to be a huge stretch to suggest that in instances where 
the slaves might be experiencing cognitive dissonance, they might be more likely to 




In conclusion, I have suggested that the self-deception we find in the Genealogy emerges 
as a case of self-regulation (in weak, sick individuals). With the examples of [A], [B], and 
[C] we have seen how the tension in the slaves’ psychology comes not from a conflict 
between belief-states, but rather from the presence of certain emotions (vengefulness in 
particular) experienced with a specific frequency/intensity/duration.  
I have suggested that the use of pretense-states provides the slaves with an acceptable 
outlet for their emotions such that they do not cause the kind of cognitive dissonance 
which may conflict with their self-deceptive beliefs. The pretense-states are able to 
achieve this thanks to their narrative richness, and as such, are more effective than, for 
example, additional belief-states in easing cognitive dissonance.  
Avoiding such cognitive dissonance is crucial for allowing the slaves to maintain a feeling 
of moral superiority over the nobles, and accordingly, to endure and prosper (as far as 
their circumstances permit). Self-deception in this scenario thus acts as a form of therapy 
for the slaves. In this way, we see how psychological self-regulation can involve capacities 
such as imagination, and that the kind of emotional simulation this provides, allows the 









When sketching a theory of a Nietzschean self, and how it might operate, one way to 
approach this might be to consider how such a self responds to, and copes in challenging 
contexts, i.e. how it self-regulates. Broadly construed, we can understand self-regulation 
as the maintenance or re-calibration of some kind of balance within the self, 
physiologically or psychologically, particularly in the face of adverse circumstances. 
Considering the operations of a self under this lens of self-regulation enables us to view 
the self, not as a static entity, but rather as something that is responsive and dynamic. 
Nietzsche himself speaks of an ‘instinct of self-restoration’ (EH ‘Why I am so Wise’ 2) – 
this seems to imply that the self has some ability to sustain itself and recuperate.  
How can we understand self-regulation on the Nietzschean picture? A first pass might be 
to consider whether it is reducible to other values such as strength or flourishing. 
Nietzsche frequently refers to, and praises these notions throughout his works (e.g. GM 
I:10), and it might seem that a self that can self-regulate is a self that is strong or a self 
that is flourishing. However, there are problems with this approach: by Nietzsche’s lights, 
both strength and flourishing are value-loaded terms, and discussions of these terms 
have a distinctly elitist flavour. Nietzsche seems adamant that not everyone is strong, for 
example differentiating between the weak herd and the strong artistic types, and he often 
seems to conceive of flourishing in a particularly narrow way; aligning this activity with 
artistic capacity, aesthetic excellence, and culture [Kultur] (‘The Greek State’). Self-
regulation, by contrast, seems to be something that everyone engages in (albeit, perhaps, 
to greater or lesser extents, and with more or less success). One obvious example would 
be the slaves in the Genealogy: these individuals self-regulate in that, through their self-
deceptions and pretense-states (see Chapter Four), they find some means of enduring 
their difficult circumstances. Although they self-regulate, Nietzsche by no means 
characterises the slaves as strong or as flourishing.  For this reason alone, at least, it seems 




The latter notions are presented as being commendable, and exceptional, whilst the 
former appears to be far more commonplace.  
How else might we then characterise self-regulation? The idea that an individual 
recalibrates and recuperates through self-regulation may lead us to align this activity 
with health. An ability to recover and convalesce after challenging periods would seem to 
be an important facet of health. We tend to think of a healthy individual as someone who 
is not only resistant to illness in the first place, but who, should they succumb to illness, 
has a propensity to regain their health quickly and easily. Understanding self-regulation 
in terms of health may then seem like a natural option.  
However, as I will argue, on the Nietzschean picture, self-regulation emerges as a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for his distinctive understanding of health, and that 
there are occasions where these notions come apart. The first section will review 
attempts made by commentators to understand Nietzsche’s concept of health, and use 
them to draw out some of the differences between health and the activity of self-
regulation. The second section will then use the example of the slaves in the Genealogy as 
a case-study of self-regulation to fine-tune this notion. Here we have a particularly 
complicated example in that these individuals seem to exhibit some of the marks of health 
observed in the first section, yet are classified by Nietzsche as fundamentally sick. For 
this reason, they present an especially interesting case of very efficient self-regulation, 
and demonstrate how this notion is a distinctive capacity in its own right.  
Triangulating self-regulation with health in this way will therefore enable us to begin to 
understand self-regulation as an independent notion, whilst also providing us with a 
more fine-grained understanding of Nietzschean health. We will see that there are 
various aspects of self-regulation which emerge, such as endurance, and efficiency, which 







5.1 Defining Health  
 
In order to understand how self-regulation and health may come apart, we must first 
begin by trying to understand what Nietzsche takes health to be. This section will review 
two approaches to defining Nietzsche’s concept of health. The first approach tries to 
understand health in terms of other Nietzschean notions (Letteri 1990; Neuhouser 
forthcoming), and the second approach makes reference to a) the arrangement of drives 
within the self, and b) the quality of these drives, i.e. whether an appropriate drive is in 
authority within the drive hierarchy (Huddleston 2017). I will then use these approaches 
to highlight some differences between health and self-regulation.  
The first thing to note is that Nietzsche’s understanding of health is complex: throughout 
his writings (but especially in his later works), Nietzsche appears to think in terms of 
‘healthy’ or ‘unhealthy’, applying these terms to entities as varied as individuals (GM II:15, 
EH ‘Why I am so wise’ 1), entire cultures (HAH I:224; A57), drives (GM III), values (TI 
‘Morality as Anti-Nature’ 4), and religions (A51; TI ‘Improvers of Humanity’ 3). The idea 
that ‘healthy’ is applied in all of these cases initially appears confusing - how are we to 
make sense of this term being applied to such diverse phenomena? One element of 
Nietzsche’s thought to keep in the background is his so-called ‘naturalism’, and his claim 
in BGE 230 to ‘translate man back into nature.’ With this in mind, we can begin to see how 
Nietzsche might place the physiological and psychological, i.e. components of a self, in 
some kind of continuum with, for example, the moral or the aesthetic. In this way, 
Nietzsche is introducing an idiosyncratic notion of health. 
In The Gay Science, we find Nietzsche’s most protracted discussion of health (GS 120; GS 
382) – this has been the main focus for many commentators (Letteri 1990). Here, 
Nietzsche addresses two questions: 1) whether it is even possible to define health and, 2) 
‘whether we can really dispense with illness?’ It is worth examining the first passage (GS 
120) in full: 
Health of the soul.- The popular medical formulation of morality that goes back 
to Ariston of Chios, "virtue is the health of the soul," would have to be changed 
to become useful, at least to read: “your virtue is the health of your soul.” For 




wretched failures. Even the determination of what is healthy for your body 
depends on your goal, your horizon, your energies, your impulses, your 
errors…and above all on the ideals and phantasms of your soul. Thus there are 
innumerable healths of the body; and the more we allow the unique and 
incomparable to raise its head again, and the more we abjure the dogma of the 
"equality of men”, the more must the concept of a normal health, along with a 
normal diet and the normal course of an illness, be abandoned by medical men. 
Only then would the time have come to reflect on the health and illness of the 
soul and to find the peculiar virtue of each man in the health of his soul. In one 
person, of course, this health could look like its opposite in another person. 
Finally, the great question would still remain whether we can really dispense 
with illness-even for the sake of our virtue and whether our thirst for 
knowledge and self-knowledge in particular does not require the sick soul as 
much as the healthy, and whether, in brief, the will to health alone, is not a 
prejudice, cowardice, and perhaps a bit of very subtle barbarism and 
backwardness. 
At a first pass, Nietzsche’s declaration that ‘there is no health as such, and all attempts to 
define a thing that way have been wretched failures’ may lead us to view any such project 
as fundamentally misguided. On closer inspection however, as Huddleston (2017) has 
convincingly argued, to read Nietzsche as denying there is a concept of health per se 
would be mistaken- instead his claim is:  
that the valence of particular characteristics will be different in different cases. 
We need to interpret these characteristics in the context of one another in 
order to determine whether they redound to health or not. What may be a 
detriment to overall health in the case of one person may be a boon to overall 
health in the case of another. As such, we cannot infer from particular marks 
(or symptoms), regarded in isolation, that a person is healthy (or sick). Holistic 
interrelation of these characteristics is crucial. 
(2017:137) 
In this way, the ‘anti-universalist tenor’ of this passage ‘is not inconsistent with their 
being a core notion of health, understood in a suitably general way’ (2017:137). This may 




one is a child may be different to what is ‘healthy’ when one is an adult cf. (KSA 9. 11 
[112]): one simple example of this is the number of hours of sleep required according to 
age.  
Read this way, it may then be tempting to collapse this notion of health into other 
concepts, and define various ‘healths’ as differing degrees of these concepts relative to 
the individual’s contexts. What kind of concepts might these be?  
The fact that Nietzsche immediately follows this claim by introducing the relation 
between health and illness, may lead us to focus on notions which would allow the 
individual to engage with this relation. These might be combative notions like 
‘overcoming’ or ‘struggle’ where illness is battled and dispensed with. Or the notions 
might be more recuperative like ‘reinterpretation’, where illness is transformed or 
accommodated for in some way. Letteri (1990) opts for the former approach, and argues 
that ‘for Nietzsche, health is essentially overcoming’ (1990:410). Letteri understands the 
notion of overcoming against the background of Nietzsche’s discussions of power, and 
argues that health as overcoming manifests against resistances or incapacities, i.e. illness. 
This interpretation, he maintains resists a ‘view of health as a pristine state of inertia, as 
mere lack of disturbance’ and instead proposes that ‘health is…not simply the absence of 
weakness: it is, rather, the free admission of weakness into an arena of struggle with the 
aim of conquering it and thereby becoming stronger’ (1990:411).  
However, aligning health solely with overcoming is problematic for three reasons. Firstly, 
there is a worry that the notion of overcoming is perhaps too crude vis-à-vis Nietzsche’s 
stance on sickness in GS 120. Given that Nietzsche often speaks of the value of suffering 
(BGE 225; GS 7; GS 13; GS 318; GS 325), it seems that he resists the idea that health should 
be defined as an absence of illness qua pain and suffering. (We should also note that not 
all forms of illness involve explicit experiences of pain, although they may involve 
degeneration or impairment e.g. a psychosis or dementia). There are also scenarios 
where pain serves as a useful warning sign to ensure we stay healthy: consider the case 
of a runner acknowledging that he should rest because of a twinge in his foot. Whilst he 
could keep running with reasonably minimal discomfort, this pain signals that to do so 
would cause complications further down the line. In this example pain actually helps us 




definitional opposite of illness and vice versa. In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche speaks of the 
usefulness of illness, and how it has enabled him to refine his perspectives and become 
healthier:  
To be able to look out from the optic of sickness towards healthier concepts 
and values, and again the other way around, to look down from the fullness and 
self-assurance of the rich life into the secret work of the instinct of decadence 
- that was my longest training, my genuine experience. 
‘Why I am so wise’ 2 
As Janaway (2017:80) notes, suffering can be useful to the sufferer in that by: 
undergoing particular sufferings’ they ‘may re-configure their attitudes in 
ways that are important to them. They may understand things differently, 
begin to feel different emotions, be released from feeling other emotions, 
change their self-conception, develop new capacities and find a meaning in the 
course of events or in their life as a whole.  
If we understand overcoming to be a case of eliminating illness (at least illness conceived 
of as pain and suffering) altogether, then this seems difficult to square with Nietzsche’s 
remarks on the usefulness of illness. It seems that on Letteri’s reading of overcoming, the 
idea is that illness is to be battled with before being eradicated – Nietzsche, however, 
seems to imply that there is a value to illness other than the fact that it is something to be 
wrestled with. In this way, he offers an understanding of health that is more nuanced than 
the notion of normal functionality undisrupted by illness.  
Secondly, as Huddleston notes, we should resist placing too much weight on the 
characterisation of health as this idea of overcoming, and the agonistic relationship 
between health and illness should be restricted to what Nietzsche terms ‘the great health’ 
(GS 382):  
This form of health is closely bound up with sickness in that it is possible only 
through a certain overcoming of sickness. It is won through long, arduous 
struggle. As Nietzsche will put it, one does not just ‘have’ it, but ‘acquires it 
continually’ (GS 382). While it is important to bear this form of health in mind, 




true of all spiritual health, let alone of all health. This close constitutive 
dependence between health and the overcoming of sickness (physical and 
spiritual) is a feature of a particularly exalted kind of health; indeed, the very 
fact that Nietzsche marks the form of health off in this way, with the special 
adjective ‘great’, would suggest that not all health is like this.73 
Thirdly, I suggest that, as Nietzsche himself makes clear in Ecce Homo, the capacity to 
overcome illness is only possible if the individual is already fundamentally healthy:  
Something with a typically morbid nature cannot become healthy, much less 
make itself healthy; on the other hand, for something that is typically healthy, 
sickness can actually be an energetic stimulus to life, to being more alive.  
(EH ‘Why I am so wise’ 2) 
We also find this thought in The Wagner Case: ‘sickness can itself be a stimulus of life: it 
is just that you have to be healthy enough for this stimulus!’ (WC: 5). To define health as 
essentially overcoming, as Letteri does, misses the mark somewhat. If, as Nietzsche states, 
you can only exercise this capacity to overcome illness, if you are already healthy, then it 
is not obvious that we should equate these two things. Health might be a necessary 
condition for the capacity to overcome illness, but this can imply that it is something over 
and above the capacity: overcoming is only part of the story. For example, in physiological 
terms, we might think of how someone with a strong immune system does not succumb 
to a winter flu – the virus enters their system, but because they are already healthy, their 
immune system is able to defeat or ‘overcome’ the virus. It seems we would want to say 
here that there is something about their immune system other than its ability to defeat 
the virus that designates it as healthy. Overcoming is certainly part of the story but there 
are other definable, more specific features we would want to refer to when explaining 
why that person is healthy.  
                                                        
 
73 cf. ‘Health and sickliness: be careful! The yardstick remains the body's efflorescence, the mind's elasticity, 
courage and cheerfulness - but also, of course, how much sickliness it can take upon itself and overcome - 
can make healthy. What would destroy more tender men is one of the stimulants of great health.’ (Notebook  





So, it seems that health as ‘overcoming’ or ‘struggle’ may not get us very far in defining 
Nietzschean health. Which other notions might be employed? One characteristic which 
Neuhouser (forthcoming) draws our attention to, is the notion of interpretation. When 
discussing Nietzsche’s concept of biological health, Neuhouser beings by appealing to 
Nietzsche’s ideas of power and life. (We should note that, as I will discuss in the final 
section of this chapter, it is not always obvious that Nietzsche’s concept of health maps 
neatly on to life). Neuhouser suggests that life’s aim is the process of continually striving 
to create conditions for discharging power: ‘Nietzsche characterises life – animated by a 
will to life (Lebenswille)- as a series of activities that aims not primarily at self-
maintenance or reproduction but at power – at creating ever “greater units of power”, 
and maintains that illness is thus understood as impeding this particular function: ‘illness 
involves some disturbance in, or blocking of, life’s characteristic activity of creating ever 
more powerful configurations of life’ (forthcoming:4). How then does this function of life 
operate? Neuhouser suggests that we can understand this function as interpretation, i.e. 
the assigning of meaning to seemingly ‘random, unconnected, “meaningless” 
happenings’: 
[T]o interpret, then – to give something a meaning – is to impose a function on 
what at first is merely ‘there’ by incorporating it into a system of purposeful 
activities such that it comes to serve an end of the organism as whole. 
(forthcoming:4) 
and he draws upon the following quotation from the Genealogy to support this claim:  
every happening in the organic world is an overpowering, a mastering, and 
every overpowering….is itself a re-interpreting, a fitting into place, in which 
previous ‘meaning’ and ‘purpose’ must be obscured…or extinguished. 
(GM II:12) 
Health thus consists in an ‘order-imposing function’, which can be reduced to this activity 
of interpreting. Neuhouser unpacks this idea at the level of the drives:  
[A] hierarchical organisation in which higher (or “nobler”) functions rule over 




purposefully ordered whole – into, in other words, an organism, in which 
specialised functions work together to further the vital ends of the whole. 
(forthcoming:5) 
The idea here seems to be that the drives will interpret events and experiences they 
encounter by imposing an order or meaning upon them, bringing them into the hierarchy, 
such that the individual is able to continue to discharge power. Neuhouser does not give 
a specific example of this but an obvious candidate to consider for this process would be 
the suffering which the ressentiment subjects encounter in the Genealogy. As a result of 
the political/social/material oppression the slaves and priests face, they experience a 
high degree of suffering which makes their situation seem irremediable and without 
hope. Nietzsche goes on to suggest that the brute fact of this suffering is not really the 
main problem: ‘what actually arouses indignation over suffering is not the suffering itself, 
but the senselessness of suffering’ (GM II:7) – it is the lack of meaning or purpose of the 
suffering that renders it intolerable:  
Man, the bravest animal and most prone to suffer, does not deny suffering as 
such: he wills it, he even seeks it out, provided he is shown a meaning for it, a 
purpose of suffering. The meaninglessness of suffering, not the suffering, was 
the curse that has so far blanketed mankind, – and the ascetic ideal offered man 
a meaning! 
(GM III:28) 
Before the ascetic ideal, the suffering of the slaves and priests appears as one of those 
‘random, unconnected, “meaningless” happenings’ which must be assigned some 
meaning or order for it to be rendered bearable. The ascetic ideal allows the ressentiment 
subjects to reinterpret their suffering as meaningful – it is now viewed as a consequence 
of sin (which can be cured), and is a necessary step to becoming ‘good’: 
 
Only those who suffer are good, only the poor, the powerless, the lowly are 
good; the suffering, the deprived, the sick, the ugly, are the only pious people, 




and powerful, you are eternally wicked, cruel, lustful, insatiate, godless, you 
will also be eternally wretched, cursed and damned! 
(GM I:7) 
Here we have a sophisticated example of how meaning is assigned to experiences in order 
to generate order. This activity allows the ressentiment subjects to endure their suffering, 
and to make sense of its presence within their mental economy. 
 What is puzzling, however, is that Neuhouser characterises illness as including 
characteristics of ‘powerlessness, passivity, reactivity, leadenness, and, perhaps most 
important, an incapacity to impose order, or meaning, on encountered realities’ 
(forthcoming:7). Whilst we can certainly attribute the majority of these characteristics to 
the ressentiment subjects, it does not seem as though the last characteristic is a good fit. 
These individuals seem particularly adept at imposing order and meaning onto their 
encountered realities, so much so that an entire framework of a morality system is 
generated. So, going by Neuhouser’s description of illness here, it looks like the 
ressentiment subjects do meet this condition of health, namely reinterpretation and 
order-imposing function.74 Yet Nietzsche persistently refers to them as ‘sick.’  
One option might be to invoke the idea that there are degrees of health (and illness), and 
that the ressentiment subjects merely possess a very low degree of health – they still 
exhibit some capacity to interpret and impose order. However, this approach does justice 
neither to the level of sophistication of their interpretation and order-imposition (as 
noted above), nor to the force of Nietzsche’s descriptions of the ressentiment subject’s 
sickness- he seems to view them as essentially sick (GM III:14; GM III:15) – the use of the 
definite article in these passages ‘the sick’ [die Kranken] implies that this is their defining 
characteristic, and that there is no modicum of health present. This is further reinforced 
                                                        
 
74 When Neuhouser surveys the ressentiment subject’s ‘illness’ he points to four factors: 1) a measureless 
drive to make oneself suffer, 2) mendacity, 3) a lack of self-affirmation, and 4) a self-undermining dynamic 
present in the ascetic ideal. Without going into further discussion on these four characteristics, we may 
note that no reference is made here regarding the ressentiment subject’s capacity to interpret and impose 




by the fact that Nietzsche utilises a cautionary tone here, suggesting there is a danger of 
‘infection’:  
The sick are the greatest danger for the healthy…. The sickly are the greatest 
danger to man: not the wicked, not the ‘beasts of prey’. Those who, from the 
start, are the unfortunate, the downtrodden, the broken – these are the ones, 
the weakest, who most undermine life amongst men, who introduce the 
deadliest poison and scepticism into our trust in life, in man, in ourselves. 
(GM III:14) 
Reducing health to interpretation therefore looks problematic when we consider this 
case in the Genealogy. It seems here that the ressentiment subjects meet the criterion of 
interpretation (even if they do not possess other marks of health). The reinterpretations 
they produce are sophisticated: they succeed in creating an entirely new valuation system 
which eventually supplants the previous moral system of the nobles. It is worth noting 
that the ressentiment subjects in fact display far more proficiency in interpretation than 
the nobles. As Nietzsche makes clear, the nobles are relatively unreflective agents and 
their health consists in their physicality: 
The chivalric-aristocratic value judgments are based on a powerful physicality, 
a blossoming, rich, even effervescent good health that includes the things 
needed to maintain it, war, adventure, hunting, dancing, jousting and 
everything else that contains strong, free, happy action. 
(GM I:7) 
We get the sense that, as Ansell-Pearson suggests, the nobles merely live ‘a life of 
immediate physical self-affirmation’ (2007: xxi), unconstrained and uninhibited in their 
agency – there seems to be very little need for them to reinterpret and give meaning to 
any challenging experiences they encounter. For all intents and purposes, the nobles have 
free rein. The ressentiment subjects however are forced to utilise their capacity for 
interpretation. By Neuhouser’s suggestion, this should mean that they are exhibiting an 
important mark of health yet Nietzsche is adamant that these individuals are pathological 




works, (it is something which he himself professes to engage in), it seems that we cannot 
confine this activity to the healthy, given the cases cited in the Genealogy.  
Let us take stock of what we have learnt so far about health with this approach of aligning 
health with broader Nietzschean concepts. It seems that this method of defining health 
has certain shortcomings: firstly, it can make it unclear exactly what work the concept 
health here is doing, and secondly, it often shows that the concept health and these other 
notions of overcoming and interpretation can come apart.  These broader concepts 
receive attention on their own merit in Nietzsche’s works, in varying guises, including 
contexts where references to health do not feature. This approach is perhaps a result of 
focusing on passages where Nietzsche discusses health in abstract terms (as in The Gay 
Science passages). We need only consult the distinct case-studies in which health is a clear 
concern, such as the slaves and the priests in the Genealogy, to see that we ought to be 
cautious about merely reducing health to other concepts, and that cases of health can be 
nuanced. This is not to say that the concept health cannot overlap with these other 
notions, but rather that we should note that it seems Nietzsche does not merely use the 
term ‘health’ as a substitute for these notions.  
How else might we attempt to define Nietzschean health? Rather than reducing health to 
other concepts, which appears to be too broad an approach, we could refer directly to the 
mental apparatus in the self. Given that Nietzsche provides us with a detailed 
philosophical psychology, it seems that this would be a good starting point to think about 
health and to assess how this might be understood at the level of the activities of the 
drives and affects. One way of exploring this approach would be to adopt, as Huddleston 
(2017) calls it, a ‘formal and dynamic approach’ where the aim is to ‘understand health 
in fundamentally descriptive (as opposed to normative) terms and to have the key 
descriptive properties be formal and dynamic ones concerning the strength and 
interrelation of the drives’ (2017:151). Here the focus is on the arrangement of the drives 
within the self. For example, accounts might focus on the extent to which drives are 
unified or integrated, or whether there is a strong dominant master drive ruling over the 
hierarchy and so on.  
However, Huddleston argues against defining health solely in formal and dynamic terms, 




which Nietzsche himself emphasises are unhealthy, e.g. Socrates in Twilight of the Idols. 
In this example, (as Nietzsche characterises him) Socrates has a strong master drive (in 
this case reason) which strives to co-opts other drives towards its purpose: ‘he is 
seemingly doing what the formal and dynamic account would prize as characteristic of 
health. Socrates has a strong master drive (viz., reason) which rules over his other drives’ 
(2017:155).  Given that in this work Nietzsche describes Socrates in very negative terms 
–presenting him as pathological and referring to reason as a ‘tyrant’ (TI ‘Socrates’ 11), the 
idea that according to the formal and dynamic account, Socrates is meeting a criterion of 
health, seems troublesome. So long as there is an adequately strong dominant master 
drive in the hierarchy, an individual can be termed healthy on these formal and dynamic 
accounts: ‘one can live up to these standards, and still be pathological, in virtue of the 
quality of the drive that is dominant’ (2017:156).  
As a result of this concern, Huddleston suggests that we ought to supplement such 
accounts with normative considerations, i.e. to assess whether the right kind of drive is 
in charge: ‘the core concept of Nietzschean health is not fully explicable except by 
reference to substantive normative terms. It matters not only that the drives are powerful 
and unified. It matters in addition what drives are regnant, and whether (by Nietzsche’s 
lights) those drives are worthwhile and whether they ought to be regnant’ (2017:136). 
We therefore ought to focus on ‘the quality of particular drives in the self and the worth 
of their aims’ (2017:136), and supplement any formal and dynamic accounts accordingly, 
otherwise we will fail to capture the central marks of Nietzschean health.   
Huddleston emphasises the idea that it matters which drives exhibit strength and 
authority in the hierarchy– whether those drives are appropriate rulers within the self, 
and whether their aims are worthy. With regards to the example of Socrates, the problem 
here is that reason, according to Nietzsche, is not suited to be in authority of the hierarchy 
of drives:  
 
When Nietzsche claims that reason is made ‘a tyrant’ in the case of Socrates, 
the problem is not that reason is an ineffective ruler. It is that reason is 




tyrants may get their way, but the important point is that they shouldn’t get 
their way. 
(2017:156) 
The fact that reason was strong and effective enough to overpower the ‘anarchy of the 
instincts’ in Socrates does not indicate that he was healthy: reason still remains an 
inappropriate ruler. Huddleston argues that this kind of normative judgement regarding 
whether the drive in charge should be in that position, is crucial if we wish to avoid 
miscategorising individuals as healthy or unhealthy. In maintaining that ‘we do better to 
think of Nietzschean health in terms of a cluster of characteristic features’ Huddleston 
seems to advocate acknowledging this normative dimension of the formal and dynamic 
accounts whilst also bearing in mind central marks of health such as ‘resilience, 
discipline, vitality, a certain positive condition of the will to power, a certain tendency 
toward integration’ (2017:136).  
In this way, Huddleston argues that in order to begin to understand Nietzsche’s concept 
of health, we need to move beyond a formal and dynamic account which is concerned 
with the arrangements of the drives and to instead consider the normative dimension of 
the formal and dynamic accounts, i.e. precisely which drives are in charge, and whether 
they are appropriate ‘rulers’.  
What does this account tell us about health? One consequence, is that there is an emphasis 
on the drive constitution of the individual rather than basic environmental factors,75and 
the implication seems to be that the health of an individual is relatively fixed. To go back 
to the example of Socrates: even if he places himself within a context conducive to his 
health (in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche discusses the importance of the appropriate nutrition 
and climate), and bearing in mind that what is healthy will vary according to different 
individuals, we get the sense that he cannot be classed as essentially healthy on this 
normative account in virtue of his drive constitution, i.e. an inappropriate ruler – reason- 
                                                        
 





is in authority. Unless he changes his drive constitution in some significant way, Socrates 
will remain, in some sense, fundamentally sick: ‘Socrates is among Nietzsche’s paradigm 
cases of a sick, decadent person’ (Huddleston: 2017:154).   
If this sickness comes down to drive constitution, it is not obvious how one would go 
about changing or ‘curing’ themselves. Although Nietzsche gives some indication that we 
may try to deaden or eliminate drives (D 109; GS 290), it seems that a master drive will 
be especially strong and resistant to such procedures. Moreover, before attempting to 
deaden or eradicate a drive, there must be some recognition by the individual that this 
drive ought to be removed. Huddleston states that ‘it matters whether the part (or drive) 
actually is worth retaining (in its present or transmuted form)’ (2017:158). But this 
implies that the individual is able to assess the normative worth of their drives. We can 
envisage certain scenarios where this is feasible, for example an individual recognising 
that their drive to aggression is too prevalent and needs to be mitigated or removed 
(perhaps they come to realise this by observing external consequences, e.g. getting fired 
from their job due to being overly aggressive and confrontational in their interactions). 
In such a case, we can see how someone would be able to evaluate the worth of this drive 
and decide to work to remove it. In the case of Socrates, by contrast, it looks as though 
Socrates will deem a drive to reason as admirable and worth retaining. In this way, it 
seems that Socrates will remain ‘sick’ since there is an inability to self-correct, as it were. 
The possibility of amelioration or recovery from this sickness thus appears to be ruled 
out.  
With regards to the slaves in the Genealogy, Huddleston’s account is helpful in 
illuminating why they are classified as fundamentally sick. We get the sense that their 
sickness is due to their essential constitution, and that they are unable to do anything to 
alter this:  
Those who, from the start, are the unfortunate, the downtrodden, the broken 
– these are the ones, the weakest, who most undermine life amongst men, who 
introduce the deadliest poison and scepticism into our trust in life, in man, in 
ourselves. Where can we escape the surreptitious glance imparting a deep 
sadness, the backward glance of the born misfit revealing how such a man 




person!’ is what this glance sighs: ‘but there’s no hope of that. I am who I am: 
how could I get away from myself? And oh – I’m fed up with myself!’ . . .  
(GM III:14) 
So how exactly is the arrangement of their drives constituted? Given the palpability of 
emotions like vengefulness, envy, and hatred (see Chapter Four), it seems plausible to say 
that the drive to ressentiment (particularly in carrying out the so-called slave-revolt), 
dominates the drive hierarchy. Ressentiment is presented as characteristic of the slaves: 
Nietzsche repeatedly makes reference to ‘the entrenched hatred and revenge of the 
powerless man’ (GM I:10 cf. GM I:14; GM III:14), and ridicules the slaves for their inability 
to exercise this drive in physical form as the nobles would do: ‘when ressentiment does 
occur in the noble man himself, it is consumed and exhausted in an immediate reaction, 
and therefore it does not poison’(GM I:10). The physical weakness of the slaves however, 
does not prevent their drive to revenge operating: they are able to exact an ‘imaginary 
revenge’ (GM I:10), which is achieved via self-deception. A drive to ressentiment is much 
maligned by Nietzsche- it is a mark of reactivity and weakness rather than activity and 
strength. The idea of this drive reigning in the drive hierarchy is therefore seen as a 
definitive indication of sickness.  
The fact that this drive to ressentiment reigns in the hierarchy dictates that the slaves are 
sick no matter what other drive activity they display. Nietzsche presents the slaves’ self-
deception as the defining activity of these individuals: this phenomenon is central to the 
slave revolt in morality, and gives a good indication of what else is going on in their drive 
hierarchy. It is interesting to note that in generating their self-deceptions, the slaves in 
fact exhibit some admirable traits, specifically regarding their drive to artistic creation.  
In Chapter Four, I argued that a key component of this ‘sublime self-deception’ is a 
pretense mechanism which is deployed in order to avoid cognitive dissonance (brought 
about by the conflict between the subjects’ emotions of, for example, vengefulness, and 
their person-facing self-deceptive beliefs such as ‘I am humble’). Such cognitive 
dissonance runs the risk of undermining the subject’s self-deception. Intermediary states 
like pretense-states work to re-frame the subject’s emotions via imagined narratives (cf. 
GM I:15), thus easing the cognitive dissonance that might be experienced. In this way, 




context – this emotional simulation which the narratives provide generate this ‘imaginary 
revenge’ (GM I:10), and allows their self-deceptive person-facing beliefs to remain intact. 
In other words, the subject is able to experience feelings of vengefulness whilst also still 
believing that they are meek and mild. 
If, as I have argued these pretense-states occupy this role in the slave’s mental economy, 
then this implies that the drive to creativity is particularly active and strong. From 
Nietzsche’s descriptions of the slaves, he is careful to stress their creativity (GM I:10; GM 
III:15; GM III:20), and emphasises their imaginative capacity (see Chapter Four). The 
narratives they construct, as seen in the Tertullian passage (GM I: 15) are sophisticated, 
rich, and fantastical with vivid descriptions that are effective in provoking emotional 
responses. Such narratives require a high degree of artistry – these are not just simple 
stories which link up happenings in uninteresting ways. It therefore seems highly 
plausible that a drive to creativity is in operation here.  
Huddleston has emphasised the idea the importance of the quality of drives and the 
worth of their aims. It seems like a drive to creativity fits this idea of an appropriate drive 
- Nietzsche is consistently committed to the notion of creativity across his works (e.g. BT, 
GS). Moreover, in GS 299 he is especially concerned with the question of ‘how to make 
things beautiful, attractive, desirable for ourselves when they are not’, i.e. what kind of 
aim this particular drive might have. He praises artists for teaching us the following 
lesson:  
Only they have taught us the art of viewing ourselves as heroes-from a distance 
and, as it were, simplified and transfigured-the art of staging and watching 
ourselves. Only in this way can we deal with some base details in ourselves. 
(GS 78) 
What is interesting to note is that this seems to be precisely what the ressentiment subject 
is doing with his pretense-states. The narratives involve the subjects viewing themselves 
as the heroes of the story: ‘he has conceived of the ‘evil enemy’, ‘the evil one’ as a basic 
idea to which he now thinks up a copy and counterpart’, the ‘good one’ – himself!’ (GM 
I:10).  Specifically, as I have discussed in Chapter Four, the ressentiment subject sees 




detail’ – to be validated. This is achieved through narratives, which stage these hero 
characters, simultaneously providing the ressentiment subjects with distance from their 
own realities and allowing them to engage with their emotions of vengefulness. It seems 
like this is a good candidate for what Nietzsche describes in GS 78.  In this way, it looks as 
though the drive to creativity is playing a substantial role in the ressentiment subject’s 
mental economy- it is called upon to generate these pretense-states, which work to 
safeguard their self-deceptions, and allow acceptable outlets for their ‘base details.’ 
Without the operations of this drive, the ressentiment subject might experience cognitive 
dissonance, and the self-deceptions which are required to enable them to endure their 
unfortunate conditions, are at risk of collapsing.  
With this example of the pretense-states, at least, it seems that the slaves present a certain 
degree of commendable and perhaps even healthy drive activity: a valuable drive (the 
drive to creativity) with a worthy aim (reinterpreting or transfiguring certain aspects of 
the subject, i.e. the emotion of vengefulness) ranks highly in the hierarchy. Nevertheless, 
the fact that the drive to creativity has ultimately been co-opted by the reigning drive to 
ressentiment means that the slaves remain essentially sick.  
This section has reviewed two different approaches to defining health. In doing so, I 
suggest that the following distinction emerges – there are ways in which an individual 
can persevere and continue to manage themselves/ function in light of difficult 
circumstances that do not always coincide with health. In other words, it seems that from 
the above examples, individuals can self-regulate even in sickness. This suggests that self-
regulation may be a necessary condition for health but it is not a sufficient one. The next 
section will explore this distinction and attempt to outline some features of self-
regulation.  
 
5.2 Self-Regulation  
 
This section aims to outline aspects of self-regulation, and to show how it can come apart 
from health. I will examine cases of self-regulation in both, according to Nietzsche, sick 




An initial objection may be that the idea that someone self-regulates in sickness does not 
seem very plausible: initially it may seem difficult to put these things together – we may 
be accustomed to thinking that a healthy person is someone who is good at self-
regulating, i.e. they are able to adapt quickly to their environment, and process 
experiences to maintain functional efficiency and overall physiological and/or 
psychological integrity.  
However, a few examples may help show that it is not only healthy individuals who self-
regulate, and that illness does not necessarily amount to an inability to engage in the 
process. Consider the case of a high-functioning alcoholic: the general consensus is that 
addiction is a form of illness, and that no matter how well-functioning the addict, this 
dependency is seen as a departure from health. Quite often, (high-functioning) alcoholics 
are able to maintain professional and personal lives, and do not use alcohol to achieve a 
state of inebriation, but rather to maintain a state of equilibrium. In other words, self-
regulation manifests as a particular dependency, and the alcoholic drinks to maintain a 
psychological balance (and sometimes even a physiological balance – take, for example, 
delirium tremens which would mean that a surgeon would have to drink in order to avoid 
shaking hands). Other examples might be a patient suffering from motivation or 
defensive delusions, where these delusions arise as a result of the individual struggling 
to cope in some way, e.g. self-esteem issues, and cause the individual to view other people 
as responsible for their own difficulties. Or we might think of the confabulations of an 
amnesiac, who unwittingly falsifies memories in order to compensate for a lack of or a 
break in personal identity. With these examples, we can see that self-regulatory 
mechanisms, are evident in individuals who are in some way unwell or have impaired 
capacities.  
I suggest that in the Genealogy, we find a clear case of self-regulation in sickness. As 
previously noted, Nietzsche is unambiguous about the state of the ressentiment subjects’ 
health – they are fundamentally sick (GM I:6; GM III: 14, GM III:15). This illness is 
described in both physiological and ‘spiritual’ terms, and in passages like GM I:6 there is 
the suggestion that these two kinds of complaints can run alongside each other, or are 




From the very beginning, there has been something unhealthy about these 
priestly aristocracies and in the customs dominant there, which are turned 
away from action and are partly brooding and partly emotionally explosive, 
resulting in the almost inevitable bowel complaints and neurasthenia which 
have plagued the clergy down the ages. 
(GM I:6) 
This illness of the ressentiment subject is juxtaposed against the ‘powerful physicality, 
blossoming, rich, even effervescent good health’ of the nobles (GM I:7). Given Nietzsche’s 
continued emphasis on the fact that the ressentiment subjects are essentially unhealthy, 
it seems vital that we incorporate this into any account of Nietzschean health, and 
accommodate the full force of these descriptions, i.e. moderating the category which the 
ressentiment subject falls under, from ‘fundamentally sick’ to ‘poor levels of health’ does 
not seem like an adequate move. 
The category of ressentiment subject can be delineated further into two specific sub-
types: the slaves and the priests. Both groups are, according to Nietzsche, essentially sick 
and both engage in self-regulatory processes. For the purposes of this chapter, however, 
I will focus on the self-regulation of the slaves. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, 
Nietzsche’s attitude towards the priest is somewhat ambivalent: at times, he even 
appears to admire the priest, referring to him as ‘the direction-changer of ressentiment’ 
(GM III:15), and ‘this real artist in feelings of guilt’ (GM III:20). Nietzsche acknowledges 
the ascetic priest’s intellect: ‘the greatest haters in world history, and the most intelligent 
[die geistreichsten Hasser], have always been priests: – nobody else’s intelligence [Geist] 
stands a chance against the intelligence [Geist] of priestly revenge’ (GM I: 7), and appears 
to be impressed by the priest’s stalwart dedication to his ideals:  
The ascetic priest not only rests his faith in that ideal, but his will, his power, 
his interest as well. His right to exist stands and falls with that ideal: hardly 
surprising, then, that we encounter a formidable opponent in him, providing, 






In this way, Nietzsche views the ascetic priest as a sophisticated paradigm of virile self-
domination, since it is clear that the priest is seeking power and mastery over himself and 
others. The priest is evidently successful in self-regulating in that he persists and even 
‘thrives’:  
Let us consider how regularly and universally the ascetic priest makes his 
appearance in almost any age; he does not belong to any race in particular; he 
thrives everywhere; he comes from every social class.   
(GM III:11) 
Thus, despite being an ‘apparent enemy of life, this negating one’ the priest ‘actually 
belongs to the really great conserving and yes-creating forces of life …’  (GM III:13). 
Although the priest engages in self-regulatory processes, the fact that Nietzsche displays 
an ambiguous attitude towards this type of individual brings in certain considerations 
which may confuse the point.  
Secondly, there is a tendency to view the slaves merely as tricked by the priest and thus 
as entirely passive individuals, blindly following the priest’s teachings. However, as I 
hope to have shown in Chapter Four, the slaves in fact engage in sophisticated self-
regulatory processes. Examining the slaves as a distinctive case of self-regulation will: (i) 
demonstrate that these individuals are more complicated than they may initially appear 
(in fact more complicated than the nobles), and (ii) bring out aspects of self-regulation 
we may not have noticed previously, showing crucial differences between this process 
and health.   
As highlighted in the previous section, the reason the slaves are sick is due to the 
constitution of their drives and the fact that a drive to ressentiment is dominant. In this 
section, we will explore the consequences of this, and map out how this affects the 
mechanisms deployed to self-regulate.  
The drive to ressentiment implies a certain dissatisfaction with oneself: as Huddleston 
notes ‘the unhealthy person will be unable to bear certain parts of himself, in part because 
he has not (and cannot) sublimate them adequately into the whole that he potentially is. 
Because he is so distasteful to himself, he will need to resort to certain forms of self-




kind of attitude towards themselves: ‘If only I were some other person!’ is what this 
glance sighs: ‘but there’s no hope of that. I am who I am: how could I get away from 
myself? And oh – I’m fed up with myself!’ …’ 
Here Huddleston implies that the activity of self-deception is not the preferred 
mechanism for processing content which the individual finds distasteful. If possible, this 
kind of material should either be incorporated or removed altogether. He refers to the 
following passage from The Gay Science:  
It is practiced by those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their 
nature and then fit them into an artistic plan until every one of them appears 
as art and reason and even weaknesses delight the eye. Here a large mass of 
second nature has been added; there a piece of original nature has been 
removed – both times through long practice and daily work at it. Here the ugly 
that could not be removed is concealed; there it has been reinterpreted and 
made sublime. Much that is vague and resisted shaping has been saved and 
exploited for distant views. 
(GS 290) 
In this way, Nietzsche suggests that material ought to be either incorporated via 
reinterpretation such that it is made ‘sublime’ or eradicated from the self. The slaves’ self-
deception, as I have understood it in Chapter Four, allows for neither possibility.  
Although, as I have suggested, this activity of self-deception can involve some admirable 
drive activity in that the drive to creativity is activated, this mechanism is not one which 
allows the subject to incorporate parts of himself into the ‘whole that he potentially is’. 
Nietzsche suggests that this idea of incorporation or integration can be achieved by 
‘concealing’ and ‘reinterpreting’.  
In Section One, when evaluating Neuhouser’s suggestion that health involves 
interpretation, I argued that from the example of the slaves, it is clear that this activity 
does not only belong to the province of health, since the slaves are able to assign meaning 
to their suffering via the ascetic ideal with great success. These fundamentally sick 
individuals practise interpretation with great proficiency, and it seems that this is 




assigning meaning and order to their experiences enables them to tolerate and endure 
their difficult circumstances. 
When it comes to their own emotions of hatred, vengefulness, and envy, however, the 
matter is entirely different. Whilst the slaves are able to interpret and incorporate their 
suffering effectively, they are only able to temporarily mask their emotions – the 
distasteful parts of themselves - via pretense. Interpretation occurs in so far as these 
emotions are reframed via narratives and transferred to and expressed in this more 
acceptable context. But they are not reinterpreted or modified into emotions of a different 
kind, and it seems that this level of reinterpretation would have to occur for this material 
to be fully integrated. The idea that the slaves remain so unhappy with themselves, 
suggests that this incorporation has not taken place. Moreover, these pretense-states are 
only temporary: as I emphasised in Chapter Four, to say that the slaves continually 
engage in them would be tantamount to delusion, and there is no textual evidence in the 
Genealogy for this phenomenon. Any ‘concealment’ or ‘reinterpretation’ the pretense-
states offer has a limited time-frame. I also argued that at no point is this negative 
affective content removed from the slaves’ mental economy: if this were the case, they 
would not be as sick as Nietzsche suggests. Instead these emotions continue to lurk in the 
slaves’ mental economy.  
The mechanism of self-deception enables the slaves to endure and self-regulate, in order 
to manage their emotions and their situation, but it does not lead to incorporation of the 
parts of themselves they find distasteful.  
Examining mechanisms of self-regulation in sick individuals brings the following features 
of self-regulation to light: (i) stability, endurance, or resilience, (ii) productivity and 
functional efficiency, and (iii) adaptivity. With the example of the slaves, their mechanism 
of pretense provides them not only with a means of tolerating their suffering, but also 
with a means of avoiding cognitive dissonance arising from tensions between their 
emotions and their self-deceptive beliefs. This ensures that the slaves are able to maintain 
a certain level of stability, in response to both their external circumstances, and the state 
of their inner world. The fact that the drive to creativity is implicated in this mechanism 
of self-deception means that the slaves, far from remaining inert, become very productive 




manner, and in this way at least, the slaves retain their functional efficiency. Finally, the 
slaves’ self-deception emerges as a sign of adaptivity to unusual and difficult 
circumstances – their pretenses and the resulting new value system answer to clear aims, 
i.e. exacting revenge on the nobles. They are not created for random effect but are 
designed to be responsive to a particular situation.  
In this way, self-regulation can occur very efficiently in cases where the individuals are 
sick. This is not a process which is restricted to the healthy as we may initially have 
thought. Moreover, it is evidence of the fact that individuals are to be conceived of as 
responsive and dynamic, and that even in sickness we possess ‘the active capacity to 
create, to transform or give new forms, and meanings to things, including ourselves’ 
(Janaway: 2017: 81).  This also gives us some indication of why Nietzsche finds ‘the sickly’ 
in the Genealogy so alarming: ‘the sick are the greatest danger for the healthy; harm 
comes to the strong not from the strongest but from the weakest. Do people realize this?’ 
(GM III:15). We might normally conflate sickness with an inability to self-regulate and 
survive: the idea here is that if a particular group is sick, then they are weak, and if they 
are weak, then they will die out. With the example of the ressentiment subjects, however, 
Nietzsche is keen to emphasise that this is not necessarily the case. These individuals, 
according to Nietzsche, are certainly weak in terms of their norms. But they emerge as 
surprisingly resilient and able to survive/persist: through mechanisms like self-
deception they are able to function efficiently. Moreover, the cautionary tone Nietzsche 
uses in places like GM III:15 implies that the sickly can infect and overthrow the healthy- 
we certainly see an instance of this in the idea that the morality of the nobles is displaced. 
The features of self-regulation which the slaves exhibit – stability, endurance or 
resilience, productivity and functional efficiency, and adaptivity are enough to ensure 
that these individuals survive.  
However, as noted in the example of the slaves, one further aspect of self-regulation is 
missing when we consider sick individuals - the idea of incorporation and psychological 
integrity. Nietzsche alludes to at least three methods by which incorporation can take 
place: via forgetting, through the use of (autobiographical) memory, and through the 




In Chapters Two and Three, I discussed the importance of forgetting and 
autobiographical memory as mechanisms of self-regulation. Forgetting allows the 
individual to ‘digest’ experiences and to dial down the negative affective valence 
associated with difficult experiences. In this way, space is cleared in the mental economy, 
and the health of the self is not only preserved but bolstered. Experiences are 
incorporated in so far as the useful components are taken in and made use of (as in the 
process of digestion and uptake of nutrients/expulsion of toxins). Autobiographical 
memory allows for events to be included in the narrative self, and in Chapter Three, I 
suggested that we can view Nietzsche constituting such a self through autobiographical 
memory in Ecce Homo. The interactions between the drives and autobiographical 
memory allow material to be incorporated into an emerging narrative which bolsters the 
well-being of the individual. In both cases, I have argued that neither forgetting nor the 
construction of a narrative self through autobiographical memory is to be understood as 
a form of whitewashing or censorship, but rather as a means of incorporation and 
integration of experiences into the self. Huddleston (2017) and Gemes (2009b) refer to a 
further method of integration or incorporation - Nietzsche’s notion of spiritualisation (TI 
‘Morality’ 3): here drives take on more refined, acceptable forms under the influence of 
other, stronger drives. The notion of incorporation and the ensuing psychological 
integrity seems pertinent for what Nietzsche describes in GS 290 and is one aspect of self-
regulation which does appear to coincide with health.   
Commentators such as Reginster (1997) have drawn attention to the importance of 
integrity within the self. Reginster argues that Nietzsche aligns this notion of integrity 
qua psychic harmony with nobility:  
The early noble's ''predominance did not lie mainly in physical strength but in 
strength of soul-they were more whole human beings" (BGE, 257). Strength of 
soul" and "wholeness" evoke a certain notion of integrity, which therefore 
stands out as a crucial feature of nobility of character. 
(1997: 298) 
Gemes (2009b) and Katsafanas (2011) also highlight the importance of integrity within 
the self (though they characterise this in different ways: Gemes understands integrity to 




consist in a unity between reflective and unreflective components in the mental 
economy). It seems like we can understand psychological integrity as a mark of health in 
that the individual does not experience any cognitive dissonance – this can be detrimental 
to a sense of self and agency, and well-being in general.  
 
The below table illustrates what we have learnt about self-regulation from the examples 
in this chapter.  
 
 
Self-regulation is a phenomenon which individuals can engage in to varying degrees. At a 
very basic level, it can involve our immediate contact with the world: we might think of 
Nietzsche’s example of forgetting as perceptual filtering with the example of the leaf in 
‘On Truth and Lies’. Here, too much perceptual data would be overwhelming for an 
individual and would not be processed in their mental economy. At a more sophisticated 
level, self-regulation can involve the processing of affective experiences (as we have seen 
in Chapters Two, Three, and Four), and this kind of self-regulation can occur in radically 












Interpretation Stability/Endurance/Resilience Forgetting 
Incorporation Productivity and Functional 
Efficiency 
Autobiographical Memory 








in more or less successful ways – success here can be understood as tantamount to 
survival.  
With regards to the relationship between health and self-regulation, the picture is 
complicated. The use of forgetting, autobiographical memory, and the process of 
spiritualisation are all generally aligned with health, and draw on each of the methods 
above: interpretation (e.g. autobiographical memory), extirpation (e.g. forgetting), and 
incorporation (e.g. spiritualisation). I have argued that self-deception is presented as a 
characteristic of sickness, but still very much belongs to the phenomenon of self-
regulation. The fact that the slaves survive through this successful mode of self-regulation 
has nothing to do with health.  
We have seen how self-regulation and health can come apart. Just because one is sick, 
does not mean that one does not self-regulate efficiently. We have seen this with the 
slaves in the Genealogy. On the flipside, just because one is healthy does not mean that 
one is self-regulating efficiently. An interesting example for the latter case is the nobles 
in the Genealogy. Nietzsche emphasises that these individuals are healthy (GM I:7; GM 
II:1) and through their capacity to forget they self-regulate. Nietzsche praises their use of 
this capacity to forget, and the implication is that this affords them with a sense of well-
being, self-esteem, and psychological integrity in general as they are not held back by 
negative affective material: ‘a man like this shakes from him, with one shrug, many worms 
which would have burrowed into another man’ (GM I:10). However, the fact that the 
nobles seem to rely on this particular method of self-regulation leaves them vulnerable: 
when confronted with the slave revolt, this group’s resilience and ability to adapt and 
survive is tested and found wanting. Forgetting does not appear to be particularly useful 
in dealing with the newly minted values of slave-morality and the intellectual agon of the 
priests, and the fact that the slave revolt exploits aspects of the nobles such as their drives 
to competition, or domination. There does not seem to be anything to ‘forget’ in 
particular.  
We might speculate that a potential means of combatting the slave revolt would be via 
further reinterpretation but it does not seem that the nobles opt for this: they do not 
create new values, reinterpret the slaves’ values, or engage in any kind of overhaul of 




their morality is displaced by the slave-morality.  In this way, the nobles’ self-regulation 
is somewhat fragile: they are unable to adapt even though they are ‘healthy’, since 
interpretation does not appear to be in their arsenal (Nietzsche seems to assign this 
capacity of interpretation to artistic or intellectual types- they nobles of the Genealogy are 
not presented as falling into either category). With this example of the nobles, we can see 
that interpretation is not always necessary for health, and that health does not always 
amount to resilience.  
I will conclude this section by briefly reflecting on the relationship between the concepts 
of self-regulation and health, and Nietzsche’s notion of life. Much like health, life is a 
concept to which Nietzsche frequently refers but never really clarifies. It is often 
presented as a normative concept like flourishing, and commentators (e.g. Neuhouser) 
have tended to align it with power. It may seem like a truism that health and life go hand 
but as we will see in this final example, this is not necessarily the case. In the third essay 
of the Genealogy, Nietzsche outlines the nature and function of the ascetic ideal of the 
priest and the slaves. Initially, as an ideal of self-abnegation and self-denial, the ascetic 
ideal may seem to operate against life. However, as Nietzsche makes clear, this particular 
ideal is ‘a trick for the preservation of life’ (GM III:13) and the priest is in fact, in the 
service of life: 
You take my meaning already: this ascetic priest, this apparent enemy of life, 
this negating one, – he actually belongs to the really great conserving and yes-
creating forces of life . . . His ‘no’ that he says to life brings a wealth of more 
tender ‘yeses’ [eine Fülle zarterer Ja’s (sic)] to light as though by magic; and 
even when he wounds himself, this master of destruction, self-destruction, – 
afterwards it is the wound itself that forces him to live ... 
(GM III:13) 
By utilising the ascetic ideal to propagate ideas of sin and guilt and thus provide meaning 
to the slaves’ suffering, the priest enables the slaves to continue living and directs them 
to ‘self-discipline, self-surveillance, and self-overcoming’ (GM III:16). Chapter Four 
discussed how the priest’s teachings inspire the pretense mechanisms used by the slaves 
in their self-deception, and that this emerges as a successful means of self-regulation. In 




healing instincts of a degenerating life, which uses every means to maintain itself and 
struggles for its existence’ (GM III:13). Nietzsche presents the priest as a resilient type: as 
previously noted, the priest self-regulates very efficiently or ‘thrives’ cf. GM III:11. Given 
that the priest is fundamentally sick however, we now have an example in which both life 
and self-regulation are present, but health is distinctly lacking. By setting life and health 
against the background of self-regulation, we can see how complicated the relationship 
between these concepts can be and that they do not necessarily map onto each other as 




In summary, by triangulating the notion of self-regulation with Nietzsche’s remarks on 
health, and the case-studies of health and sickness he provides in works like the 
Genealogy, we have been able to uncover key methods and characteristics of the self-
regulation process. Self-regulation emerges as a distinctive phenomenon in its own right 
which does not always coincide with instances of health. In this way, it appears as a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for health. We have also been able to establish that, 
when viewing individuals through this lens of self-regulation, Nietzsche’s concepts of life 
and health can also be independent of each other in cases like that of the ascetic priest 
and the slaves. The ‘instinct for self-restoration’ to which Nietzsche refers in Ecce Homo 
is therefore not restricted to the 'higher' types but appears to be more widespread and 












With this thesis, I hope to have proposed a new framework in which to explore some of 
Nietzsche’s remarks on the self.  I have characterised self-regulation as a phenomenon 
exhibited by all individuals, in various ways, and to differing degrees of efficiency and 
success, where success is understood as allowing the individual to survive, (and, in some 
cases, to flourish or prosper).  
Self-regulation has been understood as the maintenance of the individual’s psychological 
integrity in both a basic sense, i.e. everyday processing of experiences, and in more 
extreme cases, when the subject finds themselves in challenging or adverse 
circumstances. It is interesting to note that this process of self-regulation does not always 
coincide with health, as we may have originally assumed.  
I have also investigated how the process of self-regulation may provide the necessary 
conditions for individuals who (in Nietzsche’s eyes), are capable of the ‘higher’ activity of 
self-formation. We have seen that incorporation, in particular, emerges as a particular 
mode of self-regulation which would play a part in self-formation.  
I have examined components of the Nietzschean self beyond the drives and affects, how 
their functional profiles differ from the drives and affects, and the way in which these 
components interact with them. In this way, we have seen some of the richness and 
nuance of the philosophical psychology envisaged by Nietzsche.   
To close, I will offer some further lines of enquiry which this project has raised.  
So far, I have focused on examining processes which are not restricted to those whom 
Nietzsche terms ‘higher types’. I have looked at processes which can occur in ordinary 
individuals, and in those whom Nietzsche views as ‘weak’ or even ‘sick’. But what would 
self-regulation look like in Nietzsche’s higher, artistic individuals, for example Goethe? 
How might this differ from the ordinary case? The particular drive constitution in such 
types might dictate specific modes of self-regulation, beyond those explored in the thesis.  
A second, and related enquiry would be to ascertain what a sufficient condition(s) for 




the drive constitution required for self-formation. I have suggested that self-regulation is 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for the activity of self-formation. Further 
examination between higher level processes like artistic creation, and more basic 
regulatory procedures, may shed some light on what these sufficient conditions for self-
formation might be.  
Lastly, throughout the chapters, the term ‘capacity’ has been used. Forgetting, memory, 
and imagination (used in generating pretenses) have all been characterised as capacities. 
A further step would be to explore whether we can arrive at a unified notion of a capacity 
(as has been attempted with the notion of a ‘drive’ or ‘affect’), and to examine how such 
a structure would interact with other components of the self such as conscious willing, or 
the intellect.  
I hope to have shown ways in which we may supplement drive-theory accounts, and to 
suggest that the components of a Nietzschean self examined in this thesis illuminate how 
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